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1. "The most concerned ask today: 'How is man to be 
preserved?' But Zarathustra is the first and only 
one to ask: 'How is man to be 0 v e r com e ?'''* 
Introduction 
* "Thus Spoke Zarathustra" IV-On the Higher Man-3 
1 
Explanation of the footnote appara.tus: 
1. The passa.ges quoted from Nietzsche's untranslated Nachlass 
appear in the original German. 
2. Also quoted in German are passages from ~enschliches, Allzu-
!,enschliches, 1--10rgenrote and Die Geburt der Tragodie. 
3. All other quotations from Nietzsche' a works are from the 
translations cited in the bibliography. 
4. In the list of references at the end of each chapter each 
book is referred to by an abbreviation; the key to these 
abbreviations is found on p. 190 along with the bibliography. 
In addition, I abbreviated the titles of the chapters in 
Nietzsche's Ecce Hom~ by fOrming their acronyms. Thus, for 
instance, UEH ... WIASW 5" means: Ecce Homo, chapter entitled 
"Why I 8llIi so Wiseu , section 5. 
5. Among the references there are some whose source does not 
appear in the bibliography; the reason for this is that 
I took the quotations in question from photocopies I had made 
a long time ago without noting the particular edition I had 
been using. Thus, my chOice was either to exclude these 
quotations or to use them without being able to indicate the 
source completely; I chose the latter option. 
That this planet - considered not as a hunk of rock but as 
a multi-dimensional theatre" including sentience and reflection 
within which "the human condition" is merely a temporary 
viewpoint - is in the grip of certain cumulatively dangerous 
developments entering the world through the activities of man, 
but whose source or nature have not yet been called by their 
proper names, and which seem to be proceeding from no particular 
center of control, can hardly be doubted any longer. 
They are ubiquitous, intimate, intricate, but as yet 
inadequa tely identified processes, only incidentally physical, which, 
rather like a disease cutting across all boundaries of inner and 
outer, friend and foe, race and ideology, appear to be digesting 
both this planet and ourselves, both materially and psychically, 
so that they will likely leave nothing but exhausted matter, barren 
arrangements, and sense-less minds where once there had been 
countries and peoples and faiths 0 
Our squandering of the inherited capital, both biological 
and historical, is tremendous, and our sacrifices to the fierce 
gods of this age are bloodier than the Aztec ritual slaughters, 
and more astounding than the building of the pyramids. 
We are not the first, and will not be the last, to suspect, 
with shuddering dizziness, that humanity might not be in the best 
of hands - or minds. 
I 
We have perhaps reached a point where we are no longer 
certain that all human problems can be solved by technical skill, 
where a weariness of settling our disagreements through battles 
has stolen into us and a distrust of ideologies is dripping its 
cynical apathy into our hearts, where the promise of progress 
has lost its naive appeal, and where all criticism that stops at 
this or that culpable one leaves us cold, so that we wish to 
pause in our strivings in order to regain some clarity from so 
much confusion and noise of achievement. 
It is perhaps in such a moment that we begin to wonder. 
We wonder, for instance, whether it is really true that peace 
would reign on earth if only ••• armament •.• pollution •.• 
poverty ••• communism. Q. capitalism... crime national 
sovereignties ••. inequalities ••• had been got rid of. And 
in such a moment - it is an unlikely sort of moment, anyway -
we may even be willing to entertain a strange, but nevertheless 
obscurely, teasingly attractive thought about the nature of this 
whole amorphous-polymorphous unsatisfactoriness of our cursed-
beloved existence, our 'predicament': What if, so this playfully 
shocking thought whispers, our malaise is not at all due to a 
lack of the right values or our failure to strive for the right 
things, or the activities of some evil one{s)? What if - and 
now this thought becomes downright malicious - there is 
something profoundly unsound about this customarily ongoing 
existence itself? And what if our very customary strivings 
themselves, individual and collective, for desirable objects and 
states, and for the satisfaction of needs, as well as our 
faith that there are, somewhere in time or space or after-
time or other-space, truly good arrangements upon which we 
ought to fix our attention and which we ought to attain, -
what if even most of our well-intentioned customary strivings 
participate in a fatal character of unsoundness? 
Just as we normally presume to know what is good and 
what bad so we take for granted that we know what is health 
and what unhealth. Agreed that we do know unhealth in its 
most strikingly immediate forms, - yet it could be that our 
model of health has been crucially incomplete, missing a vital 
limb or two, as well as clumsily divided into physical and 
mental, so that what has 'been traditionally regarded as evil, 
sinful, wrong, or immoral would, according to a more complete 
model, be regarded rather as expressions of a truncated health 
or of outright diseases; - not, however, merely of bodily 
malfunctionings: for this reduction of ill to the corporeal is 
itself one typical strategy by that model of health whose 
inadequacy we are beginning to suspect. 
If at this stage of our musings we have not become 
impatient, irritated at such silly thoughts, it might occur to 
us that it is indeed true that if our entire customarily ongoing 
existence were somehow permeated by an unsoundness then 
this would have necessarily escaped our notice simply because 
we normally have no standpoint outside the total customary 
character of living, that is: because our very style of 
perception, the nature of our everyday transactions, our 
emotional receptivity, our method of diagnosing troubles, and our 
strategies for tackling problems, are themselves part and parcel 
of this customary dynamics of living, thus presupposing 
themselves and their total character as valid while systematically 
locating all possible causes of disturbance by means of, and 
therefore elsewhere than in this customary way of existence 
itself. 
It may be that while considering this unsettling 
possibility a vision like a daydream lights up for a moment, 
a vision, for instance, of the whole noisy world of man as 
if in truth asleep, and of 'man's movements as if directed, 
pushed, and knotted by invisible hands, mankind being an army 
of somnambulist soldiers fighting battles for unknown generals 
whose hypnotic orders permeate all communications, a world 
where superstition holds up a mask of science, and canonized 
violence calls it self justice. 
Perhaps the vision sharpens, showing our customary 
human existence to be a jungle of occult forces where speech 
is an incessant tumult of spell-binding and - wrangling, and 
black magic an everyday manner of transaction, where selves 
are rarer than diamonds but demon possession, ghost 
incarnations, automatisms, trance and out-of-the-body states 
are the norm, where perception is the way of living without 
seeing, and emotion the ability to go through life without 
feeling, an existence whose time is the denial of change, 
whose values are its way of doing without appreciation, and 
whose thoughts are its method of preventing thinking, a 
world where hardly anyone wills but most everyone is willed, 
- a world, in short, which is unspeakably remote, even in 
its most respected expressions, from that state of reason 
and enlightenment and humanity which precisely this ongoing 
customary existence ascribes to itself as a matter of course 
and in proud contrast to supposedly dark and barbaric ages 
of the past. 
Let this already sufficiently disquieting vision be 
punctuated by one last qu~stion: VVhat if precisely we who 
ha ve become futuristic - have no future, neither a physical 
nor a moral - spiritual one, - and perhaps not even a today? 
Indeed, the possibility might be less farfetched than 
we would like to admit to ourselves during our I sober' moments 
that the species "man", as well as the earth herself, could 
actually be ruined by the ravages worked through superstition. 
Perhaps it is by means of fables a.nd fairy-tales sooner 
than through statistics, computer models, or sociological 
analyses that we can abbreviate for our intelligent vision and 
emotional sensibilities the vital import of happenings on earth! 
But at this point in our musings we probably wish to pull 
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ourselves back from such foolish and disturbing daydreams, 
back into the real world. 'The real world'? The' real world' 
- that is, as perceived, as felt, interpreted, and lived in 
the customary way? Has perhaps a small, nagging doubt 
nestled in us: What if there really is something unsound about 
the whole customary dynamics of living, unsound despite and 
in the midst of, perhaps even because of, our best-intentioned 
strivings and proudest achievements, and unsound only 
incidentally at the physical plane (where it spreads out over 
the planet) but centrally stretching through all the dimensions 
of human existence~ 
What, then, do we mean by 'soundness'? This much 
is certain: the problem of /I soundness" is posed in contrast 
to the mythologies of sinfulness, the nightmares of guilt, 
the imperatives of wars and revolutions, the dreams of 
ideologies, the hrrsterias of religion, the orgies of moral 
rearmament, the battles of good and evil, - and the facile 
therapeutics of sociologies and psychiatries which derive their 
standards of norm and abnorm from the historical currencies 
of their time or from the unexamined ideals of their 
practitioners, and whose banner is 'adjustment' or 'increased 
efficiency' or 'maximization of happiness l or the 'development' 
of a 'self' whose nature - or non-nature - has never been 
effectively questioned. 
This does not seem to leave us with many alternative 
interpretations of 'soundness'. Our wondering about the 
soundness of the whole customary dynamics of living, even 
in most of its respected and acclaimed expressions, amounts, 
then, to wondering whether man - excepting, perhaps, a few 
known and unknown cases of health - has really entered 
into his right mind yet. 
To suspect the possibility of a decisive, under certain 
circumstances perhaps fatal, unsoundness permeating all 
aspects, indeed, the totality, of the customary dynamics 
of living, including most of its acclaimed heights, is not only 
an irreverent - some would call it 'cynical' - experiment 
sure to draw its 'reward' of sneers, cold scorn, and fury, 
but above all it is a difficult one. 
It is difficult for immediately upon its launching this 
experiment runs aground on two seemingly unsurmountable 
problems: For one, is it possible to call the total dy namics 
of ongoing human existence into question wi.thout already condemning 
it, without falling back into the pose of calling this world a 
swamp of sin, without poisoning one's everyday transactions 
by a sm oldering suspiciousness, cynicism, or methodical 
hypocrisy, - without, that is, developing an evil eye for this 
world? 
This could be called the ethical dilemma of the experiment. 
On the other hand, which standpoint could one possibly take 
in one's explorations that would not be already in the thrall -
grammatically, emotionally, transactionally, perceptually, 
conceptually - of just those everyday dynamics towards 
which one now wishes to become critical? Or could a measure 
of freedom from the distortion and finitude inherent in any 
standpoint be realized through a constant ranging over many 
standpoints? 
Therein consists the metaphysical dilemma of such an 
experiment. 
Having run aground on this twofold seemingly impossibility 
- this seeming self-contradictory presumptuousness - of an 
investigation into the essential soundness of the very 
customarily ongoing existence itself, we are stuck for the 
moment, and we take the opportunity to look around for a 
precedent. We examine tne titles of books by philosophers 
within the past hundred years: "Fear and Trembling", "The 
Crisis of European Sciences", "The Sickness unto Death", 
"Being and Nothingness", "Nausea", "Beyond Good and Evil", 
"The Question of Being", "Civilization and its Discontents", 
"Twilight of the Idols", "The Concept of Dread", "Sense and 
Nonsense", "Ressentiment", "One-dimensional Man". Clearly, 
the question of the soundness of the ongoing human enterprise 
as a whole has arrived in the Western hemisphere. If we add 
the growing literature of concern about our spontaneous 
mismanagement of the natural world within which we subsist, 
then we see that the problem, though only incidentally physical, 
/0 
has not only arrived but has already been explored in some 
of its more tangible ramifications. 
Foremost among the modern philosophers who both 
took notice of an all-pervasive and extremely serious malaise 
afflicting life in the Western hemisphere - then mainly in 
Europe, now in North America as well - and created diagnoses 
of their own are, of course, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, 
Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Sartre. I am deliberately 
omitting Marx from this list for he was much too rigidly 
committed to a naive, though complexely elaborated, polarized 
vision of man and history, - he was a master builder upon a 
fundament painfully vulnerable to even small amounts of 
scepsis and psychology - and true philosophical inquiry. 
As regards our present purpose, however, namely, 
that of getting a handle on the problem of the essential soundness 
of human existence as we know it, Nietzsche's thinking is 
distinguished among that of the other modern philosophers in 
several important ways. First, Nietzsche was a decisive 
influence on Heidegger and Sartre. Second, he gave the 
problem of the entire customary character of life (in Europe) 
more attention, pursued its ramifications more contin1tously, 
more widely and deeply, and exposed his whole self to its 
profoundly unsettling implications more courageously, than 
anyone else. Third, Nietzsche simply is the most radical and 
energetic sceptic in the history of Western philosophy since 
\I 
the Pyrrhonic sceptics, Montaigne notwithstanding, whom 
he loved and emulated-and outdistanced. Only Wittgenstein 
among the modern philosophers has a similar sceptical 
temperament, though his whole thinking is rather more 
narrow and lacks that ice-cold and white-hot explorative 
exuberance which drives Nietzsche to open up distances 
and abysses where Wittgenstein - and the others - still 
find grounds for faith. If we wish to be strict, Nietzsche 
is the only one who has actually subjected the entirety of 
our inherited existence to a scrutiny with regard to its 
soundness, including time, the religious need, grammar and 
logic, self, utility, egoism, causality, the existence of 
mankind, moral improvement, science, progress, the value 
of truth, and whatever el~e we chance to believe in. 
Fourth, Nietzsche's solution to the problem of the soundness 
of customary existence, his prescription for the malady as 
he diagnosed it, is bolder, and more original than the answers 
offered by the others: it is also more difficult to understand, 
and more interesting. 
I shall, therefore, seize upon Nietzsche's thought as 
the most important precedent and principal guide in our 
perplexity concerning the essential un-/ soundness of our 
customary existence. 
Although Nietzsche's philosophical investigations by no 
means took their point of departure from a focal concern for 
12. 
the essential soundness of customary existence, this question 
soon became a recurrent topic for his widely roaming 
observations. Already in 'Human, all too Hllman he had 
begun to trace a crucial link in everyday existence between 
the predominance of a morality of mores, for instance, on 
the one hand, and a basic character of unsoundness, on 
the other hand. So he wrote, ". • • the first experiment 
is • • • to see whether mankind can change itself from a 
1 
moral into a wise mankind." He also began to explore the 
possible shapes of a life without metaphysical verities, for 
they are "imaginations which originate only in errors of reason 
and deserve not satisfaction but destruction", and "philosophy 
can serve to ••• remove them; for they are acq~red, 
temporally limited needs which are based upon suppositions 
2 
contrary to science." Thus, "it is, according to historical 
probability, very well possible that man will some time 
become wholly and universally sceptical; the question will then 
be this: 
influence 
What form will human society take under the 
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of such a mode of thought?" 
His next book, The Dawn , subtitled "Thoughts about 
the moral prejudices", was already entirely devoted to exploring 
morality as a problem, even as possibly a factor in rather 
than a remedy for our malaise. 
In the following Joyous Wisdom , morality - "the 
4 
morality that is very prestigious nowadays" - and metaphysics 
emerged as the principal obstacles to man's 'becoming what 
he is', to man's coming into his own, - to man's being in 
his right mind. 
These preparatory raids into what had, until then, 
been philosophical no-man's-land culminate in I 2arathustra' 's 
devastating diagnosis of man's malaise: 
" 
do not believe those who speak to you of 
otherworldly hopes! Poison-mixers are they, whether they 
know it or not. Despisers of life are they, decaying and 
poisoned themselves, of whom the earth is wary: so let 
5 
them go." 
"It was suffering and incapacity that created all 
otherworlds - this and that brief madness of bliss which is 
experienced only by those who suffer most deeply. 
Weariness that wants to reach the ultimate with one 
leap, with one fatal leap, a poor ignorant weariness that 
does not want to want any more:, this created all gods 
6 
and afterworlds. II 
"Once the sin against God was the greatest sin; but 
God died and these sinners with him. To sin against the 
earth is now the most dreadful thing, and to esteem the 
entrails of the unknowable_ higher than the meaning of the 
7 
earth." 
And last,: 
" 
• whatever harm evil may do, the harm done by the 
good is the most harmful harm 0 00. The stupidity of the 
good is unfathomably cunning. .0. For the good are unable 
to create; they sacrifice the future to themselves 
- they crucify all man's future , The good have always 
8 
been the beginning of the end. /I 
With this merciless diagnosis, Nietzsche not only 
attacked the naive credibility of moral rearmaments, religious 
revivals, organizational improvements, and technical advancements 
as sound investments for modern hopes to improve man's 
lot, but he also shot a deadly arrow at the Achilles .... heel of 
socialism and other political or revolutionary reform programs, 
namely, at their naive faith, inasmuch lias they say and feel 
in their hearts, I We already know what is good and just, 
9 
and we have it too; woe unto those who still seek here!1I1 
Abandoning the traditional theological, metaphysical, 
epistemological, axiological, and political paradigms of accounting 
and prescribing for human existence, Nietzsche began to 
increasingly rely on medical metaphors and a pseudo-
physiological vocabulary to characterize the nature of the 
ongoing situation - and the task which man had to face up to. 
Man was not just abandoned by God, was not just 
ignorant and laboring under errors, was not just unhappy, 
or wicked, or ill-adjusted, - man was sick:" ••• man is ••• 
10 
the sick animal ••• II • 
But in Nietzsche's assessment of the situation 
IS 
confronting modern man this fact: that man was sick, meant 
something far more terrible than that which the ordinary 
understanding takes the fact of sickness to signify. VIlhen 
we think of someone as being sick we visualize this 'someone' 
as a sort of unchanging substratum who' has', or manifests, 
different properties at different times. Healing, according 
to this naive everyday model of thinking, consists in somehow 
removing the property of 'sickness' fr'om and restoring the 
property of 'health' to the unchanging substratum, namely, 
to 'the one who' is sick, or healthy, as the case may be. 
In Nietzsche's view, however, there is no unchanging substratum 
anywhere in this universe. Man, for instance, does not 
signify an unchanging entity which 'had' a history and which 
'experienced' the vicissitudes of life 0 Rather, if man is 
sick, and especially if man has been sick for a few centuries, 
then the situation is not just that of an unchanging substratum 
'man' having 'undergone' so many 'experiences' and having 
acquired the property of 'being sick', but is that of a sick 
type of man having ascended to dominanceo As Nietzsche 
saw it, 'man' always embodies his qualities, and his qualities 
are his embodiment; there is no separation between mind and 
body, or soul and body, - or health and body. 
Thus, in Nietzsche's diagnosis, the problem is not 
that an unchanging substratum 'man' has temporarily 
lb 
acquired the accidental quality of 'being sick', but, to 
put it most radically, that sickness has become man, that 
is, if we keep the language of substrata and external qualities, 
that the substratum has become sick (~ness) 0 Consequently, 
whatever (Western) 'man' does, thinks, believes, values, it 
is precisely a sick substratum that 'acquires' and 'sheds' 
all these external qualities. 
As if this were not a sufficiently shocking thought 
Nietzsche discovered a further consequence of sickness not 
being an external quality pertaining to an unchanging substratum 
but being the type, the substratum itself: "When a decadent 
type of man ascends to the rank of the highest type, this 
could only happen at the expense of its countertype, the type 
11 
of man that is strong and ,sure of life 0" That is, not 
only does 'man' signify the embodiment of an illness, but 
health, namely, the embodiment of health, has itself been 
reduced to a sur.bordinate, and despised, type. 
In short, according to Nietz'sche's understanding of the 
matter, health and sickness are not external, or accidental, 
qualities attaching to and detaching from an unchanging 
substra tum 'man' like clothes to and from a manikin, but are 
the very fact of man, more accurately, are the very fact, 
in each case, of a man. The fact which is signified by man 
changes in its entirety, though in many ways very subtly, 
when 'man' 'becomes' ill or healthy. Moreover, 'man' has, 
17 
actually, 'become' ill: "mankind itself has become mendacious 
and false down to its most fundamental instincts - to the 
point of worshipping the opposite values of those which 
alone would guarantee its he th, its future, the lofty 
12 
right to its future." 
Of course, that 'fact' of 'man' which has 'become' 
ill consists not so much in bodily features as in men's 
functioning: their emotions, their thinking, their believing, 
-their philosophizing. It is in respects such as these 
that men have become sick, have become sickness itself. 
It is precisely for this reason that moral restructurings, 
political reforms, technical advancements, and all the other 
devices of modern progressive civilization can do nothing to 
improve man's lot but have'to remain mere palliatives. 
At this point we are probably developing a sense for 
that unfamiliar complex of tasks and problems and possibilities 
which Nietzsche is referring to when he calls his "whole , 
Zara th ustra 13 ••• a dithyramb ••• on purity", when he 
calls Zarathustra "the act of a tremendous purification 
14 
and consecration of humanity," and when about the figure 
of Zarathustra himself, he says, "To understand this type, 
one must first become clear about his phySiological presupposition: 
14a 
this is what I call the great health (Gesundheit}". 
N ow we also understand why, "assuming one is a person, 
one necessarily also has the philosophy that belongs to that 
I~ 
person i but there is a big difference. In some it is their 
deprivations that philosophize; in others their riches and 
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strengths 0" Consequently, the philosophizings, valuations, 
beliefs, moralizings, and art of those in whom their deprivations 
became creative simply cannot be taken seriously. Therefore 
it is first with "supra-human well-being and benevolence 
(Wohlseins und Wohlwollens) that ••• great seriousness 
really begins, that the real question mark is posed for the 
first time, that the destiny of the soul changes ,,16 
According to this diagnosis, new moralities, technical 
advancements, and the other paraphernalia of 'progress l 
are simply so many ways of sidestepping the one task whose 
time has come: not just to 'become' healthy - for there is 
no 'one', no neutral substratum, 'who' could, like a manikin, 
exchange 'his' external qualities, exchange 'sick' for 'healthy' 
- but to become and to bring forth the man who is fit. 
Wherein does man's sickness consist - wherein does the 
sick man consist - according to Nietzsche? The nature of 
the sickness, or rather, the nature of the sick man, consists 
in a fundamentally false relationship to the way things truly 
are. The specific illness of the Western sick man , that is, 
of the Western false relationship to the truth of existence 
consists in Christianity, Nietzsche thought; Christianity -
'Platonism for the people
' 
- is that false relationship in that 
it is an anti-natural morality and an addiction to the I beyond'. 
Because man has become a false relationship, and thus has 
become a false order of values, Nietzsche calls for a 
"Transvaluation of all values: that is ••• for an act of 
supreme self-examination on the part of humanity. ,,17 This 
self-examination is, as we have seen, to be understood in 
analogy to the physician's examination of his patient! 
Insofar as all of Western man~ s reverences have been 
conditioned by this anti-natural morality and the metaphySic 
of the 'beyond', and insofar as through and in these 
reverences Western man has been sick, and insofar as his 
sickness is terminal, that is, insofar as he simply has no 
future in his sick state, namely, as the sickness he is, 
Western man is now confronted by the most "terrifying 
Either/Or:IEither abolish' your reverences or - yourselves!'" 
And, adds Nietzsche, "The latter would be nihilism; but would not 
18 
the former also be -nihilism?- This is our question mark. II 
Does this Either/Or seem familiar? It iS,though in a 
different formulation, that very same ethical and metaphysical 
dilemma upon which our musings ran aground just when we 
were about to launch into an experiment of questioning the 
soundness of the entire dynamics of our customary existence 
so far. 
In 2arathustra Nietzsche formulates his answer to 
that question mark, and to the malaise of Western man. 
More accurately, he formulates his name for his answer, 
20 
namely, "der Ubermensch", but the precise substance of 
that answer had not by any means become clear yet, so 
that Nietzsche continued to explore in a fabulous diversity 
of aphorisms and notes the subtleties and ramifications of 
that disease as well as of that health which in his view 
constitutes the single decisive alternative confronting humanity. 
Clearly, since there is no unchanging substratum 'man', 
the very fact, the very substance of man is continually 
being determined and re-determined by what we might in a 
large sense call 'political' events. In this sense Christianity, 
f or instance, was a decisive political event. Consequently, 
Nietzsche saw the task of health to be one not just for 
the individual but also, and perhaps more importantly, for 
whole peoples. Therefore,Nietzsche consistently explored 
the problems and possibilities of discipline and breeding and 
'great politics', the politics of determining the very fact and 
substance that 'man' is and will be. 
As we have said, Nietzsche was not ~lone among modern 
European philosophers in seeing himself as tackling a disease 
rather than a mere conundrum or challenge to knowledge or 
moral problems of the times. More recently, Wittgenstein 
19 
spoke of "philosophical illnesses". In his view, '!The 
philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment 
20 
of an illness. II 
For men like Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, 
2./ 
Heidegger, and Sartre the air.:l of philosophizing is no longer 
the production of an exhaustive account or systematic survey 
, 
of the world or of the faculty of reason, nor is i.t that of 
vindicating their own age, or showing the finger of God at 
work in the forces of history, or of issueing permanently 
binding ethical principles; they no longer believe that anything 
can be explained or exhaustively accounted for: "Del' ganzen 
modernen WeltanschauUllg liegt die Tauschung zugrunde, dass 
die sogenannten Naturgesetze die Erklarungen del' 
Naturerscheinungen seien. So bleiben sie bei etwas 
Unantastbarem stehen, wie die alteren bei Gott und dem 
21 
Schicksal." Consequently, the later Wittgenstein said 
that his own aim in philosophy was rather to flshe~-J the fly 
22 the way out of the fly-bottle." . Neither do these men 
believe in progress, or wish to tailor a creed for modern 
man to follow. Nietzsche even risks the guess that "what. 
was at stake in all philosophizing hitherto was not at all 
'truth''', that is, never was explanation, the vindication of 
God'S action in history, or the discovery of true ethical 
principles, but always was "something else - let us say, 
. 23 health, future, growth, power, hfe." 
"(All) previous interpretations have been perspective 
valuations ••• for the growth of power; 0 •• every 
strengthening and increase of power opens up new perspectives 
2.2-
and means believing in new horizons ••• The world with 
which we are concerned is false, ••• (but) a falsehood 
always changing but never getting near the truth: for -
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there is no I truth'. II Thus, the "aberration of philosophy 
is that, instead of seeing in logic and the categories of 
reason means toward the adjustment of the world for 
utilitarian ends (basically, toward an expedient falsification), 
one believed one possessed in them the criterion of truth 
and reality. 11 25 IIAccordingly, I do not believe that a 
'drive to knowledge' is the father of philosophy; but rather 
tha t another drive has, here as elsewhere, employed 
understanding (and misunderstanding) as a mere instrument 0 
• •• (In fact, all) the basic drives of man • 0 0 have done 
h "I h " 11 26 Ad' " h" p 1 osop y at some tIme ••• n ,In an entry In 1S 
notebooks he muses: liThe really royal calling of the 
philosopher (as expressed by Alcuin the Anglo-Saxon) : 
To correct what is wrong, and strengthen what is right, 
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and raise what is holy. II And elsewhere: "one can conceive 
philosophers as thos~ who make the most extreme efforts 
to test how far man could elevate himself ••• ,,28 And, 
finally, to which European philosopher between Plato and 
Nietzsche would it have occurred, even in his most frivolous 
moments, to describe his relationship to wisdom, to that 
sophia whose lover he supposedly is, in words like 2arathustra's: 
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"Brave, unconcerned, mocking, violent - thus wisdom wants 
us: she is a woman and always loves only a warrior. ,,?29 
Clearly, during the last hundred years a revolutionary 
reassessment has been taking place in the West concerning 
the task and capability of thought, the nature of ,'truth' , 
and even concerning the requisite personal - and by no means 
merely intellectual - endowment of a lover of wisdom. 
But when we expand our horizon beyond the European 
theatre to include the thinking of other peoples on this 
planet, the seemingly novel turn of these men, for instance, 
their analysis of the human predicament as a problem of 
(ill) health rather than as a battle between good and evil 
or as a struggle for salvation, - this turn shows itself to 
be merging into a great and ancient river of human thought 
and exploration - and practice. Among the tributaries of 
this river we have to count not only schools such as Vedanta, 
Taoism, and the many branches of Buddhism in India, Tibet, 
China and Japan, but perhaps also the world-wide phen'omenon 
of shamanism. 
In fact, once we have widened the scope of our vision 
beyond the great European philosophical traditions, a 
spontaneous sensation is likely to arise that "the whole of 
religion might yet appear as a prelude and exercise to some 
2'a distant age. II 
Perhaps we of the West have been committing an 
error which betrays a certain characteristic limitation of our 
traditional philosophical understanding in that we have been 
indiscriminately regarding ever1w:Aerethehigkest tnai:i,;,ti:O!t'u; 
of intellectual-emotional-practical cultivation as 'religions' 
on the model of our own Christian background, and have 
been doing so as a matter of course. In viewing as 
'religions' the noble intellectual-emotional-practical traditions 
of non-European origin we have perhaps merely been 
projecting our own need, our own addiction, our "old habit 
(of seeking) another authority that can speak unconditionally 
and command goals and tasks,,3 0 into them. Probably we 
ourselves are not yet weaned from Christianity; hence 
the modern soul catchers roaming the earth today find a 
willing prey in us 'Christians with a bad conscience'. For 
"under the rule of religious ideas one has become accustomed 
to the notion of 'another world (behind, below, above)' - and 
when religious ideas are destroyed one is troubled by an 
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uncomfortable emptiness and deprivation. J/ 
It is conceivable that the noble schools of Buddhism, 
Taoism, and Vedanta, f or instance, receive their proper 
appreciation only when we regard them as three of the most 
decisive and well-matured over comings of religion - and of 
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metaphysics, as "victors over God and nothingness", in 
Nietzsche's longing words. 
This characteristic proclivity of ours to see 'religion' 
iWlhere"ver men are emancipated and whole and have traditions, 
celebration, and intellectual-emotional-practical cultivation 
is the reason why Nietzsche in The Antichrist!! could not 
restrain his lamentation over the decisive manner in which 
- so he thought - Christianity has spoiled the fruit of 
those two glorious buddings of emancipation in Europe, the 
Greeks and l~ssaJl~IWUIj;:. 
It is also conceivable that the real tasks for men 
who are 'victors over God and nothingness' have as yet 
no names, at least, still have no names in the thinking of 
the Western hemisphere. Perhaps Nietzsche's affirmation 
of the Eternal Recurrence, Rilke's "RUhmen", and 
Heidegger1s 'thinking' are the first true tasks for the 
emancipated man that have been formulated in the West. 
Our musings began by' experimenting with seeing a 
character of essential unsoundness in the overall dynamics 
of customary human existence as we normally know it 0 
Immediately upon launching our experiment we ran aground 
on a twofold dilemma: that of an appropriate ethical 
attitude, and that of an appropriate epistemological 
methodology. We rejected the lures of the soul catchers 
and searched for a precedent to our dilemma. We saw 
that certain modern philosophers had already begun to 
explore our problem, foremost among them Nietzsche. 
Among Nietzsche's aphorisms we discovered a statement 
of precisely our dilemma. Realizing that the revolutionary 
turn of certain modern philosophers brings them closer to 
schools developed in non-European countries, such as those 
of Taoism, Vedanta, and Buddhism, we now ask whether 
the proceedings and insights of any of these schools might, 
in return, be able to elucidate, by means of its being 
uncontaminated by European idiosyncrasies of thought and 
emotion, certain crucial developments in Nietzsche's thought 
and emotion which alienated him from the great European 
traditions. 
In fact, attempting to understand and evaluate 
Nietzsche's thought purely in terms of earlier European 
thought, or even from a contemporary Western standpoint, 
would make US overlook what is genuinely novel and 
unorthodox in him. Within a purely Western standpoint the 
Greco-Christian tradition of vision, sentiment, and thought 
inescapably structures our receptivity and comprehension 
according to certain paradigms. F or instance, without a 
non- Western paradigm we almost inevitably see in Nietzsche's 
non-Christianity only an anti-Christianity or a neo-antiquity. 
Or again, we will claim that "Nietzsche 000 may be said 
to have invented the atheism of the political right. 
Zarathustra wants to create a true universal goal for 
humanity and must therefore overcome the false universal 
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goals that already exist. 11 But Nietzsche neither is 
an atheist, nor of or for the political right: he both cuts 
across and undercuts such distinctions by thinking much 
2.7 
more fundamental issues than they will. Moreover, it 
is precisely the idea of a universal goal, any universal goal, 
which is Christian and unacceptable to Nietzsche)Zarathustra': 
'Zarathustra' deliberately proposes a task which he knows will 
split humanity in two: into those who Gil. .r. e and thos~ who,.Q., r e not 
the 'can' implied by that lought'. Even Heidegger has no 
choice but to assimilate Nietzsche's experiment to the 
tradi tion: " Nietzsche's thought (namely: the 'will to 
power') moves on the long line of the ancient leading 
question of philosophy, the question of what beings are • 
• •• The fundamental question, i. e. the question that 
became the foundation stone of philosophy, is the question 
about the essence of Being; it has never been developed in 
the history of philosophy as such. Nietzsche, too, remains 
wi.thin the preliminary domain of that question. ,,34 But, 
as we have seen, Nietzsche explicitly denied that the 
question about the essence of Being is the fundamental 
question! Though with regard to· the tasks that he foresaw 
for thought he did indeed admit to be writing a mere 'prelude 
to a philosophy of the future' 0 It is conceivable that 
Nietzsche's intention is literally not thinkable within the 
Greco-Christian idiom; and, "where nothing is heard the 
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acoustic illusion is that nothing is there". The crucial 
role of the apperceptive paradigm is best expressed by a 
Sufi proverb: "When a pick-pocket meets a saint all he 
sees is his pockets 0 " 
However, when we turn to the East in the search 
for a paradigm by which to do more justice to Nietzsche's 
experiment than any standpoint within the Greco-Christian 
tradition permits, it turns out that precisely Buddhism, 
which Nietzsche thought a respectable but merely nihilistic 
escapist practice, promises to be of special interest and 
help in making sense of many difficult and, in terms of the 
great European intellectual-emotional traditions, unintelligible 
steps in Nietzsche's intellectual-emotional-vivial experiment. 
While the details of this elucidation will be carried out in 
the later chapters, I shall here point to the following 
rather striking parallels between certain important aspects 
of Nietzsche's thought, on'the one hand, and Buddhist 
thought, on the other. 
1. The centrality of the medical metaphor, both for 
understanding the nature of the malaise, or predicament, 
inherent in ordinary human existence, for interpreting the 
philosopher's activity, and for visualizing the philosopher's 
task and accomplishment. We have already seen Nietzsche's 
own heavy use of phYSiological and medical terminology in 
order to formulate his observations and guesses about the 
historical situation of European man in 1880. Buddhist 
literature abounds in metaphors from medical practice 0 
There are, for instance, the Four Noble Truths, clearly 
conceived in analogy to illness-diagnosis-prognosis-medicine: 
The basic fact of suffering, the fact of a cause of this 
suffering, the possibility of stopping suffering, and the 
way to do it 0 In one sutra, the Buddha compares his own 
teaching to a physician's skill, and ordinary existence to 
the unenviable condition of a man wounded by a poisoned 
arrow. Elsewhere we read that liThe Saviors of the 
36 
World ••• have ••• become the supreme physicians •••• " 
And, the central elucidatory conceptual device of Mahayana 
Buddhism~ the notion of §unyata, is likened to the 
I1 medicine administered to a sick man by a doctor" with the 
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purpose of removing all his ills". 
2. Nietzsche as well as the Buddhists conceive the 
purpose of their 'medical' prescriptions to be not a 
functional restoration of the' 'patient' back into the gears 
of society - that society which consists of the "ordinary 
person •• (who) •• lives with his mind obsessed by perplexing 
. o. obsessed by clinging to rites and customs obsessed by 
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maJevolence ••• 11, as the Buddha characterized it, but as 
a whole-making in a trans-social sense beyond good and 
evil and metaphysics, and, in the case of the exceptional 
individual, as a total transfiguration beyond the entirety 
of what he had previously reckoned to be his home, his 
nature, his virtue, and his destiny. 
But even though both see the sound nature and true 
destiny of man beyond good and evil and metaphysics, they 
do not reject either morality or a way of speaking which, 
to the uncomprehending, is indistinguishable from metaphysics. 
One could also say that it f:tr.tr.cc.iwsaiil~ tid: lite 
like that of Nietzsche or the Buddhist that morality and 
metaphysics lose their immature and stifling manners and 
attain their proper function as helpers of man. To put 
this idea in the most radical, though somewhat paradoxical, 
fashion: it is impossible to be moral or to think before one 
has emancipated oneself from 'morality' and that reliance 
upon the - putative - truth of thought which characterizes 
bad!l.M~rild~p1tAii1.q::SdJda.7<iphy • 
3. Man's ordinary manner of existence is characterized 
by both as 'impure', 'unclean', 'ill', 'ignorant', and 'mendacious' , 
rather than as evil, sinful, politically imperfect, or 
economically lacking. 
4. Both hold that it is precisely the customary life, 
including its most acclaimed expressions, the life that prides 
itself on being firmly lodged in reality, practical, down- to" 
earth, sensibly planning for the future, and accomplishing 
deeds of greatness, it is that very life which is stumbling 
through self-spun labyrinths of delUSion, which i'8 incapable 
of truly appropriate action and appreciative discrimination, 
free-floatingly out of touch with the earth, plainly without 
3/ 
a future, and prevented from attaining true greatness. 
5. Purity, a truly sound existence, wholeness is attained 
not by adjustment to social standards or by achieving 
certain goals, but by becoming, somehow, coincident with 
the unadulterated truth of this very world itself, not just 
in isolated ecstatic sessions, but in one's continuous 
everyday life. Thus, both the Buddhist Bodhisattva and 
•• Nietzsche's 'Dbermensch are not 'ideals' at all, in the sense 
of more or less arbitrary images of desirable states of 
affairs, but are non-arbitrary possibilities inherent in 
the very nature of man and reality itself Q 
6. The perfectly realized man, in the Buddhist and in the 
Nietzschean sense, continues to act in this world, to "bring 
home the redemption of this reality" ;39he is one"whose 
compelling strength will not let him rest in any aloofness 
or beyond" and "who will sanctify all activities, • Q. (for) 
this world must be transfigured ever anew and in new 
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ways;" or, to speak with the ~uddhists, who as "Mse 
Bodhisattvas ... engender in themselves the great compassion" 
and "become the supreme physicians ••• who course in the 
practice of pity and concern for the welfare of others", 
and who "fetch suffering beings out of the three places 
of woe (although) they never have anywhere the notion of 
41 
a being." 
7. E30th conceive the 'treatment' as a radical stripping 
away of all supports Ifin which formerly we may have found 
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our humanity", during which ordeal the 'patient' is 
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sustained only by his "double will", by his commitment to 
compassion and enlightenment. 
•• 8. Finally, both Nietzsche's Ubermensch and the Buddhist 
Bodhisattva are expressly conceived as counterideals to 
previous nihilistic-escapist ideals, as anti-dotes against a 
rampant poison. These 'ideals' 'ideals' in the previously 
explained non-arbitrary sense - themselves are already a 
device in a higher kind of 'medical' practice, in 'great 
politics' • 
Thus, our original musings and predicament have not 
only led us to become acquainted with Nietzsche's thought, 
but have also carried us hadf -way around the planet to 
India where we find a school of thought with whom 
Nietzsche's experiment has more in common than it has 
with the European philosophical tradition!' In appreciation 
of the beauties of these two developments of thought and 
of their strange affinities, but without presupposing their 
complete parelelUsm or ultimate compatibility, I shall, then, 
layout the essentials of Nietzsche's thought insofar as 
it pertains to the understanding of his concept of the 
•• 
Ubermensch, his possibility and necessity, and shall do the 
same with regard to Buddhist thought and its concept of 
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the 'Bodhisattva'. 
Finally, I shall also show how both Nietzsche and the 
Buddhists, .:;ach in their own way, tackle the twofold 
dilemma upon which our original musings on the soundness of 
the customary way of life as a whole had run aground, and 
how, therefore, a conti:Q.uing critique of ongoing existence 
with regard to its soundness seems to be possible. 
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II. lYman is the sick animal ll * 
* GM III 13 
An exposition of Nietzsche's and the 
Buddhist views concerning the fundamental 
fact, character, and significance of ill 
inherent in man's ordinary existence, as 
well as of those concerning the nature 
of a greater health as it is foreboded 
in a radical suffering -such as 
'Zarathustra's and prince Siddharta's-
from that existence. 
Our present reflections took their departure with a 
remembrance of 'dangerous developments on this planet' and 
our 'predicament', though the nature of these 'developments' 
and of this 'predicament' was left undetermined in favor 
of a willingness to experimentally open ourselves to a sense 
of a fundamental unsoundness permeating the whole of 
customary existence, even in its conventionally most 
acclaimed expressions. 
sti.ll, how can we say that there is a general 
'predicament', 'dangerous developments' in some rather 
impersonal sense, when many people only know that they 
are hungry, or worry about their next vacation? Are we 
perhaps only imagining a 'predicament', afraid to tackle 
real down-to-earth concrete problems, as a Marxist might 
charge? 
It might easily seem so -especially at those times when 
we only notice hunger or worries- if we fail to pay attention 
to one inconspicuous little fact that normally gets overlooked 
almost as a matter of etiquette, and does so especially in our 
technological-psychiatric-ideological age, but the comprehension 
of which is crucial for the soundness of our experimental 
exploration of unsoundness; namely, the fact that there are 
altogether no problems, n e i the r 'down-to-earth concrete' 
problems nor a 'predicament' or 'dangerous 
developments' such as those mentioned at the outset of 
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our musings. 
If earlier our thought-experiment of suspecting 
customary human e~stence to be pervaded by a spontaneously 
ongoing unsoundness had seemed outlandish, though perhaps 
tolerable as an experiment, then the present claim, that 
there are altogether no problems, must seem sheer madness. 
Quite apart even from hunger and worry, if there are 
no problems then why do we reflect on 'man's predicament l ? 
For the sake of calming our irritated perplexity concerning 
this question we must anticipate some of the points that 
prqperly belong to later stages in our argument. 
Briefly, the claim that there are altogether no 
problems means that types of problems 'exist' only 
correlative to types of caring. 
But who is it that cares? 
'rhis question concerns the nature of illness, dis-eas~, 
and problems in general. Do illness, dis-ease, problems consist 
in objective facts or events? Or in pain? Or in pain 
associated with certain objective facts or events? Anticipating 
ourselves, we claim: illness etc. consist, rather, in 
suffering from certain facts or events, e. g. from pain, or 
from pain associated with certain events or facts. 
And who is it that suffers? 
In each case, it is a certain sensibility that suffers, 
'a sensibility' not as some abstract, free-floating capacity, 
but as embedded, and embodied, in a certain ongoing way of 
life. This sensibility is that ongoing life itself, namely, 
its sentience aspect, that fundamental irritability, responsiveness 
and impressionable liveliness which constitutes the very 
motility of an ongoing life, layered as it is between degrees 
of slow dullness, such as that of genetic constitution, bone 
and flesh, and of quick delicacy, as that of mood, emotion, 
thought and inspiration. We do not claim, however, that 
he who is ill necessarily suffers from it himself. On the 
contrary, he who is ~ll may think of himself as perfectly 
healthy, while it is some other sensibility which detects his 
unhealth. F or instance, a physician is able to diagnose 
illnesses in patients who believe themselves free from disease. 
However, we do claim that ,for a given fact or event to 
be reckoned as an illness, dis-ease, or problem, someone 
somewhere must suffer from that fact or event. 
A way of human existence is always already a highly 
specific - though normally unconscious - ongoing choosing 
and creating of a particular character of existence, of a 
'life-style' in the deepest sense of that worn-out expression. 
Thus, problems do not exist as such but presuppose 
an ongoing appreciative and volitional stratum of reference. 
Problems - even of the 'down-to-earth' type - do not exist 
purely as, or rigidly correlative to, given facts or events -
though in the total absence of correlative facts problems are 
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not problems but madness - but 'exist', more basically, 
correlative to a very specific kind of ongoing sensibility 
which, first of all, perceives in terms of one system of 
facts rather than another, and, for which, secondly, 
these facts have a specific vital significance, namely, a 
significance unconsciously in terms of and for the sake of 
tha t ongoing way of lif e • 
When, therefore, a way of life becomes questionable, 
or a sensibility changes, then so will the type and the weight 
of 'the problems' that 'exist' correlative to it. On the other 
hand, if a type of problem becomes questionable then so does 
a way of life which necessarily 'has' these problems. 
If, then, we sense a 'predicament' or a basic 'unsoundness' 
anq. not merely hunger or specific frustrations, the reason 
for this difference is neither that some thing exists for us now 
which did not exist before, nor that we are right now and were 
wrong before, but is a sensibility correlative to a different 
ongoing commitment, namely, one not to self-preservation or 
to the realization of next year's vacation, or ·to the victory 
of the proletariat, but an intuitive commitment to a certain 
basic, arerall character of life. It is that sensibility which 
is the sentience-aspect of our altered commitment that now 
suffers globally, so to speak, and intuits a comprehensive, 
coherent and fundamental 'predicament' where previously 
there were only the chaotic multitude of sharply 
individual, discontinuously and randomly rising and disappearing 
problems. 
Our imaginary Marxist charge that an investigation 
into a global unsoundness represents merely an avoidance of 
'the concrete problems' of human life on this earth could, 
then, be turned around into a polemical rebuttal against 
'the concrete problem' solvers, to the effect that it is 
their attitude rather which in its uncritical s~rvitude to 
a sensibility that takes notice of defects exclusively in 
ideologically delineated terms, that is, as we have seen, 
which in its uncritical commitment to a certain ideologically 
projected character of life methodically blinds itself to the 
possibility of a much more basic, ubiquitous, always already 
ongoing, spontaneous and innocent stratum of unsoundness which 
has already completely infected the ordinary naive as well as 
the sophisticated ideological identifications of problems and 
remedies. 
To experience, then, even if only by way of a vague 
inkling, an overall and fundamental unsoundness is itself a 
derivative of a certain ongoing sensibility, namely, of one 
which has - temporarily - let go of specific problems in 
favor of 'listening' to the ongoing stream of human life itself. 
It can do so for it is the sentience aspect of that life itself. 
F or instance, the emphasis which both Nietzsche and 
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Buddhism in their 'medical' treatises and prescriptions give 
to the purification and consecration of man, instead of to 
a mere social adjustment or historical production of certain 
states of affairs, as the true purpose of a 'cure' for the 
problems of everyday existence such as they see it, indirectly 
reveals once more that most fundamental experience which they 
hold in common and which they have also stated directly, 
namely, that the v e r y c h a r act e r 0 f I i v n g 
a-,s wen 0 r m a I I y k now i t is, in some 
sen s e a n 'i I I n e s s'. 
An illness, however, as we have said, is never such 
simply by virtue of consisting of this or that objective state of 
affairs: if no one suffers from a given objective state of 
affairs, then it is not an Hlness. There must be suffering 
associated with a state of a'ffairs - though, as we have seen, 
he who suffers from a fact may be spatially remote from 
the fact - if such a state is to be called 'an illness'. Thus, 
it is suffering that defines illness. 
But from this it follows that every refinement of man's 
health, every increase in man's stature, derives from an 
abnormal alteration in sensibility which, somehow, begins to 
s u f fer from that which others still experience as 
indifferent, as pleasant, acceptable, as right and normal. 
"You want, if possible - and there is no more insane 'if 
possible' - t·. 0 abo lis h s u f fer i n gil, writes 
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Nietzsche, "And we? It really seems that we would rather 
have it higher and worse than ever. Well-being as you 
understand it - that is no goal, that seems to us an end, 
a state that soon makes man ridiculous and contemptible -
that makes his destruction des \: r a b Ie. The discipline 
of suffering, of g rea t suffering - do you not know 
that only this discipline has created all enhancements of 
man so far? In man c rea t u r e and c rea tor 
are united ••• but ••• you r pity is for the 'creature in 
man', for what must be formed, broken, forged, torn, 
burnt, made incandescent, and purified - that which 
1 
n e c e s s a r i I y must and s h 0 u I d suff er • II 
Thus, 11prophetic human beingsll, namely, those who 
know of new heights and healths for man, "are afflicted 
with a great deal of suffering; ••• it is their p a ins 
2 
that make them prophets. 11 
And, what is the instinct for cleanliness or purity 
that instinct which dominated both Nietzsche's and the 
Buddha's lives, but a sensibility that s u f fer s from 
certain conditions and that seeks a state where those 
conditions do not obtain? JlWhat separates two people most 
profoundly is a different sense and degree of cleanliness •••• 
3 
saintliness (is) the highest spiritualization of this instinct. Jl 
Consequently, 1.1 ••• it almost determines the order of 
rank how profoundly human beings can suffer ••• by virtue 
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of his suffering {a man) k now s m 0 r e than the 
4 
cleverest and wisest could possibly know 
" 
Because suffering, and the instinct for purity as one 
generator of suffering, drives him who suffers to new healths 
and heights, because ll ••• nausea itself creates new wings 
and water-divining powers •• 0 II, therefore " ••• 
'5 
• •• (is) •• the advocate of sufferingH • 
Zara thustra 
Now we understand what Nietzsche said by calling 
Zarathustra a Hdithyramb on solitude or, if I have been 
6 
understood, on pur i t y.ll 
'On solitude': because llthe highest instinct of cleanliness 
places those possessed of it in the oddest and most dangerous 
7 lonesomenesses ••• 11. 'On purity': because 'Zarathustra~ 
Nietzsche experiences the ongoing customary human existence 
as unclean. 'Zarathustra's u f fer s fro m rna n: 
he experiences not only the average human existence but 
even the customary best as radically impure, or, which 
amounts to the same thing, as unsound, that is. as a 
8 
debilitation, Jldiminution and levelling ll of man, as a way 
of preventing man from attaining his true health and greatness. 
'To suffer', that means not a snobbish dissatisfaction, 
personal frustration, theoretical disagreement, political 
dissent, artistic over sensitivity , moral indignation, or the 
resentment of the failures and the agony of the oppressed: 
for all of these sentiments criticize the ongoing existence 
only with regard to those features from which they derive 
disadvantages, and would by all means affirm the customarily 
ongoing world - or some variant of it - if only they profited 
from it as they see others do now. Rather, 'to suffer' 
means that our very bodies revolt, even against our wishes 
or duties, that we are at the mercy of a spontaneous 
reaction in us which, like a physical illness, proceeds from 
no ideology and is indifferent to the conventi,onal scapegoats 
and methods of accusation as well as to the customary medicines, 
entertainments, honors, - and profits. In this state we feel as if 
our true being, or destiny, had somehow altogether withdrawn 
beyond the reach and competence of the ongoing existence, 
and as if the tension between our factual being and our 
destiny ached in the pain of our illness. It is this nausea 
at even the best of the customarily ongoing existence that 
drives him into solitude in his search for purity, for a new 
health, which consists of a new man since health and unhealth 
are not external, indifferently exchangeable qualities of an 
unchanging substratum 'man'. 
Thus, according to FW 316, it is precisely his suffering 
from what custom regards as the best in man which makes 
'2arathustra' a prophet of future, or at any rate of possible, 
healths and heights for man, - even though manking cannot 
possibly (as a whole) cross over into these new healths and 
heights. But it is not only his suffering from what man 
conventionally takes to be his best that distinguishes the true 
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prophet. He also wrests from concealment the lineaments 
of a greater health: the prophet knows man's illness through 
his own suffering, but for him it is "an illness as pregnancy 
9 
is an illness" The prophet's power to act as a midwife to 
another health for man constitutes his greatness. Without 
the prophet man's illness would be a meaningless suffering 
best forgotten. But through him mere illness is turned into 
the nausea of pregnancy and the pain of birthgiving. He 
delineates a creative meaning in man's ills: he sees in man 
a higher destiny sick with the smallness of man's customary 
greatness. 
Any possible evolution of man, then, whether as 
individuals or as mankind, can take place only if suffering, 
namely the suffering due to an abnormally altered sensibility 
which experiences the norm and the best of the ongoing 
world as nauseating, continues and develops to ever new 
degrees of agility, subtlety and cqmprehensiveness. 
But for suffering to contain pointers to new healths 
rather than to lead into the cul-de-sacs of neurotically 
constructed patterns and securities, it must itself already 
be the expression of - at least a moment of - extraordinary 
health rather than of a neurotic irritability. That is, for 
suffering to be valid as a director of development, that which 
suffers in us must already be a new health. It is precisely 
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the suspicion that what suffered in the wise men of past 
ages was not a new health but a neurotic irritability, a 
melancholy, a weariness or resistance to life, that forced 
Nietzsche to closely scrutinize the men of past ages and not 
merely their theories. "Were they all perhaps shaky on their 
legs? late? tottery? decadentsJ Could it be that wisdom 
appears on earth as a raven, inspired by a little whiff of 
10 
carrion?JI In order to assess what it was that suffered 
in him, and what it had been in the wise men of th,.e past, 
Nietzsche was driven to explore the nature of health - and 
to distinguish in himself the perspectives of health from 
those of unhealth. The marks of a great health became 
one of the most important recurrent topics in his notes 
and aphorisms. And he began to discover in ever greater 
detail the insidious, all-pervasive unhealth of customary 
existence. 
Thus, the problem that we had encountered earlier: 
How do we know that our critique of ongoing existence is 
not itself in thrall to this existence? may be solved, on the 
one hand, by the requirement that we s :u'f f' la' 1" ifl<om the 
customary world, and from its most acclaimed expressions 
no less than from its admitted lowlinesses. 
But, on the other hand, a new problem has risen: How 
do we know that it is indeed a higher health that suffers in 
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us, rather than a melancholy or a neurosis or the mere fear 
of the lapse of time? Health always belongs to a particular 
being, to an integrated way of life, never to existence or 
life as such. A new health belongs to a necw being since 
health is not an accidental quality modifying an unchanging 
substratum 'man'. If our suffering is due to a new health 
- rather than to a perverse iliscontent - then cither we are 
destined to be ourselves a new way of life, or we are pregnant 
with a new being. 
Our question then is: what kind of a be,ing is it in us 
that experiences the ongoing world as ill? What are we 
destined for or pregnant with: a god, a dwarf, a monster, 
or something as, yet nameless? Are we suffering due to "a 
new health, stronger, more seasoned, tougher, more audacious, 
11 
and more joyful than any previous health Jl? due to a destined 
way of being which now everywhere experiences the customary 
world even in its honors and rewards as a cruel network of 
stifling halts, debilitating distortions and harmful lies? Or 
-is life perhaps too volatile, too enigmatic, too unjust, 
or too incomprehensible for us, "too much", as Roquentin 
says in Sartre's novel Nausea'? Perhaps fundamentally 
all suffering is that of a premature or that of an overdue 
birth: not yet ready for this life, or already cramped by it? 
It is really no answer at all if we say that it is 'man', 
or worse - because more mendaciously idealistic - 'humanity', 
that is suffering in us: for 'man' is merely the theatre 
where these events take place. In 'Zarathustra's words: 
'man' is a rope stretched over an abyss. What suffers in 
him are the two poles between which he is stretched. Man 
conceived as a purely factual entity cannot be ill: for his 
illness belongs factually to him, is part of the factual man. 
Only an ongoing project, that is, more generally, only some 
kind of will-to can be ill. But this will-to can never be a 
will to the purely factual: that would not be a will at all. 
Health, Sickness, injury, suffering therefore always 
refer to some kind of will-to, though the Jl..to" does not 
necessarily indicate an intention, a conscious project, or 
even a thinkable (intelligible) one, but might signify an 
intrinsic tendency, a tendency that nevertheless seeks, 
and creates, its temporary steppingstones which in turn 
become known to consciousness as 'intentions'. Since the "-to" 
of a 'will-to' does not necessarily signify a conscious project 
oX' even anything that we would b~ willing to own up to if 
indeed we became conscious of it lithe intention is merely 
12 
a sign and symptom that still requires interpretation Jl • 
We might go farther and venture lithe suspicion that the 
decisive value of an action lies precisely in what is 
u n i n ten t ion a I in it, while everything about it 
that is intentional, everything about it that can be seen, 
known, 'conscious', ••• betrays something but con c e a I s 
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13 
even more. If 
We suffer most deeply when we feel denied in the very 
nature of our being, in the very elements of our essential 
existence - or of what we take to be our essential existence. 
But !lour nature lf and "essential existence" cannot have a 
purely factual signification for the denial of a mere fact 
does not give rise to suffering; rather, they signify a 
will-to for it is only by virtue of a will-to that there can 
be health and sickness, injury, suffering and contentment. 
Yet it is not necessary to assume that 'the self' -in 
whatever sense- is the author of that will. It is conceivable 
that such a will has no origin or cause at all. As long as 
lInature of our beingll and JI our essential existenceJ/ are 
understood in a purely 'worvldlyl, i g e g temporal-historical 
sense, that is, as long as my will-to refers to - or constrains 
itself to refer to - essentially temporal, time-bound and 
time-binding forms so long it is precisely time itself which 
necessarily denil3'S the very nature of our being, the very 
elements of our essential existence. In other words, as 
long as we regard ourselves as essentially temporal beings we 
necessarily suffer from time, though neither this suffering 
nor its cause, the will-to time-bound and time-binding forms, 
need be conscious as such. 
However, if it were possible not to feel denied by time 
in the very nature of our being, if it were possible in this 
human body and without any loss of human gifts to somehow 
affirm time itself, perhaps even to affirm it as the very 
nature of our being - which affirmation, in turn, might give 
rise to a different experience and conception of time - then 
we would not suffer from time. 
On the other hand, the suff ering f~om time and the 
palliatives this suffering devised for itself would be e~perienced 
as an illness by one who is able to affirm time. It would be 
an illness because his will-to finds itself in conflict with 
that will-against-time which underlies the suffering from 
time, and because the ways and the world created by that 
suffering, including the palliatives against it and the resentment 
growing from it, constitute a dynamics everywhere at odds 
with his affirmation of time ~ Thus, if it were possible to 
affirm time itself then such a one would find himself ill with 
the ongoing customary existence if that existence were 
essentially characterized by the suffering from time! He 
would be ill, however, by virtue of his greater health, that 
- is, by his ability to affirm and integrate into his embodied 
being that which makes others ill, while sacrificing none of 
their powers or beauty. 
'Zarathustra' suffers from man's smallness. But what 
is it that makes men, even the greatest, small? It is their 
inability to say and live Yes to life, an unconditional and 
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unreserved Yes. Wherever men pretend to say Yes they 
have tacit reservations about life. Men's Yes to life is 
mixed with a tacit No, and sometimes the No is even louder 
than the Yes. Men are suffering from life for life denies 
them insofar as they deny life in their claim to their essential 
existence conceived as purely temporal. Suffering, men are 
always on the search for palliatives besides nourishing a 
deep resentment against that same life from which they 
suffer by virtue of their No. 
HI was the first", writes Nietzsche, "to see the real 
opposition: the degenerating instinct that turns against life 
with subterranean vengefulness ••• versus ••• the highest 
affirmation, born of fullness, of overfullness, a Yes-saying 
without reservation, even tw suffering, even to guilt, even 
14 
to everything that is questionable and strange in existence." 
But 'time' is a name for life in its aspect as a 
succession of victories, in which all victors become vanquished 
and join 'the past'. Therefore, fithat man be delivered 
from revenge H, revenge being "the will's ill will against time 
15 
and its 'it was' H, ffthat iSH for 'Zarathustra' Jlthe bridge to 
16 
the highest hope and a rainbow after long storms. JI If 
the delivery from revenge is the highest hope then, conversely, 
'the will's ill will against time' characterizes the actually 
ongoing ways of men. In the prologue to Zarathustra 
Nietzsche baptizes the highest hope for man by the name 
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of "overman". The contrast to the 'overman' is set by a 
picture of "the last man". The' last man' represents man's 
highest development insofar as he is unable to free himself 
from revenge, from his suffering from time. 
Thus, according to Nietzsche the most fundamental 
and most important choice that confronts man when he wakes 
up to his precarious position in the universe without a moral 
God is that between a 'highest affirmation without reservation' 
-an affirmation without object for all possible objects depend 
on an element of negation- and an attitude containing a No 
-for instance, by way of attaching itself to an object - J 
however smalL or secret. This is a choice that also challenges 
the role and importance of consciousness since it is conceivable 
that "the decisive value of 'an action", for instance, whether 
it represents an affirmation without reservation or not, 
17 
Hlies precisely in what is u h i n ten t ion a I in it". 
Neither can this choice be postponed: our ongoing existence 
is always already saying Yes or Yes-and-N o. Moreover, to 
the extent that we are saying No to life insofar as it is 
time we are already suffering from time. The suffering 
from time is, however, imperceptible to the consciousness 
belonging to an existence which denies, and is denied by, time: 
for such a consciousness necessarily interprets all suffering 
as referring to further time-bound and time-binding entities 
and seeks its palliatives not in a revision of but in terms of 
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its fundamental stance. Its fundamental stance is an ill 
will against time out of its impotence to avert its fate in 
time. The will imprisoned in a fate against its will "redeems 
18 
him self f oolishlylf • Due to his No to life, to his foolish 
19 
redemptions, to the "priestly naivete in medicine ", and to 
the toxicity of his customary palliatives man is II t he sick 
20 
animal". He is sick in that he has become accustomed to, 
has himself b e com e, '.'an aversion to life, a rebellion against 
21 
the most fundamental presuppositions of life". Morality, 
ideals, the beyond: under these names "a n tin a t u r e 
itself received the highest honors ••• and was fixed over humanity 
22 
as law and categorical imperative" so that now "the concept 
of the goo d man signifies that one sides with all that is 
23 
weak, sick, failure, suffering of itself.1I "Man, suffering 
from himself ••• but uncertain why or wherefore, (has been) 
thirsting for reasons (as well as) for remedies and 
24 
narcotics". But it "is (precisely) the means of consolation" 
-of consolation since lIthe real cause of their feeling ill 
25 
remains hidden ll -"which have stamped life with that 
fundamental melancholy character in which we now live: 
the worst disease of mankind has arisen from the struggle 
against diseases • It has been justly said of Schopenhauer 
that he was the one who again took the sufferings of mankind 
seriosuly: (but) where is the man who wi.ll at length take 
the antidotes against these sufferings seriously, and who will 
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pillory the unheard-of quackery with which men, even up to 
our own age, and in the most sublime nomenclature, have 
. 26 
been used to treat their illness of the soul?" Consequently, 
27 
Nietzsche asks: "Where are the new physicians of the soul?" 
The choice between the 'highest affirmation without 
reservation' and a partially negative attitude is in Nietzsche's 
thinking at once the choice between 'the great health' and a 
succession of diverse partial healths with their attendant 
partial unhealths. Man's most fundamental sickness is 
revenge. Revenge, however, is not a unitary event with a 
characteristic identity, a clearly defined syndrome, but 
proliferates into the many forms of m.ada.cit,. 
("Ve:r:-Iogenheit Jl -one of Nietzsche's most frequent and most 
important words of condemnation), petty cruelty, anti-
naturalness, and conventionally practised self -deception. No 
manifestation of individual or social life is immune tro. le#r!a.g 
infiltrated and, eventually, perverted by revenge in some 
suitable form. The diversity of the forms of revenge, for 
instance, of the false consolations (religious and secular) 
against the cruel progress of time, witnesses to the ingenuity 
of man, an ingenuity constrained, however, into a fundamentally 
self-defeating framework. Revenge, in its concrete Dtan1toldltess. 
not only prevents man from attaining 'the great health' but 
cripples him and perverts even his highest expressions: religion, 
justice, sex, art become vehicles of vengefulness and desperate 
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indulgence. Nietzsche him self, as a philosophical physician, 
mercilessly hunted down and exposed many of the hiding places 
and highly respected conventional masks of revenge, both in 
religion (Christianity), justice (equality), philosophy (the ideal) 
and other seemingly noble expressions of the customarily 
ongoing existence. The deliverance from revenge, as well as 
from the manifold palliatives and foolish redemptions which 
the 'imprisoned wUl' devises for itself, is the work of the 
new physicians of the soul. These physicians serve not those 
various merely partial healths whose concepts constitute the 
range of insight and error of the customarily ongoing existence. 
The i r loyalty is neither to man -insofar as 'man' himself 
i s a sickness rather than a neutral substratum to whom an 
external quality 'sickness' is appended- nor to any of the 
customary moralities and ideals (Wunschbarkeiten:) to the 
extent that these themselves are the products of man's 
unhealth and of the foolish attempts of his imprisoned wi.ll. 
Their effort goes rather towards "a reconciliation wi.th time 
28 
and something higher than any reconciliation". 
"The fundamental conception of (Thus Spoke Zarathustra ) 
(is) the idea of the eternal recurrence, this highest formula 
29 
of affirmation that is at all attainable II • 'Zarathustra l is 
the teacher and proclaimer of this highest affirmation 0 As 
such he is not yet him self one of 'the new physicians' but 
only the spokesman for the great health. At the same 
time, however, he embodies this health himself: liTo understand 
this type, one must first become clear about his physiological 
presupposition: this is what I call the g rea the a I t h 
(die grosse Gesundheit) JJ • 'The ladder on which he ascends 
and descends is enormous; he has seen further, willed further, 
been e; <il- p.a,b 1 e further (weiter gewollt, weiter g e k 0 n n t) 
than any other human being. ••• in him all opposites are 
blended into a new unity. The highest and the lowest 
energies of human nature ••• (well) forth from one fount 
with immortal assurance. • •. Here man (der Mensch) has 
been overcome at every moment; 0 •• Precisely in this 
width of space and this accessibility for what is contradictory 
2arathustra experiences himself as the sup rem e t y p e 
o f a lIb e i n g s ; ••• he has the hardest, most 
terrible insight into reality, has thought I the most 
abysmal idea', (and) nevertheless does not consider it an 
objection to existence, not even to its eternal recurrence -
but rather one more reason for being himself the eternal 
Yes to all things, 'the tremendous, unbounded saying Yes 
31 
and Amen' • .ll 
Thus, Nietzsche's concept of health resembles an 
32 
inspired etymological exegesis of "Wohlsein und Wohlwollen" 
~well-being and well-willing'): "wohl" signifies affirmation, 
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assurance, . Gelassenheit , round- and wholeness, eaSe; and 
this flwohl"- neSs is both the substance ( -sein') and the 
will (. -wollen ) of 12arathustra', and therefore of health. 
By contrast, that unhealth which is called 'man' consists 
\ in an adherence to only one pole in every pair of opposites 
and a repression of the other; it consists in a narrowness, 
in a lack of self, in mendae~t1, stagnation, vengefulness, 
impoverishment, and an indulgence in 'what is human'. 
But these characteristics of unhealth, of the merely 
partial kinds of health, are also those of anti-nature for 
the squandering of overabundance, the luxurious growth of 
opposites and their interplay, the width of contradictions, 
its magnificence beyond morality and ideals ( 'WUnschbarkeiten 
are essential characteristics of Nietzsche's f'pure, newly 
33 discovered, newly redeemed nature". 
Nietzsche's concepts and visua~lizations of health, 
nature and greatness are in many. ways more alien to European 
thinking -steeped as it is in Platonic- Christian moralisms and 
idealisms as well as in a fundamental dualistic tendency- than 
they are to the thought and experience of Buddhism, Vedanta, 
and Taoism, though Nietzsche's vocabulary is unmistakably 
European, for instance in his emphasis on the will and on 
history. 
Even if there were no further reasons for becoming 
acquainted with Nietzsche's and Buddhist thinking side by side, 
the former's search for 'the new physicians' alone already 
suggests an examination of the Buddha's 'medicines' with 
regard to the ills diagnosed by Nietzsche just because the 
Buddhists are so emphatic in their regard of the Buddhas 
and Bodhisattvas as 'royal physicians'. Perhaps the most 
extraordinarya~ect aacl-i.pl1:catioll -~- fl:o.y.a W."t.elta pe1at 
Q·1"'de,,-- of their consistency in this regard is that the 
very function of language itself insofar as the Buddhas and 
Bodhisattvas avail themselves of it changes in its character 
from the saying of being and the conveyance of information 
to that of a skilful apportioning of medicine and a skilful 
devising of magic spells for the sake of propelling the listener 
or the disciple 'out' of his illness 'into' his original health 
and nature. Among the European philosophers only Nietzsche 
through his uncompromising and fearless critique of the 
traditional verities and moralities ventured so far into that 
strange territory beyond truth ano. good and evil as to begin 
to reconceive the function and nature of language itself. 
Precisely because language never serves a neutral truth but 
always a certain way of life -necessarily embodied in a type 
of being- the man of the great health will also think differently, 
will rally his energies round and through different concepts. 
Conversely, the language of the great health is necessarily 
unintelligible to 'the sick animal'. 
Nietzsche himself had respect for the Buddha's teaching, 
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but regarded him with reservation and, ultimately, considered 
him too to be a type of decline: II ••• Christianity ••• (and) 
Bud d his m ••• belong together as nihilistic religions -
they are religions of decadence", even though "they differ most 
.:" 
remarkably" in that the Buddha "stands b e.y 0 n d good and 
evil ••• , ••• proceeds with hygienic measures ••• , ••• prescribes 
ideas which are either soothing or cheering, and ••• invents 
means for weaning oneself from all the others ••• , and is ••• 
opposed to the feelings of revenge, antipathy, 
res sen tim e n t ••• ". 
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However, it appears that Nietzsche knew only about 
H 1 nay a n a Buddhism and was uninformed about the 
later developments of M a hay a n a and V a j ray a n a. 
/I 
If he had been a ware of tlie later Buddhist developments 
centering in or growing out of the Madhyamika critical school 
it is likely that he would have regarded them with a somewhat 
higher appreciation; in any case, he would not have called 
them 'nihilistic' religions. 
Though reasons for regarding Buddha as one of 
Nietzsche's 'new physicians of the soul' -new in the West, 
anyway - will be given later, we can make a quick 'carat test' 
with regard to the Buddha's original occasion for 'retiring 
from the world' : what in him was it that suffered from life? 
Was he really one of those 'types of decline', was it 
melancholy, ressentiment, or· some neurosis in him that 
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suddenly b'roke out into suffering from life? 
As we have said earlier, for Nietzsche to take 
seriously anyone's misery at life-as-we-know-it, that wld,cll 
lal k1ac is suffering must be a new health, a new height 
for man, a superior and more uncompromising instinct for 
purity t Let us briefly review the traditionally reported 
circumstances of prince Siddharta's 'retirement from the 
world' as well as some of the reasons traditionally reported 
as having been given by him concerning his 'homel-leaving'. 
First of all, it is significant that the Buddha's 
childhood and early manhood are said to have taken place at 
a royal palace in the care of proud and loving parents who did 
everything in their power to protect their son from misery. 
His ,.father-'wanted him to 1)e absolutely spared the sight of 
life's dark sides, and went so far as to have all flowers 
always replaced before they showed any signs of wilting. 
Moreover, the future Buddha is described to us as the most 
skilful archer in the kingdom, as married to a beautiful woman, 
and as possessing an exquisite body and a splendid temperament 
and intelligence. In sum, we are obviously to imagine the 
young prince Siddharta, the future Buddha, to be in possession 
and command of the greatest health and lovelinesses that 
the customarily ongoing existence is able to imagine and produce, 
without enemies and suffering from no unfulfilled worl dly ambition. 
In view of his, by all normal standards, enviable 
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endowments and everyday circumstances it is reasonable to 
suppose that we are meant to think of the young prince as 
harboring no resentments or frustrations due to a lack of 
possessions, skills or affection, that is, due to any 
normally conceivable reasons. 
Therefore we must imagine the shock to be terrible, 
both in himself and even more so to his parents and friends, 
when this embodiment of health and power suddenly finds 
himself suffering from life after having for the first time 
caught a glimpse of life's dark side, in the forms of an old 
man, a diseased man, and a dead man, as well as having seen 
a monk, the embodiment of freedom from the war between 
life's opposites. 
"From the traditional a'ccount of his standing in the 
world of men we are likely meant to be assured that when 
prince Siddharta, finally nauseated by the sight of his sleeping 
dancing girls in exhausted disarray after their performance, 
decides at once to leave his whole customary life and to 
'retire from the world' what was suffering in him was neither 
a longing for a longer life, a craving for more possessions, 
an aspiration to greater political power, nor any lack of 
affection or support on the part of parents, wife or 
friends, nor the eruption of a long-smoldering melancholy or 
madness, nor a sudden drop in vitality rendering the customary 
world overwhelming but still unchallenged as the standard and 
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;fulfiller of all desires, but was, in fact, the premonition of 
a greater health beyond the reach and competence of his 
customary world. 
Clearly, unless we do postulate the sudden outbreak 
of some madness in the young prince -and from certain points 
of view the whole of Buddhism can indeed seem a benign 
madness- the quality of the circumstances reported to us by 
tradition as leading up to and coloring the moment of his 
decision to 'retire from the world' unequivocally suggests that 
the future Buddha's turn-about was untainted by any touch 
of what worldly wisdom could diagnose as infirmity. 
Thus, the Buddha-to-be was perhaps not one of 
those Nietzschean sages who were 'shaky on their legs, 
tottery, decadents', 'types of decline, symptoms of degeneration' 
even though a decision in this regard will have to wait until the 
nature of and the teachings concerning the extinction (nirvana) 
. , 
of ill have been more closely examined. 
Perhaps, then, prince Siddharta was overcome by 
suffering from the world as he knew it by virtue of a sudden 
deepening and widening in him of man's health and dignity. To 
him as well as to '2arathustra' the world that had borne them, 
life as they knew it, had become an illness. It had become 
so on account of their pregnancy with a greater health and 
a greater worth for man. This new health and worth was 
'greater', hlowever, not in the sense that any further 
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alterations, accumulations, rearrangements, or distillations 
within the customarily ongoing world could possibly add up 
to it. On the contrary, along with suffering from life as 
they knew i.t they also found themselves nauseated by that 
which their customary existence offered them as its health, 
its medicines and virtues. This state of radical nausea, 
of an involuntary, almost physiological incompatibility of the 
whole man with the entire, normally subconscious, 
customarily ongoing maelstrom of points of contact, trades 
in needs, alignments of perception, patterns of appetite, 
consumption and frustration, canons of agreement and 
ambition, fashions of pleasure and praise, a state if itself 
free from or at least not reducible to any wordly infirmities, 
when translated into objecti.fying language means: life itself, 
more accurately, life as we know it, the very ongoing existence 
itself, both at its highest and lowest points, is an illness 
and a debasement. liTo him that magnificent apartment, as 
splendid as the palace of Sakka, began to seem like a cemetery 
filled with dead bodies impaled and left to rot; and the three 
modes of existence appeared like houses all ablaze. And 
breathing forth the solemn utterance, 'How oppressive and 
stifling is it all! I his mind turned ardently to retiring from 
the world. 'It behooves me to go forth on the great 
retirement this very day, I said he; and he arose from his 
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couch ••• Somehow, so the traditional account goes, the 
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sight of his dishevelled dancing girls was the drop, th.at·made 
the bucket overflow: prince Siddharta could no longer help 
seeing life as he knew it as an illness of sorts, though 
precisely not in any way that could be remedied by and 
within the world as it is normally known and lived. It is 
remarkable how 'Zarathustra' and the future Buddha agree 
in stressing the oppressive and stifling character, the 
smallness and unworthiness of the world they know, even 
in its most desired positions and its most acclaimed 
expressions. Entire kingdoms, the highest honors, 
spectacular exploits, desirable possessions, the most 
coveted pleasures, secure dependencies, are suddenly felt 
to be suffocating, to be intolerably unclean, to be reeking 
with an as yet nameless unhealth; but suffocating and 
stunting - of who m, of what? Not of prince Siddharta: 
:for 'prince Siddharta' is part of, is actually identical with, 
that world which stifles him! Who or what, then, is 'him'? 
,What in prince Siddharta is suffering from 'prince Siddharta'? 
To be consistent with our claim at the beginning of this 
chapter, that a specific problem is correlative to a specific 
sensibility - sensibility being the sentience aspect of an 
ongoing way of life - and consistent with our later assertion 
that it is only a greate'r health which suffers from this very 
world itself as we know it, that in prince Siddharta which is 
suffocated by 'prince Siddharta' and by all possible rearrangements 
;' 
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of 'prince Siddharta J~JlI world cannot be named through anything 
belonging to that world. It must be 'something' that needed 
a radically wider, deeper, and freer world such that no 
permutation of this world would do. Anticipating our 
discussion in the next chapter, and with a view to the 
actual later development of the prince into the Buddha, it 
can be said that what suffered from 'prince Siddharta' was 
purity, non-supportedness, ~unyata (or: the Middle Way) 
itsel~ • By analogy, that in 'ZarathustraJ which could not 
help but find the customary world as well as 'Zarathustra' 
-the role of the prophet and idol- unbearable was: Dionysus; 
the confinement within the facts and values of the world 
as well as within 'Zarathustra' being the supreme rule of 
Apollo, or rather, being an: attempt at such a rule. 
Such a conclusion, however, -to refer suffering to 
strange 'principles' like S'rrnyata or Dionysus- would be 
impossible for that anthropocentric modern fashion of 
thinking which ascribes everything in man to 'man'. In other 
words, neither Buddha nor Nietzsche were humanists in any 
sense. 
Thus, prince Siddharta and' Zarathustra' are seized 
I 
by met a p h y sic a I nausea at this world as a whole 
including all the improvements possible within it. To this 
odd company there also belong prince Hamlet and Sartre's 
Roquentin. It clearly is a nausea that cannot be remedied 
by socio-economic 'improvements' such as those envisaged 
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by Marx and his fellow empiricist humanists. Consequently, 
there arises the question to what extent the zeal for socio-
economic 'improvements' is actually a misinterpreted budding 
metaphysical insight and impulse (the reverse of the materialist 
interpretation of religion!). ~etaphysically grounded or not, 
the experience of normal existence as claustrophobic, stagnant, 
and impure by '2arathustra' and prince Siddharta is 
nevertheless a 'physiological' reaction, as Nietzsche calls 
it with a deliberate materialist malice, sooner than a 
moralistic, neurotic, theological, or idealistic one: purity, 
~i1nyata, Dionysus are not abstract ideal principles but the 
very marrow, so to speak, of ongoing existence. For instance, 
Nietzsche writes concerning the beginning of his pregnancy 
with "2arathustra'" Ill; .fil'ld as an omen a sudden and 
36 
profoundly decisive change in my taste". And he says 
that he lIwas the first to dj s c OtV e r the truth by being 
the first to experience lies as lies -smelling them out. -My 
37 
gentll$1i:8 in my nostrils. JI The same imagery of the sheer 
physical repulsiveness of the customarily ongoing existence 
is notorious in Buddhist literature, presumably, as with 
Nietzsche, to emphasize the non-speculative, strikingly vivid, 
immediai'ely moving -one could say: aesthetic, perhaps even 
kinesthetic- ~ non-moralistic character of the ill of the world. 
'Bamsara Jl is the Buddhist name for the everyday experienced 
• 
as oppressive, for the stifling round of finite containments, 
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each born to be dying, the staccato of desperate emotional 
investments which ignobly truncates the true life of man, 
subjecting it to an endless succession of stunted versions of 
itself. Etymologically, the word means as much as I completed 
motion': a movement bound, spell-bound, within an endless 
mirror cabinet of inescapable patterns, birth leading to death, 
death to birth again, and so on, endlessly. A contemporary 
term expressing above all the emotional connotation that the 
word "samsara" has for the Buddhist is "rat race": it 
. 
conveys the same idea of a noxious mixture of desperate 
infatuation, closed repetitiveness, stagnation, and violently 
paced helplessness. But the all-important different between 
"samsara ll and "rat race" is that the Buddhist word is spoken , 
from a I perspective' where ,life itself as we normally know it, 
including its most desirable expressions -symbolized by prince 
Siddharta's childhood circumstances-, is felt to be a rat race, 
worthy of being abandoned as such, not in favor of Nothing, 
as Nietzsche seems to have thought -how seriously, we do not 
know- but in exchange for a truly wholesome and befitting 
life. The traditional image for that new life is the lotus flower; 
"Just aSa blue , red or white lotus, although born in the water, 
grown up in the water, when it reaches the surface stands 
there unsoiled by the water - just so, brahmin, although born 
in the world, grown up in the world, having overcome the 
38 
world, I abide unsoiled by the world." 
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Wherein does the 'rat race' consist? It consists, 
simply and plausibly enough,of arising and perishing, of pursuing 
pleasurable things and a voiding unlikeable things, and of 
orienting oneself by the things of this world. But isn't this 
the whole of existence as we know it? Precisely! Pursuing 
pleasurable (or good) things - desire; a voiding unlikeable (or 
bad) things - a version; orienting oneself by the things of 
this world - delusion (ignorance); these are called 'the 
basic afflictions' or 'the debile structures of existence' 
(klesas) by the Buddhists and are regarded as the roots of 
all \further miseries. But the basic afflictions themselves 
are said to be rooted in the belief in an enduring self, in 
the adherence to the ideas of 'mine' and 'I', in possessive 
claims: Jlthe cycle of birth and death (sarpsara), springs 
39 
from holding the view that the person is real", Whereas 
when H'II and 'mine' have wasted away both inwardly and 
outwardly possessive attachment Gomes to an end and from 
40 
its cessation personal re-birth ceases." "But if ••• there 
is ••• no rebirth ••• (that) is the stopping of this whole 
41 
mass of suffering. J/ If there is no suffering then illness 
has ceased, since the idea of an illness from which there is 
no suffering -not even in the wise- is senseless. In 
samsara the very means and occasions of satisfaction are at 
• 
once the cause and ground for anguish, frustration, and 
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despair. Suffering (guhkh§,) is therefore by no means the 
. 
opposite of pleasure or satisfaction. On the contrary: 
for instance, precisely to the degree to which something 
meets our expectations is it a source of anxiety. But 
this does not mean that we ought to turn away from the 
things and occasions of this world, especially from the 
sources of satisfaction; for then we would still be orienting 
ourselves by the things of this world and expect our 
satisfaction from their opposites, or from opposing them. 
Insofar as a turning away from the things of this world 
is still an action-for-the-sake-of and conditioned by the 
putative natures of things it no more escapes suffering 
(duhkha) than does 'the ordinary uninstructed person' • 
• 
This failure of asceticism to bring forth a redemption from 
suffering was experienced by the Buddha-to-be himself 
during his apprenticeship to the two ascetic hermits: 
regarding their teachings he concl1~ded, JI<This doctrine does 
not lead to aversion, absence of passion, cessation, 
quiescence, knowledge, supreme wisdom, and Nirva~, but 
only as far as the realm of nothingness ••• and the realm 
42 
of neither perception nor yet non-perception. II 
Suffering (siu9,kh§,), as the Buddhists understand it, 
is therefore not comprehensible as actual pain or despair, 
nor as the opposite of satisfaction, and also not as the 
anguish of man's freedom of choice in the existentialist sense. 
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Its fundamental all-pervasiveness lends it rather the 
character of a universal metaphysical substance. At the 
same time it is certain that the concept of metaphysical 
substances is not tenable in any interpretation of Buddhist 
thought. Moreover, suffering is not strictly universal in 
that there is (the possibility of) a release from it, as 
proclaimed in the Buddha's Third Noble Truth. The homogeneous 
ubiquity, so to speak, of suffering, is distinctly a Buddhist 
notion and has not been seen with the same unflustered 
coolness by Nietzsche. But despite -or perhaps because of-
the near-universal reach of suffering it is "only the wise 
whose delusion has been destroyed (who) realize that 
43 
existence is duhkha." The reason "the immature man 
• 44 
does not know the duhkha nature of existence ll is that 
. 
... 
his exclusive emotional investment in time-bound and time-
binding things, the hope he places in as yet unrevealed 
aspects of existence, blinds him to their durkha nature, 
that is, more accurately, to the suffering inherent in his 
very hope itself. He does not realize that no beings arise 
and perish but IIsimply suffering ••• comes to be, suffering 
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• •• perishes and wanes Jl and that therefore his emotional 
investment in beings i s the perpetuation of (his) suffering. 
A further aspect of sam sara is karma. 'Karma' means 
Ii 
both action, volitional action, the vast network of mechanisms 
by which actions and effects are linked to each other, and 
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especially the inevitable coming-to-fruition of each past act 
in the future, i. e. the inescapable exposure to the full 
impact of past action. Thus, 'the past l -which qua ongoing 
fruition of past events is, of course, not past - dominates 
the present. VVIth regard to the unregenerate ways of 
the customarily ongoing existence, 'karma' indicates that 
I unfreedom of the will' which characterizes the activities 
of those who live under the spell of the past or in thrall 
to factors of existence, such as customs, beliefs, objects, 
emotions, praise and blame, personal identity, good and 
evil. To the extent to which a life proceeds under such 
spells it is fettered to certain continuities of material 
happenings and as such it is in thrall to time 0 Acts are 
Karmic, belong to saJTIsara, when they occur wi thin the 
context of the ongoing world being held together by the 
'view that the person is real', i. e. by the assumption of 
personal identity. The assumption of personal identity, of 
temporal being, involves an unconditional adherence to certain 
characters of 'De1;p.g ana. taus eOlJlcpEils tlHt "so ,'&ssume:a.( tQ!u~t to) 
invest himself exclusively into time-bound and time-binding 
forms, for instance, facts and values. To the degree 
that a personal identity is upheld, facts and values relative 
to it are equally persistent. Karmic action refers itself 
to facts and values 0 Because of their identity - relative 
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to the assumed personal identity - one cannot escape the 
fruition of action impinging on them, for one continues to 
relate oneself to 'them', thus submitting to all that comes 
from 'them'. WIthin the stance of a personal identity one 
has no choice but to relate to 'them' since without persistent 
facts and values personal identity could find no substance 
and would collapse. 
Paradoxically, then, the assumption of personal identity 
makes a genuine present impossible for to have such requires 
precisely a recovery of a not-yet-committed, serene and totally 
mobile, that is, calm empoweredness out from the temporal 
maelstrom of intentions, duties, hopes, and occupations. The 
normal way and concept of personal identity is just therefore 
a peculiar absence of 'oneself' • 
The Buddhist concept of saqJ.sara seems to be a 
perverse outlook on life for it denounces as ill those very 
factors of which life consists, as far as we normally know: 
self, things, desires, hopes, aversions, calculations, will. 
It proclaims the shocking thesis that our customary concepts 
of health and human worth, as well as all the thinking and 
activities based on these, even though perhaps not entirely 
false are, in any case, essentially incomplete and, being 
incomplete while regarded as sufficient , have been unable to 
prevent "the sic k 1 i n e s s of the type of man we have 
46 
had hitherto, or at least of the tamed manll. 
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A crucially important inference regarding the nature 
of human suffering, of the human predicament, forces itself 
upon us from the fact, on the one hand, that Nietzsche and 
the Buddhists insist on a physiological-medical imagery to 
characterize the unsatisfactoriness of the customarily ongoing 
existence -while deliberately avoiding a more traditionally 
moralistic, idealistic or soteriological approach- and from 
our assumption, on the other hand, that that in them 
which experienced the normal life world as ill is already a 
greater health. The inference is that insofar as that 
'great health' belongs to man e sse n t i a I I y man-and-
his-life-world is ill precisely to the extent to which -speaking 
with Nietzsche- he has not yet b e com e w hat h e 
is. Because man has not only not yet become what he is 
but is always already investing himself in what-he-is-not 
man is b e sid e himself, in Greek: paranoid. And there 
is an unmistakeable element of paranoia in that misery which 
'2arathustra' and the Buddha discern at the normally 
invisible basis of the customarily ongoing existence: a -normally 
unconscious- sense of being hunted down by time, a consequent 
smoldering ill wUl,and a propensity for toxic palliatives and 
ineffectual infatuations.* 
* If the trend of the present analysis of man's 
predicament is correct, then Marx's thesis that religion is 
opium for the people appears confirmed, in a sense, while 
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Because Nietzsche and the Buddha diagnose man's 
predicament as a paradoxical incongruity between what man 
is factually and what man is in truth they proclaim the cure 
for 't h e sick animal' to consist in a decisive shift - a 
shift from his fixations in 'facts and things' , in 'good and 
evil', and in 'I' and 'mine' - into his right mind, that is, 
since -in their view there is no difference between the two-, 
into his true nature. The implication is, of course, that 
the ordinary world, the factual world, is somehow false, 
and that it is precisely insofar as man adheres and belongs 
to that ordinary, factual -and ritual- world that he has 
not yet become what he is 0 
his derivation of the need for intoxication from inadequate social 
provisions shows itself to have falsely taken for the real ground 
of man's misery only one of the expressions of and compensations 
(namely, inordinate social greed) for man's basic illness 0 
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lfthe err 0 n e 0 usn e s s of the world in which we 
think we live is the surest and firmest fact that we can 
lay eyes on"':< 
Through suffering the customarily ongoing 
world is experienced as an illness. A 
closer examination of this world, and of 
the plness, reveals a fundamental falseness 
... as radical as that of the prisoners in 
Plato's Cave- of the world we inhabit 
and 'perform'. An acquaintance with the 
'theses' of Buddhist dialectical inquiry 
allows us to see and acknowledge the 
strange results of Nietzsche's scepsis. 
The unfamiliar (non-) picture of the 
(non-) world emerging through the efforts 
of an uncompromising scepsis points towards 
the need for a new man to live in that 
(non-) world. 
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We have said that the i r suffering from the world 
as customarily known eventually comes to mean to 'Zarathustra l 
and to prince Siddharta that it is not they themselves who are 
ill but the ongoing world, or rather, that the ongoing world is 
their illness. The experience of a seeming infirmity of oneself 
gets turned around into a diagnosis of ill somehow inhering in 
that ongoing world, although it is admitted that this ill is 
normally imperceptible, inconceivable in terms of the normal 
transactions of men and the world, and 'a truth only for the 
wise'. 
'World' in this sense is a dynamic character, not an 
assembly of objects or an array of facts. Neither is it 
external or internal, objective or subjective, but is that 
wherein object and subject first occur, and occur in such a 
way that the object is that which appears relative to a 
subjectivity kept fixed. 
The sense and point of attributing ill to the world rather 
than to oneself is not to pretend oneself uninfected by its 
sickness but is rather that insofar as one actually i s ill the 
cure is to be sought not in a readjusting and returning to that 
customarily ongoing world but in a radical overcoming of that 
world altogether. 
Still, their suffering from the world of normal human 
existence would be madness after all or a fatal flaw i.n their 
psychosomatic constitution if indeed the world in truth w ere , 
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fundamentally even though perhaps not yet in scientific detail, 
as we normally think it, if, in other words, any truly radi cal 
step out of the customarily ongoing ways of men necessarily 
were a plunge into Nothingness. As we have seen, even 
Nietzsche seems to have held the view that the Buddhist 
prescription amounted to just that 0 
However, both Nietzsche and the Buddhists emphatically 
characterize this stepping ou.t of a!l'.d oyercomi:ng the customary 
world as at the same time a step i n t 0 our original nature, 
as a becoming who -or what- we are in. tru.th. 
In view of the tradition of certain words we must 
guard against taking the reference to 'our original nature' 
here to imply an anthropological differentiation between the 
natural and the artificial, a distinction between the empirical 
man and his Platonic essence, a historical comparison a la 
Rousseau between the savage and the citizen, a Kantian 
distinction between phenomenon and noumenon, or the idea of 
some underlying or hidden stratum producing I us' as we know 
ourselves 0 
N or is it implied by speaking of lour original nature' 
that this 'nature' is 0 u r s, is specific to us. The phenomenon 
of 'ourness l , of 'self l , as well as that of consciousness, may 
well have a 'nature' which cannot be thought in terms of Imine' 
and 'thine'. The step into 'our original nature' is meant rather 
as a rapprochement with what we are in truth. Here again, 
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'truth' is not a certainty about something, a primordial 
disclosedness of something, a correct belief, or what we 
'really' are underneath the mask of personality. 
Both Nietzsche and the Buddhists regard the nature of 
man's illness, namely, of the ill man, as a fundamentally false 
relationship to the truth of existence 0 Normally, man i s 
that false relationship 0 The customarily ongoing existence 
consists, somehow, of a step 'out' of the original nature of 
man, 'away' from what we are in truth, and into a false 
relationship to that truth. However, in their view, these 
'errors' which spell-bind the normal world do not consist of 
insufficient data, false beliefs or mistaken calculations such 
that additional information, true beliefs or correct results 
would put the ongoing human existence on its way to recovery. 
More radically, the customary human existence is e sse n t i all y 
in 'error' so that a cure would alter the very character of 
human existence. It would therefore do so in ways, and result 
in traits, inconceivable by and unrealizable within that existence, 
since the ongoing substance of health is different from that 
of ill, and the healthy man is a different man than the 
sick one. liTo translate man back into go. that eternal basic 
text of hom 0 nat u r a, •• 0 'Why did we choose this 
1 
insane task?" 
But Nietzsche answers his own question in innumerable 
formulations which attempt to pierce the heart of man's 
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illness. He chooses 'this insane task' because he sees 
"Der Mensch, e i n g e s per r t in einen eisernen 
Kafig von I r r tum ern , eine Carikatur des Menschen 
geworden, krank, kummerlich, gegen sich selbst boswillig, 
voller Hass auf die Antriebe zum Leben, voller Misstrauen 
gegen alles, was schon und glUcklich ist am Leben, ein 
2 
wandelndes .Elend ••• H (My emphasis). 
The Buddhist answer is similar: he sees the ordinary 
man "holding a speculative view (d:~'Fi), the wilds, wriggling, 
scuffling and fetter of speculative views (dtsti). Fettered 
. .. 
by this fetter, the ordinary uninstructed person is not freed 
from birth, from ageing and dying or from grief, sorrow, 
3 
suffering, lamentation and despair"; we "err about like 
antelopes on the evil paths of this forest, of this jungle, 
of this p r i son -this ineluctable sam sara-
. 
paths full of 
the pitfalls of f a u 1 t y vie w s which those astray 
4 
follow." {My emphasis) 
The value of holding up Buddhist thought as a mirror 
next to that of Nietzsche is that it gives us not only the 
inspiration but above all the courage to take Nietzsche seriously 
on his own terms, which we would hardly be able to if we 
assimilated him into our Western ~ackground, that is, by 
means of the Greco-Christian paradigms. Without the 
encouragement from an already established tradition, such as 
that of Buddhism, whose outlook differs no less radically from 
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what we are accustomed to, than Nietzsche's, a reading 
of Nietzsche is irresistibly drawn to regarding him either as 
a metaphysician, a nihilist, or - a poet. 
Whereas to Nietzsche's searches and researches a 
metaphysical intent could still be ascribed -for instance, by 
Heidegger- with a measure of plausibility, Buddhist thinking 
and teaching from its very beginnings in the sermons of 
the Buddha expressly proceeds in the service of man's 
reconvalescence into a great health, his consecration, and 
his initiation into his true nature as into that of all things, 
rather than for the sake of 'truth', 'knowledge', 'improvement', 
'utility', or 'progress'. Thus it shares with Nietzsche's 
passion the unflinching directness and incandescent purity of 
intent which refuses to be side-tracked into embellishing 
man's disease, dispensing oonsolation, justifying man's 
compromises, locating guilty ones, or rallying around social 
reform programs. The Buddha declares that he explains only 
what "is connected with the goal, is fundamental to the 
Brahma-faring, and conduces to turning a way from, to 
dispassion, stopping, calming, super-knowledge, a wakening 
5 
and nirva:g.a." Nevertheless, as thinking it cannot articulate 
itself without polarities and without a tension direction for 
which, however, it takes the distinctions of illness (duJ:kha) 
and nirvana, ignorance (avtdya) and enlightenement, duality and 
• :c 
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~tinyata, rather than those of not-being and being, falsehood 
and truth, evil and good, uninformedness and knowledge, or 
conservation and progress. The concept of "being", on the 
contrary, always is unambiguously linked with illness and so 
are all those modes of thinking and conduct which depend on 
or imply that concept. "Why do you harp on Ibeing'? It 
is a false view ••• Here no 'being' is got at." Instead, 
"it is simply suffering that comes to be, suffering that 
perishes and wanes, ••• (and) naught else than suffering is 
6 
stopped." 
The stretch between illness (duhkha) and (its) 
. 
extinction (nirva\la) without the concepts of 'being' or 'the 
good' can seem too narrow a basis for thinking and more 
suitable for escapists and other misfits - until it is realized 
how our very being is steeped in illness. Then the task of 
a thinking that wishes to lead man out of his misery changes 
profoundly in character: from serving the security and 
advantages of the ongoing existence in terms of its own 
concepts and values it begins to serve a transmutation of that 
existence itself as well as of all its sensibilities. But an attempt 
at a transmutation would again proceed under the spells of 
the ongoing existence if it were to take any of its orienting 
elements or definitions from that existence. A thinking in the 
service of a transmutation must therefore go against the grain 
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of those basic characters which both define and maintain 
the pre-transmuted state -the customarily ongoing existence-
in itself. The most distinctive common denominator, the 
very symbol of, as well as the crucial support for 'good' and 
'evil' within, the normal everyday is the concept of 'being' • 
It is so not only once it has become the philosopher's trademark 
but already in the very fabric of everyday life whence, in turn, 
the philosopher destills both his rarefied version and its 
importance. Metaphysics, as the attempt to fix the features 
of being, to comprehend the truth of existence through 
judgements, is not the philosopher's invention or prerogative 
but a spontaneous tendency of the human mind and, as mind, 
inherent in everyday living. 
However, even a thinking which does not refer itself 
to any beings as its support or validation but which nevertheless 
serveS as a valid guiding thread in our lives must be regarded 
as a form of knowledge. For that very reason it is necessary 
to distinguish between knowledge and what the Buddhists call 
"prajna", the former connoting any way of thinking that 
supposes itself justified by, aimed at, and grasping hold of 
real beings, the latter signifying, not just a way of thinking, 
but a way of living which nowhere assumes itself supported 
by, in t ouch with, requiring, or leading to, the reality of 
beings, The latter , avoiding both the thesis that any something 
is and the thesis that nothing is, goes by the name of "The 
Middle Wayll (Madhyamika). On the Middle Way it is not the 
same to believe that p, on the one hand, and to think p and 
act as if p, on the other hand. From the standpoint -or 
rather, on the way- of Erajna the axiom does not hold that 
lip = 'pi is true", for the simple reason that not anything is 
held to be true (as such) 0 Through prajna all things step 
into the light of their own nature without being distorted by 
being viewed, in the manner of knowledge, as a means to our 
ambition. For example, it is the way of knowledge which 
presumes that lito a fiction there surely belongs an author" 
while it is the way of prajna that replies, "w 1;1 y ? Doesn't 
7 
this 'belongs l perhaps belong to the fiction, too? II Wilen 
therefore, the Buddha say~, "I see no other single hindrance 
such as this hindrance of ignorance, obstructed by which 
8 
mankind for a long time runs on and circles on (Le., in sarpsara)1I 
the ignorance in question is the lack of s a v i n g 'knowledge' 
not a scarcity of information or the insufficie~cy of available 
scientific knowledge. But is the saving 'knowledge' knowledge 
or prajna? What is the nature of this saving 'knowledge': 
Does it have for its object something eternal and unchangeable, 
or something wholly good, or something indubitably certain? 
Does it preserve that very schema of 'knowingl which calls 
for an object? Does it grasp hold of another world, a better 
world which is thoroughly good, wholesome, and which rests in 
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its original nature? Does it expound the ways of true being? 
Does it instruct us in the characters of our original nature? 
Does it preserve eternal truths? 
On the contrary. From the beginning it is made clear 
that not only is the bringing forth of the true and original 
man not dependent on but is incompatible with the establishment 
or knowledge of truths. The "saintly wise man ••• does not ••• 
claim to possess or to indubitably cognize any element of 
9 
existence whatever. JJ Subhuti, among the Buddha's disciples 
the foremost spokesman -according to the Mahayana- for 
10 
"the Buddha's might Jl claims that there "is nothing to 
understand ••• F or nothing in particular has been indicated, 
nothing in particular has been explained ••• no dharma at all 
11 
has been indicated, lit up, or communicated." In the same 
vein, Nagarjuna, the strictest dialectical expounder of the 
Buddha's Middle Way, says that "no 'Truth' has been taught 
12 
by a buddha for anyone anywhere." And CandrakTrti, his 
commentator, continues: JlThere is no true doctrine concerning 
njrva:p.a ••• and there is no final triumph over sarp§ara for those 
13 
who search persistently for nirv~:p.a as something existent. JI 
The reason for this paradoxical, indeed, from a Greek and 
Christian standpoint hardly intelligible, 'state of affairs' is 
that the "Truth, properly understood, is devoid of a reality 
of its own, (and) enlightenment, properly understood, is 
14 
(also) devoid of a reality of its own". In other words, the 
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ultimate teaching of the Buddha is not about anything! 
The saving 'knowledge', then, whatever the nature of 
its efficacy and 'content' , is most certainly not a species of 
.""-knowledge but is a kind of praJna.. If by lIscientificll we 
mean: basing itself on, aiming at or serving a reference to 
(at least some) beings regarded as real, then the Buddhist 
prajna and its correlative use of language is not scientific. 
Its purpose is not to know the world or to explain its ways 
-n a mel y , to do so in the service of other purposes 
such as (technological) manipulation within and for the sake of 
the customarily ongoing world- but to act as a medicine 
against its illness and to 'ferry' man over into a great health 
and into his original nature. 
But how is it possible' to 'ferry' man over tnt 0 the great 
health by means of an instruction where there 'is nothing to 
understand •• (where) nothing in particular has been indicated 
••• explained •• g or communicated', especially when as a result of 
this Iferrying over' there is not anyone who is established in 
the great health just as there is no one who can grasp the 
perfect wisdom (prajnaparami6i) which serves as the 'ferry'? 
What are we to think of that great health when its embodiment, 
the Buddha, replies to the question whether he is a human being, 
15 
"No, indeed, ••• I am not a human being. lI ? Is this 'cure' 
perhaps worse than the 'disease'? If it is true in the Buddhist 
case too that the 'substance' of the healed man is different from 
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that of the ill man, must we not conclude that it is Nothing 
since there is 'nothing to understand', 'no 'truth' has been 
taught', nirvatla 'is not something existent' , and since on the 
other shore of the great health and original nature "No wisdom 
can we get hold of, no highest perfection, no Bodhisattva, and 
16 
no thought of enlightenment eitherl/? That is, Jlthere is 
no individual as such who has gone beyond. There is neither 
a shore here nor there; it is merely a manner of speaking 
to say you have crossed over. Neither do the words you utter 
exist, nor does what you speak about exist, nor does he with 
17 
whom you speak exist nor he who comprehends. /I 
A cure is determined by the character of the illness 
and by the nature of health. If thinking is to act as a guide 
out of man's ill and to 'ferry' him over into his great health 
and original nature then it can make positive prescriptions, 
reveal something to be understood, disclose beings, and teach 
requisite 'truths' only if such fundamental schemata as 
, 
'understanding/explaining something', 'knowing a truth', 'being 
in the world' , and 'being one who .grasps wisdom' remain valid 
within the context of the great health and original nature. 
In the Buddhist view, the 'substance' of the ill man is 
eliJlgiDg Uft 1,gtll'J:ta1lce'.'(i!¢dyi>. 
Are knowledge -as distinct from prajI{a-and the wish 'to be 
taught something' themselves forms of clinging? Is the very 
view of oneself as a 'human being' a happening of ignorance? 
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Is the reliance on 'truths' -even if for the sake of redemption-
a feature of the ongoing illness? Is all action-for-the-sake-of 
both an expression and a cause of suffering? Is the very 'being 
this-and-this particular person' already a descent into illness? 
If so then knowledge, 'being human', purposeful action, 
having a personal identity, and the reliance on 'truths' cannot 
Serve as a basis for the great health or as reference points 
by which to 'become who we are', by which to coincide with 
our original nature. 
In our everyday life we will things, we intend to do 
things and occupy ourselves with things, things both present 
at hand and imagined. A more non-committal description of 
our customarily ongoing existence can hardly be given, and yet 
f 
it is concerning precisely this seemingly innocuous tapestry of 
everyday life that the Buddhists say':' JlThat which we will and 
that which we intend to do and that with which we are occupied, 
this is an object for the support of consciousness. If there 
is an object there is a foothold for consciousness. With 
consciousness growing in this foothold there is rebirth and 
recurrent becoming in the future. If there is rebirth and 
recurrent becoming in the future, ageing and dying, grief, 
sorrow, suffering, lamentation and despair come into being 
in the future. Thus is the arising of this whole mass of 
.. 18 
suffering. Clearly, on the one hand, if there is a consistent 
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occupation with things then there will arise the concept of 
'myself' as 'the one who' is the center of these relations 
with things, while, on the other hand, if there already is 
a concept of 'myself' there will always be things, relations 
and horizons correlate to it. This unity of things in the 
world and 'the one who' relates to them - a unity which in 
the previous chapter was referred to as IIkarma" - has 
articulated by Heidegger in "Being and Time". By an 
astonishing coincidence of insight Heidegger, too, unveils 
a specific inescapable anguish pertaining to being 'one who' 
relates to things in the world, as well as the essentially 
temporal, and predominantly futural, significance of this 
anguish. Howeve::ve:r, due to taking 'thrown' Dasein, namely, 
being-in-the-world, that is, being a 'particular one who' relates 
to beings in the world - i. e., ,karma - as the starting point, 
base level, and ceiling of his ontology Heidegger could have 
arrived neither at the link between the supportedness 
(intentionality) of consciousness and illness nor at the 
possibility of a fund.amental release from this illness or anguish. 
How, then, are we to understand the Buddhist notion of an 
essential link between birth and illness, the claim that lIill is 
19 
birth again and againll, while IINirvana" - the extinction 
• 
of ill, the entry into the great health and our original nature -
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II (is) the utter extinction of ageing and dyingll? Are we 
not born? Are we not thrown beings-in-the-world? How 
can our health consist in not even being born? A m I not 
this being? A.L'1d, as this being, how can there be for me 
'the utter extinction of ageing and dying'? If these questions 
have solutions -and the Buddhists claim they do- it is certain 
that with regard to them, and in regard already to understanding 
the meaning of these questions, an ontology such as Heidegger l s 
in !'Being and Time ll leaves us in the lurch. There, each of 
us i s a particular, thrown being-in-the-world, and the best 
we can do about our fundamental anguish as such thrown 
Daseins is to convert it into an alert resoluteness which 
takes full possession of our short span of life and refuses 
henceforth to be the puppet of mere drifting opinions and 
projects heedless of the anguished seriousness of the briefness 
and frailty of being-in-the-w orld. 
It is possible to Iferry' man .over into the great health 
by means of an instruction where not anything in particular 
is explained or pointed out and where no 'truth' is given as 
a foothold only if all explanation and reliance on things pointed 
out and on 'truths' themselves are errors and part and parcel 
of man's ill and false nature, - and if the opposite of, or 
rather, the cure from, an error is not necessarily a I truth' 
or knowledge. Does the concept of 'error', or that of 'delusion', 
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imply 'truth' as its opposite? It does not if both assent and 
negation, both acceptance and rejection, both Yes and No 
-that is, insofar as they are applied to any determinate 
particular- belong to 'error' or 'delusion'. 
It is a fundamental and unambiguous Buddhist tenet that 
the customarily ongoing existence is essentially based on a species 
of error, indeed, that it i s a species of error itself. !I'The 
everyday' means total concealment. (The) •• ignorance arising 
from the utter concealment of the true nature of things is 
21 
called the everyday." And "ignorance, (in turn,) is the 
root cause of ill (d~kha), of the entire conglomerate of 
22 
afflictions from birth on." But the saving 'knowledge' , 
the opposite of that fundamental ignorance, has no object of 
its own. This is so because Jlthe exhaustive totality of words 
and transactions which are based on the distinction between 
knowing and the thing known, naming and the thing named, and 
so on, is what is meant by the t:r:-uth or reality of the 
23 
everyday personal world." The Buddhist name for 'the 
everyday personal world' is 'samvrti'. Knowledge-which-has 
an-object belongs to the ill world, is part of man's illness itself. 
Consequently, the curative 'knowledge', the saving prajna, cannot 
consist in the revelation or cognition of a saving object or 
truth, for the correlative knower would still be ill, his 
'substance' still being clinging (to a special saving object or 
truth) and ignorance (the operation of error-activities). 
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Instead of functioning within the schema of knowing-known, and 
thus correlative to an unredeemed knower, the redemptive r 
'knowledge' must act rather as a sword cutting through a 
knot: through the knot of ignorance, ile1usi. •• and clinging. 
For "Satpsara, endures as long as the entanglement in the 
twin dogmas, that things are real or that they are not, 
24 
endures. " In the customarily ongoing world so entangled, 
"things which do not exist in themselves appear in fact to 
do so to the immature, common people who are in the grip 
25 
of the illusory notion of 'mine' and 'me"'. More specifically, 
anyone "who, having foisted on things this notion that they 
have self-existent natures, affirms or denies it and ••• 
insists upon them stubbornly ••• will be fettered in the cycle 
26 
of unregenerate existence \sarpsara). II The curative 
Rrajna, therefore, acts as an un-doing sooner than as a 
doing, as a conscious not-knowing (quite possibly in Socrates' 
sense!) sooner than as a knowing. Its strange non-reliance 
upon knowledge and non-engagement in an everyday personal 
world (sa,myrti), its subtle avoidance of these two decisive 
. 
factors of the world of ill C§amsara), is a.1so suggested by 
. 
the consistent characterization of nirvana as a cessation or 
coming to rest, namely, of ill ongoings)" True wholesomeness 
is the abiding in the true nature of things, while illness is 
the abiding in a false nature of things. The 'ferrying' over 
of man into the great health takes place by un-doing, 'del-knowing 
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(his abiding in) the false nature of things 'back' - or 'forward' 
- into (an abiding in) the true nature of things. This is 
possible because 'the ill' is at the same time 'the not-ill' 
because "there is no ontic difference whatever between 
samsara and nirvana", because, as lithe revered one has 
. . 
said 0 .. , ISarpsara, .. 0 which consists of birth, decay and 
death, is the highest existence'. 1127 
But this doctrine, that lIsaJ:?sara and nirvalfa are in 
28 
essence oneil, seems even less intelligible than the doctrine 
that the very customarily ongoing existence itself is, in some 
sense, an illness: with regard to the latter view it is possible, 
at least, to imagine a healthier existence and to embark upon 
man's cure and transformation by means of such strategies 
as social reform, technological progress, improved education, 
and genetic engineering 0 But how could illness and health be 
I in essence one'? On the other hand, only if they are in 
essence one can the curative 'knowledge l be one which 
presents no' new truth or object 0 If their essences were 
\ , 
different then the redemptive knowledge would have to point 
out and grasp those special characters which belong to health 
rather than illness Q Our perplexity, however, concerning the 
identity of the nature of sarpsara and the nature of nirva¥C2-.. 
relies upon one crucial tacit presuppositi.on: that the everyday, 
the customarily ongoing world, is real as such, is real precisely 
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in respect of those characters which in its own opinion are 
fundamental to it, and that man i s as he is known in that 
world according to those characters. For if the everyday 
were not real as such but w ere a misunderstanding of 
the true nature of things, as well as an asso.ciated 
'malpractice', then the essential identity of sa~sara and 
nirvana would be no more -but also no less- puzzling than a 
happening of stage magic. For a magician's act can be 
perceived in two fundamentally different ways: in the manner 
of the audience who is taken in by his performance, or with 
the appreciation of one who knows his tricks. Or perhaps 
we should liken satpsara to the disappointing experience of 
one who is deceived by an itinerant magician whom he does 
not know to be such, losing money in bets with him, as well 
as missing his watch afterwards; while we would think of 
nirva~a as like meeting that same itinerant magician but 1eina 
cognizant of his tricks and enjoying the performance - and 
keeping our watch too. 
How real then, is the customarily ongoing world in respect 
of those characters which in its own understanding are 
fundamental to it? Does the sort of understanding which 
helongs to the everyday world abide in the truth of things? 
What does the healing Rrajna reveal concerning, or do wi.th, 
those fundamental characters and understandings? Is the 
analogy of a magician's act fitting? How does knowledge, 
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insofar as it has an object, belong to ill? How would the 
supportedness of consciousness lead to 'the arising of this 
whole mass of suffering'? And, how i.s it that ill is 
associated with the ways of the customarily ongoing existence, 
namely, if the analogy of the magician is an appropriate one, 
with (exclusively) following the lead of his clues? 
Probably the most concise refutation, among Buddhist 
thinkers, of any belief in the everyday was performed by 
Nagarjuna. We shall therefore summarize his argument 
concerning the fundamental characters of the customarily 
ongoing existence. 
These fundamental characters are: entity, self, good 
and bad, causality, time 0 Normally we believe that entities 
come into being and perish, that they interact, for instance, 
causally, that they succeed each other in time, that some 
are good and some are bad, that we can act upon them, 
and that we can know truths about them 0 We also suppose 
ourselves to be perishable entities, and we pursue good things, 
avoid bad things, and orient ourselves by facts. We believe 
our suffering to be caused by losses, disappointments, and 
injuries, and our happiness by gains, satisfactions, and 
securities. We presume that we can do things, that we 
think, experience joy and sorrow, and have certain properties. 
Such might be Nagarjuna1s sketch of the characteristic 
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framework of the customarily ongoing existence. 
Generative of these fundamental characters and of 
this basic framework is the central myth -because of its 
special status one cannot call it an assumption- that things 
have their own natures. This myth is the first metaphysics 
in that it presumes to have fixed certain features of being, 
to have grasped hold of a corner of truth by means of certain 
judgements. In Greece this spontaneous metaphysics found 
its consummate expression in Plato's theory of Ideas. But 
Plato did not invent it; it seems, rather, to be an innately 
spontaneous naive view. The enormous significance and fertile 
power of implication of this central myth can, however, only 
be appreciated against the contrast of a radical alternative 
and its ramifications, in turn. After all, even modern science 
still believes that (certain) things -e. g. Ifundamental' particles, 
radiation, or energy- have their own natures, that, therefore, 
there are laws of nature, so that, consequently, explanation 
is reduced to prediction 0 But it could be that only 
f a 1 s i f i cat ion makes possible prediction, while 
an adequate account effectively dissolves the situation as far 
as the physicist is concerned 0 
Nagarjuna, in his argument to exhibit the mistakenness 
of the everyday view of the world, draws upon two principles 
of argumentation: the logic of non-contradiction, and the simple 
\ 
\ 
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evidence of solid common sense. Both the everyday view and 
the various theories of rival philosophical schools are dismissed 
on grounds of either ignoring the simplest common sense or 
implying contradictions. Methodically, his argument proceeds 
by insisting upon strict concreteness of reference. In this 
manner, his own reasoning, which fits itself completely to 
the actual ongoings, is able to emphasize the contrast to 
a reasoning which tacitly presupposes the inherence in beings 
of 'their) own natures. The net effect, of course, is 
not to exhibit any new facts, or to prove anything about 
'reality' -for both 'facts' and 'reality' are based on the 
customarily ongoing frame of reference- but to clear up 
the way things are by dispelling the customary unconscious 
leanings towards and beginnings of delusion. 
Normally we believe, for instance,' that entities 
;:It: 
(svabhava)· come into being, perish, and undergo diverse 
alterations during their existence.. But in order to speak 
of 'alterations' we must posit something that remains the same. 
This something is precisely that which is normally thought to 
come into being, and to perish. In the case of myself this 
something is, of course, I myself. With respect to entities 
>:< In contrast to the Greeks and the moderns, Indian 
thinkers never used the distinction between essence and 
existence. 
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in general this something is said to be that which the entity 
in question is. And a Il characteristic which is invariable 
in a thing is com;nonly said to be its essential (or own) 
nature; that is, it is not conjoined with any other thing. 
For example, heat is said to be the essential nature of fire 
because in all experience it invariable accompanies fire. 
Heat is not the essential (or own) nature of water because 
it arises from extraneous conditions and because it is 
29 
something artificially produced. II Thus far the notion of 
essential nature is perfectly uncontroversial; in a sense, 
so far it represents no more than a figure of speech, an 
abbreviative formula of thought, an organization of 
experience, an accentuation of perception, and a ...,guide for 
simple discriminative action. The controversy begins when 
we ask whether that essential, own nature is something real 
or unreal, whether the being in question has this nature 
or lacks it, whether such natures. 'endure' even while the 
appropriate entities are absent, endure perhaps eternally, and 
whether, in fact,there i s a being named by that nature, 
Continuing his example of fire, CandrakTrti, Nagarjuna's 
commentator, unequivocally claims, IJBut if this invariable 
essential nature is something real, then because of its 
invariableness it could not become other. After all, coldness 
cannot become a property of fire. Thus, if we accept 
an essential nature in things, alteration is not possible. But, 
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and here he appeals to simple sensory evidence, "alteration 
i s directly perceived in things so there can be no essential 
30 
nature. II 
In other words, if a being undergoes alterations 
during its existence then there must be something that remains 
the same, namely, that being which undergoes these alterations, 
that is to say, that nature by virtue of which a given entity 
is this being rather than some other one, by virtue of which 
this being can be said to have endured. At the same time, 
if this invariable essential nature which supposedly pertains 
to the actual being -that actual being which, as we have 
said, continually undergoes certain changes- is something 
real then because of its invariableness it could not become 
other for that would be a contradiction • But if the being 
in question failed to remain the same then its nature, being 
both invariable and real, w ouId still endure -since not to endure 
would mean a change in its characteristic as nature- while at 
the same time the altered being would now have a different 
nature as well, namely, one characteristic of its new identity, 
also real and invariable g But this is logically impossible. 
'Thus, if we accept an essential nature in things, alteration 
is not possible.' It is not possible because, in Nagarjuna1s 
reasoning, the reality of an invariable nature mea n sits 
enduring as this nature; such an enduring is necessarily 
permanent since any 'perishing' or 'v:anishingl would imply a 
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variation on the part of the invariable, and thus a contradiction. 
"Real change of the nature of something is not logically possible • 
• • • (B )ecause of the unchangeableness of a true nature, change 
31 
would never be logically possible. JJ But it is plainly evident 
that there is alteration, even if that is /I said (only) with 
reference to the experience of change as understood by 
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others. JJ Consequently, beings have no essential particular 
natures. That is to say, there is not anything that remains 
the same during alterations: the alterations do not pertain 
to, qualify or modify an enduring or underlying identity. This 
means that it is actually not at all a (namely n one~) being 
which undergo'eB changes. Therefore, no entity at all has 
come into being since at no time i s there an entity. But 
to speak of non-enduring entities makes no sense; thus, if 
we suppose that the invariable essence or own nature 
supposedly pertaining to beings is real then we must conclude 
that there are not, have never been, and will never be any 
beings. 
On the other hand, if we suppose that the invariable 
essence or own nature of an entity is not real then it follows 
that any given entity cannot in reality have any nature (of 
its own, i.e. essential nature) since it makes no sense to 
say of beings that they have unreal natures. But it is by 
virtue of their essential nature remaining the same that we 
speak of beings remaining self-identical, and therefore speak 
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of beings at all since 'non-enduring being' is a senseless 
expression. Since beings do not in reality have any particular 
essential natures, 'beings' themselves cannot be said to exist. 
Thus we must conclude once again that there are not, have 
never been, and will never be any beings. 
It follows that I myself, regarded as a being, also do 
not have an essential nature (of my own) 0 Consequently, 
it cannot consistently be said that I, as this particular 
entity, came into being, endure and shall perish. Thus, I 
cannot claim to be a self. Not being a self, how can I 
ascribe to myself the power to act, thinking, suffering and 
joy, how can I 'have' qualities? Neither cogito, nor sum: 
"If the self is 
Thus "here is 
also is "there 
33 
non-existent how will anything be one's own?" 
34 
no self, no real person, no birth." Hence 
. 35 
••• no one who can grasp (the perfect wl.sdom)." 
This complete absence of being in things is named "S'unyata" 
by the Buddhists. Significantly epough, this absence of being 
in things is equated with "the exhaustion of all theories and 
36 
view s II • CandrakTrti comments, liThe exhaustion (nihsaranam), 
• • 
the ceasing to function of all ways of holding to fixed concepts 
stemming from theories or views (dr?t:i) of any kind whatsoever 
37 
is the absence of being in things 0 H 
Moreover, "If 0'0 one defines time as 'dependent on things' 
then insofar as things are not real, time, being based on them, 
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is necessarily not real either. Jf In a previous argument 
Nagarjuna reasons that time independent 6f things does not 
make sense either i "thus 
39 
• •• there is no time. II But in 
the absence of beings and time, causality is impossible too. 
Finally, as regards good and bad, these are customarily 
attributed to beings or other enduring characters. Since 
such do not exist", and since, moreover, there is no lone who' 
(e. g. myself) can be said to pursue good and avoid bad, 
'good' and 'bad' are inapplicable notions as well. 
According to Nagarjuna1s extremely terse reasoning, 
then, -of which we have given only a brief sketch- the 
entire structure of the customarily ongoing existence, rooted 
as it is in the inconsistent or counterevidential notion of being, 
shows itself to be untenable when taken strictly seriously on 
the basis of its own two most fundamental principles, those 
of non-contradiction and unsophisticated solid common sense. 
In "projecting the notion of self -existence and so creating the 
40 
everyday world" the customarily ongoing existence ,..including 
its scientifically sophisticated elaboration- i s itself the 
fundamental falsification of the truth of existence, the 
fundamental step 'out' of the original nature of man. In other 
words, it is the so-called waking mind belonging to normal 
existence that conceals the truth of things. 
But, all is not lost; for" (t )hat which, taken as causal or 
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dependent, is the process of being born and passing on, 
(sam sara) is, taken non-causally and beyond all dependence, 
. 41 
declared to be nirvana." That is, as we have said before, 
. 
"there is no ontic difference whatever between sam sara and 
• 
. - 1,42 nIrvana. . Prajl1a, the saving 'knowledge', need not 
I 
strain to grasp hold of divine or rare and elusive truths, 
need not stretch itself after esoteric facts. . Ignorance 
(a vldya) consists in constructing the everyday world through 
projecting and enacting the notion of self-existence. 
Prajna consists in unravelling and Hluminatingthis 
process: the absence of being (of particular self -existent 
natures) in things is not again an attribute of things or a 
'truth' or Ifact' to be discovered. Rather, the "exhaustion 
(ni?-saravam), the ceasing to function of all ways of holding 
to fixed concepts stemming from theories or views (drstl) of 
• •• 43 
any kind whatsoever is (itself) the absence of being in things. JI 
The non-functioning of ignorance is itself the entry into the 
great health, the coincidence with our original nature. But 
"those for whom the absence of being is itself a theory they 
1144 (are) declared to be incurable. In view of the ontic 
coincidence of sam sara and nirvana the customarily ongoing 
, . 
existence cannot be said to be a separate ill reality, or a 
separately real illness. Any material manipulation for the sake 
of restoring man to his right mind and into his great health 
would merely continue the fatal indulgence in beings and thus 
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perpetuate the fundamental ill. The essential identity of 
sa!?sara and ntrviit;la bears, therefore, a striking analogy to 
a magician's act as perceived by those who are deluded by 
his tricks into believing in them as the events which they 
seem to be, and as Seen by those who qire not so, for "All compound 
things are not what they pretend to be and are therefore 
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unreal" while customarily taken by the unenlightened as real 
It is appropriate to call the analogue to that which through 
.,J_ praJna is the way things truly are, and which through knowledge 
is the customary everyday world, fa magician's act' since it 
is not possible to 'explain' the feats of the magician by recourse 
to the elements and events which he presents and describes 
and which are vividly perceived by his audience, without falling 
prey precisely to the delusion which his tricks are able to 
produce. The audience's attempt to 'explain' the magician's 
feats in terms of what he has presented and declared to 
them corresponds in the customarily ongoing world, however, 
to the endeavour of scientists to 'explain' the events of this 
universe in terms of Ifundamental' elements and 'laws of nature' 
From a Buddhist perspective, the;t, the Scientifically instrumented 
and choreographed endeavour to free man from his miseries fails 
to extricate man from his fundamental ill health and false nature, 
as do, for the same reason, social reform, political reorganization 
and moral improvement. 
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Our excursus into Buddhist thought has shown us that 
the highest 'truth', more accurately, the highest teaching, 
need neither be nor convey knowledge, and that an overcoming 
of the ill world and the transformation of 'the sick animal' 
into an embodiment of a g:rJeat healt;h may at the same time 
demand a step from the familiar world of being into a strange 
(non-) world characterized by the abscence of being and all 
the ramifications of that absence. .We shall see that without 
such a model of intrepid investigation and uncompromising 
conclusions bound by no promises to fulfill familiar preconceptions 
I 
we should hardly have dared to take Nietzsche seriously even 
where he himself most empbatically demands that of us 0 
Immediately after his· question "Why did we choose this 
insane task? (i.e., of translating man back into nature) 
Nietzsche writes: "Or, putting it differently: 'why have 
itSa 
knowledge at all?"'. 'Putting it differently' f6.ays: the task of 
knowledge as Nietzsche understands it is somehow related to 
r 
the endeavour of 'translating man back into nature'. Knowledge 
can have a redemptive function. The cure is to 'translate man 
back into nature' while a certain kind of knowledge acts as 
a strong medicine or catalyst. But the reason man is to be 
translated back into nature is that "the many vain and overly 
enthusiastic interpretations and connotations that have so far 
been scrawled and painted over that eternal basic text of 
hom 0 nat u r a 0 •• , •• ( those) siren songs of old 
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metaphysical bird catchers ll have made man ill: "Der Mensch 
46 
ist das wahnsinnig gewordene Tierll. 'To translate man back 
into nature': this is the formula for the intent animating 
Nietzsche's whole philosophy. The German word IIzuruckubersetzen" 
has connotations lacking in the English term, among them 
also the literal meaning 'to ferry back across (the river)l , 
which would be a precise rendering of the Buddhist metaphor 
for their own task: "_yana ll in the three Buddhist Yanas 
means (ferry) vehicle! Thus, the German term has not only 
the sense of 'restating l but also of regaining.: when one ferries 
accross the river one literally reaches the other shore, not 
merely, as in 'translation', another formulation! 
But what is the nature of this saving 'knowledge'? Does 
it have for its object something eternal and unchangeable, or 
something wholly good, or something indubitably certain? Does 
it preserve the very schema which calls for an object? Is 
knowledge-which-has-an-object itself a part of that veil 
over homo natura? Must the saving knowledge know man's 
original nature?: Must this nature be knowable? Or is it 
perhaps revenge itself, 'the will's ill will against time and 
its 'it was', which first posits the eternal and unchangeable, 
the good-in-itself, the permanent true nature, the indubitably 
certain? But if so then what other than cognizing a special 
object does this saving knowledge do? After all, did we not 
say that the ongoing world is ill, -and must there not therefore 
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be another world which is better, perhaps a true world, in 
any case a wholesome world for this saving knowledge to grasp 
hold of and to lead us to, as into a promised land? And, 
finally, who .wUl be capable of that redeeming knowledge? Is it., 
like the results of scientific investigation, available to all who 
wish to employ it in their lives? 
It is for the sake of answering questions such as these 
according to a different model than the one which irresistibly 
guides our reasoning as long as we remain within the Greco-
Christian tradition that we sought inspiration and encouragement 
in the central philosophy of Buddhism. The model which we 
wish to avoid is the one that held St. Augustine in its grip 
when he wrote in his treatise against the Academicians that 
"nothing more perverse, nothing more foolish and absurd can 
be uttered than that a wise man is wise and that, at the same 
time, he does not know wisdom. • ••• Therefore, either the 
Academician is not wise or the wi.se man will assent to 
something ••• If you say that the wise man cannot be found, 
we shall no longer discuss this subject with the Academicians •• 
And so I think that the wise man certainly has apprehended 
wisdom ••• and is giving assent to that without the apprehension 
of which he would not be wise. JJ47 
Rather than to follow St. Augustine we shall attempt 
to read Nietzsche's "Why have knowledge at all?" by keeping 
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in mind the distinction between knowledge and prajna, but 
which is, of course, not one that he himself made. 
The saving 'knowledge' restores man to the great 
health insofar as it is able to translate man into his original 
nature, into 'that eternal basic text of homo natura'. Let 
us turn the question concerning the putative object of the 
saving 'knowledge' into the question of how the ongoing 
customary existence is deviating from that original nature 
and falling into ill. 
According to IZarathustra', the fundamental ill whose 
overcoming is the bridge to man's highest hope is revenge, the 
will's ill-will against time. At the same time, our ill seems 
to be due to an overlay of 'many vain and overly enthusiastic 
f 
interpretations ••• over that eternal basic text of homo 
natura'. Is the ill the same in both cases, and are revenge 
and the falsifications of man's original nature two aspects of 
it? How deep do these falsifications go? What is their 
relationship to the saving knowledge? If the falsifications 
associated with man's ill go so deep as to infect even language, 
and thus thinking, can a step out of the ongoing existence be 
thought at all? W her e is this 'eternal basic text of homo 
natura'? And wherein consists that 'reconciliation with time 
and something higher than any reconciliation' which is to deliver 
the will from revenge, - especially if we do not presume that 
there is anything to be reconciled with, anything that the 
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saving 'knowledge' might have as its proper object and point 
out to us? 
In his study on Nietzsche Heidegger decided to render 
'the will to power' as Nietzsche's answer to the question for 
an essentia and 'the eternal recurrence' as his formula for the 
existentia of the world. But such an assignment of the two 
most venerable traditional functions in European philosophical 
thought to the two conceptions which Nietzsche most 
emphatically held to be unprecedented both in import and in 
impact rests on one small assumption; namely, that, on the 
one hand, Nietzsche was still seeking knowledge to fill in 
these categories, and that, on the other hand, he intended 
his two foremost teachings, to do just that 0 
In other words, an int~rpretation like Heidegger's of 
Nietzsche's two most striking teachings can see his thought as 
the culmination of European metaphysics only because it has 
already assumed that his knowledge wants to grasp ultimate 
truth, that his teachings want to answer metaphysical questions: 
it is this assumption which permits the subsumption of the 
'will to power' and 'eternal recurrence' under the categories 
of 'essential and 'existential understood as a schema of ultimate 
being. There are indeed passages which seem to confirm this 
48 
assumption. But is the purpose of Nietzsche's way of 
knowledge the discovery of truth? Is the will to truth Nietzsche's 
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'last' will, his innermost will, so that his foremost teachings 
may be taken as the highest accomplishment of that will to 
truth? 
Nietzsche calls truthfulness, intellectual cleanliness 
49 
'the last morality' which he 'still knows how to live'. But 
does he believe that the will to truth can arrive at any truth, 
or at a final truth? Perhaps the will to truth necessarily 
discovers only - lies? Perhaps "the destruction of an illusion 
does not produce truth but only one more piece of ignorance, 
50 
an extension of our 'empty space', an increase of our 'desert''', 
while "'knowledge'" is merely "the measuring of earlier and later 
51 
errors by one another"? Could it be that the inevitable fate 
of truthfulness is to dena.te prete.e.es .~eatI.lessl7, unmask lies, 
destruct falsehood, and to lift deceptive spells without ever 
arriving at any truths of its own? Does the morality of 
truthfulness finally question not only the claims of categories 
such as 'existential and 'essential 'but even the will to and the 
faith in truth itself? In any case, lithe err 0 n e 0 usn e s s 
of the world in which we think we live is the surest and firmest 
52 
fact that we can lay eyes on ll 0 
Indeed, the morality of truthfulness, 'the last morality' 
which he 'still knows how to live', demands that "the value of 
truth must for once be experimentally cal led n t 0 
52a 
que s t, ion", and poses "the question 'w -hat i s the 
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52." 
mea n i n g 0 f a I I w i I Ito t rut h ?'" In other 
words, far from subscribing to the will to truth Nietzsche's 
guiding star and energy is of a different kind. But does not an 
investigation into the value of truth presuppose that some truths 
can be arrived at concerning this value? Nietzsche asks for 
the meaning and value of truth - not for the truth of truth. 
Perhaps meaning and value are not the kind of things that can 
be ascertained? VVe are not even sure that they depend on 
truth at all - they may be allied rather to will and illusion, 
in one word: to 'life'. Nietzsche certainly regarded 'life' 
ash i s vantage point; even The Birth of Tragedy was 
already his first attempt at his task "to see science under the 
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optics of the artist, and art under that of life" 0 Since 
Nietzsche is still speaking then what is he doing with language 
if not formulating 'the truth'? If his teaching is not metaphysics 
what is it? Poetry? If not 'truth' -or the adequacy of the 
thought to the object- then what validates his thinking? In the 
utter absence of being in things, language must take on -or reveal, 
rather, since it had mistakenly been believed to function through 
reference to real entities- an unfamiliar character. In the previous 
chapter we mentioned that the j3odhisattvas, the 'royal physicians', 
use language rather as one dispenses medicines and casts spells. 
Nietzsche envisages the true philosopher as creating and legislating 
those values and horizons within which the normal everyday proceeds, 
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-and as b r e e din g, superior II enby aeansof sui tabl,. eho-
The idea of the Eternal Recurrence, for 
instance, he explicitly held to be primarily a means of decision, 
separation, and cultivation; flwahr d.h. hier den Typus Mensch 
54 
emporhebend ••• ". Nietzsche is hardly interested in neutral 
'truths'- if indeed there are such. "Ich s u c h e fur mich 
und meines Gleichen den sonnigen Winkel inmitten der jetzt 
wirklichen Welt, jene sonnigen Vorstellungen, bei denen uns ein 
.. 
Uberschuss von Wohl kommt 0 Mage dies jeder fur sich tun und 
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das Reden ins Allgemeine, fur die I Gesellschaft l , beiseite lassen!" 
The belief in a neutral 'truth' valid for all presupposes the 
possible separation of theory from practice 0 But this separation 
is possible only if independent bases can be found for each 0 A 
basis for theory independent of practice could be found only 
in beings. But what if precisely beings are nowhere to be 
encountered - nowhere, that is, apart from a specific practice 
i n t e r m s of which putative beings can be delineated and in 
tacit reference to which concepts can have meaning? Nietzsche 
was acutely aware of the strange fact that the concept of a 
being needs for its meaningfulness as well as for its 'truth' to 
refer not to a being but to a certain practice, i. e. to a specific 
ongoing individuated will to power 0 Consequently, a I purely' 
theoretical investigation really amounts to 1 i v i n g by two 
standards. This is, perhaps, defensible in the case of the 
scientist, but never in the philosopher 0 The latter he exhorts, 
11.3 
"Not to live with two' different standards!- Not to separate 
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theory and practice llJ 
Even though Nietzsche saw that his own task was still 
more critical than creative, more preparatory than legislative 
-to be a 'prelude to a philosophy of the future', -in his 
s c e psi s he knew his time had come. But a scepsis, 
too, just as well as the creative and medical use of language 
in the absence of peing, can proceed only if it is sure of its 
path - though not necessarily of its stations or goal-, its 
morality, its virtG., by other means than the reliance on truths. 
If we define scepsis as that morality of truthfulness which 
does not presume -neither in thought nor in action- that any 
truth can be found and which is nevertheless sure of its path 
without falling into mere arbitrary self-assertion or into "that 
mobile scepticism which leaps impatiently and lasciviously from 
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branch to branch", then Nietzsche is not only a sceptic but 
the sceptic after the Pyrrhonists and after Montaigne. 
But his scepsis is not a s c e p tic ism; the scepticist 
-to use a word distinguishing him from the sceptic- "being a 
delicate creature, is frightened all too easily; Q •• Yes and No -
S7a 
that goes against his morality i " "F or scepticism is the 
most spiritual expression of ,0,." nervous eXfJ-austion and sickliness i ... 
balance, a center of gravity, and perpendicular poise are lacking 
Slb 
in (his) body and soul. II Whereas Nietz sche seeks, and by all 
means attempts to live, "the scepsis of audacious manliness" 
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S7c. 
which \I does not believe but does not lose itself in the process", 
S1J. 
and which is certainly "beyond the bourgeois ••• Yes and No" 
but not for that reason averse to living, to thinking, or - to 
commanding. "But what we get hold of is no longer anything 
questionable but rather decisions. • • 0 I am the first who is 
58 
a b I e to decide. 1/ . Therefore Nietzsche -the sceptic-
is not inconsistent when he admits, "The formula for our 
,,58a 
happiness: a Yes, a No, a straight line, a goal, for his 
Yes and No are not the assent to facts and values which those 
live who "chew pebbles (and) •• lie on their bellies before small 
58b 
round things (and) pray to everything that doesn't topple over" 
but are the Yes and No of command and creation and of loversr 
play. 
The saving 'knowledge', then, seems to be le.ss a knowledge 
of a saving thing or being, or of something ultimate and eternal 
by virtue of a relationship to which there is a cure from the ill 
of the ongoing world, than the morality of truthfulness, this 
saC. 
ongoing "virile scepsis lJ itself: that purity -or, perhaps, that 
good metabolism- which has freed itself both from the "whole 
SId( 
virtuous uncleanliness of the modern Yes and NOll, from the 
'indigestion' of dogmatism, and from the 'diarrhea' of scepticism. 
'Saving knowledge' thus seems to be some sort of coming clear 
of precisely those 'many vain and overly enthusiastic interpretations •.• 
(which have overlaid) the eternal basic text of homo natura' rather 
115 
than a knowledge of anything that saves. Insofar as the 
'saving knowledge' consists in a 'virile scepsis', and insofar 
as 'virile scepsis' is already the ongoing act of a health which 
is sure of its path without relying on any truths, the 'saving 
knowledge' is the action of health with, and with regard to, 
precisely that which constitutes the ill world's fetter and 
sickness. According to the same reasoning, the opposite of, 
the release from,superstition would not consist in a true 
belief or a better -e. g. a more scientific- theory instead 
of false beliefs or primitive theories but in a "grossartige 
E n t sag u n g und ••• ( einem ) fortwaneadeJrS 1 e I 
•• b <n 59 I d f u e r ... 8, • name y, over our ten ency to reeze 
"useful u n rea lit i e s" 60 into 'truths'. 
Nietzsche's scepsis has for its purpose neither the spread 
of indifference nor the justification of wantonness nor, as for 
Descartes, the establishment of certainty. Its function is 
rather quasi-physiological: as if tq restore a wholesome 
functioning to the organism; to promote circulation where it 
was blocked; to still bleeding and other excessive drainage; and 
to stimulate the appetite while remedying insatiability. Thus 
scepsis is both a means to and already itself the action of health, 
while it k now s no more - in the sense of referring itself 
to no entities or events beyond those which constitute the ongoing 
world and its ills - than the sick man does. 
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The morality of truthfulness, then, serves not the 
establishment of truths or the discovery of moralities but the 
bringing forth of the healthy man. "Let us not underestimate 
this: w e 0 u r s e I v e s, we free spirits, are ••• an 
inc a rna t e declaration of war and triumph over all the 
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ancient conceptions of 'true' and 'untrue'." Nietzsche's 
innermost will can therefore not be characterized as a will to 
truth, least of all as a will to determine the universe ultimately 
with regard to a fixed schema of essentia and existentia. His 
will, rather, as he himself says unambiguously, is "the act of 
a tremendous purification and consecration of humanity" which 
he attempts positively through teaching the overman, analytically 
and poetically through characterizing the overman's way of being 
from the inside, as it were', and negatively through a critique of 
those ways and concepts which constitute or express the illness 
of the ongoing customary world. Such an 'act of tremendous 
purification and consecration of humanity' is clearly not an act 
of metaphysics as metaphysics has traditionally understood itself. 
In view of the word 'consecration', and in view of the 
great health conSisting not in a restoration to but an overcoming 
of the customarily ongoing world, 'health' does not mean: health of 
man as we know man. The degree and kind of a man's health 
constitute his very substance. The healthy man is characterized 
by Nietzsche as a 'homo natura'. What kind of a 'substance' , 
then, is 'natura'? Deliverance from revenge is the bridge to the 
11'1 
highest hope. Revenge is, therefore, in some sense the opposite 
of that 'substance' which nature is and which characterizes 
'homo natura'. Revenge is the 'nature' , the substance of 
the customarily ongoing world, that is, of man as we know man. 
'I a 
Revenge is "the will's ill will against time and its 'it was lll • 
The will's ill will against time and its 'it was' is, then, the 
'nature' of the ill world, the 'nature' of anti-nature or un-nature 
Unnatur ). As this un-nature it is the substance of unhealth. 
The ongoing unhealth is also a debasement of man: this is 
implied by the word 'consecration'. Revenge exiles man both 
into ill and into ignobility. 
Morality, ideals and time are the central elements in 
that unnature which constitutes the illness and debasement of 
the customarily ongoing world. But the deliverance from revenge, 
that is, from ill-will against time, is the very bridge itself to 
man's highest hope: to his consecration, to his health, and into 
his true nature. 
H ow is man ill from time, or ill with time? In man as we 
know man "the will itself is still a prisoner". Hilt was' - that 
is the name of the will's gnashing of teeth; ••• That time does 
not run backwards, that is his wrath; 0 •• and on all who can 
"b 
suffer he wreaks revenge for his inability to go backwards 0 1/ 
The will imprisoned in time "redeems himself foolishlyll, that is, 
ignorantly and clumsily entangling himself only deeper in his 
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predicament. His predicament is that time goes against his 
will, that is to say, his will goes against time; "'that which 
was' is the name of the stone he cannot move. II So the wHl 
I redeems himself foolishly', for instance, by taking to positing 
something eternal unchangeable - a cause, being, substance, 
good, justice, punishment- and attaching himself to these 
products of "man's best reflection ll as if therein he had foiled 
time's covetousness. But !levU ••• and misanthropic (is) all 
this teaching of the One and • g. the Permanent" for they are 
mere palliatives against the will's wrath and displeasure and fail 
to redeem the will. How, then, can the will be freed from its 
prison and delivered from its foolishness? To Ilrecreate all 
'it was' into a 'thus I willed it' -that alone should I call 
"e 
redemption", 'Zarathustra l teaches. But who is this II' that 
can say: 'Thus I willed it'? Insofar as I am this particular 
individual I am subject to time and its 'it was': I a m one of 
those 'it was'. Insofar as I am this particular individual, the 
. "~ 
will, who "is an angry spectator of all that is past", is also 
an angry spectator of my life. Thus, insofar as I take myself 
to be in truth, in original nature, this particular individual, that 
is, an objective fact -one of those which get described by 'it 
was' - I am unable to say: 'Thus I willed it', for I take the 
lit l , namely, myself, to be real as such already before any 
willing on my part. Consequently, I must s u f fer my 
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passing away in the twofold sense of having to elldure ~t passiYe-
17 and of being an angry spectator of it. I as this particular 
( 
individual can therefore never J/redeem those who lived in the 
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past and ••• recreate all 'it was' into a 'thus I willed it'" 
for by taking myself as originally and truly this particular 
individual I have already turned myself, too, into an 'it was' 
who is thus in need of redemption himself. But to take myself 
to be this particular individual means: to ascribe 'my' will to 
myself as this individual. To ascribe 'my' will to myself presupposes 
taking myself as an 'it was', for if 'myself' were itself a 
creation of the will then this will could not be ascribed to 
'myself', to its own creation. The will's ill will against time 
is thus a product of the will's being mine, more cautiously 
said: of the will's 'mineness'. One of the foolish ways in which 
this imprisoned will redeems himself is by positing an eternal 
soul as a compensation for the melancholy spectacle of seeing 
its 'mineness' pass away. In a similar way it is the author 
'of "all this teaching of the One and the Plenum and the Unmoved 
and the Sated and the Permanent". 
How can the will be unharnessed from his folly, freed from 
his prison, and how can he unlearn the spirit of revenge? 
Mere reconciliation of the will with time, that is, reconciliation 
of m y will with time; presupposes and preserves the duality of 
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the 'mineness' of will and time. Such a reconciliation can be 
noble, like that of Montaigne, who says, "I am ready to let 
go of life without melancholy, but as something essentially 
63 
elusive, not as something annoying, tedious 0 Il It can also be 
mendacious and comfort itself with the idea of an eternal afterlife 
for oneself. But what is "higher than any reconciliation? 
For that will which is the will to power must will something 
'3a 
higher than any reconciliation. Jl Higher than any reconciliation 
is the overcoming of the duality itself 0 But a duality can be 
overcome only if it is not an ultimate fact, only if it does not 
define the situation down to its deepest depth or up into its 
highest height, only if it is not a duality in truth or not at all 
levels of truth. The 'mineness' of the will is the will's prison, 
or perhaps we should say it is one of the walls of its prison, 
other walls being 'values' ("the great dragon. o. on (whose) every 
64 
scale shines a golden 'thou shalt'" ), 'facts', 'truth', I man's 
(special) nature', and the separation of opposites. IMineness' 
can be overcome only by not ascribing the will to 'myselfl and 
ascribing 'myself', instead, to the wi.ll 0 Onc.e again, we are 
confronted with a "terrifying Either/Or: 'Either abolish your 
'4a 
reverences or - you r s e 1 v e Sill, for it is manifestly 
impossible to abolish time in order to overcome the fatal duality 9 
The reverence in question here is that of the custom - a custom 
at once grammatical, cultural, and intensely emotional - of 
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ascribing the will to 'myself', of conceiving myself as the author 
of my actions .>:< "The latter" -to abolish ourselves- "would be 
nihilism; but would not the former also be - nihilism? This 
,ltD 
is 0 u r question mark." 
Even if the will is no longer to be ascribed to 'myself' , 
but rather the other way around, "it is not at all necessary to 
get rid of 'the soul' at the same time ••• -as happens frequently 
to clumsy naturalists who can hardly touch on 'the soul' without 
,It c. 
immediately losing it. II Instead, "the way is open for new versions 
,lttl 
and refinements of the soul-hypothesis". Should' myself', then, 
and the world that concerns me, be fictions? "And if somebody 
asked, 'but to a fiction there surely belongs an author?' -
couldn't one answer simply: why? Doesn't this 'belongs' 
t 
perhaps belong to the fiction, too? Is it not permitted to be a 
bit ironical about the subject no less than the predicate and object? 
Shouldn't philosophers be permitted to rise above faith in grammar?" 
And, above other reverences too? Perhaps to abolish our 
reverences need not be nihilism but could be-philosophy and other 
uncanny ways 'beyond the bourgeois Yes and No'? 
In any case, the 'I' that is able to say 'thus I willed it' 
cannot be 'myself' as this mortal individual, nor as 'my eternal 
soul' for that one is only mendaciously added on.to the passing 
spectacle by the speculative ill-will against time. Since the will 
This reverence has even been enshrined in a 'necessary 
postulate of practical reason' by Kant as the autonomy of the will 
in rational beings. 
''''e. 
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in 'thus I willed it' is not to be ascribed to any 'myself' if 
the will is to be redeemed, the will must be simply itself. 
The will itself must thus be understood as prior to any 'myself'. 
As prior to any 'myself' and as the 'one' for whom all I it was' 
is a 'thus I willed it' the will is prior to time. But what is 
the nature of a will that no longer acts in time, which is therefore 
free from ill will against time, and which creates both the truth 
of entities and the individual who in turn claims the will as his 
own, thereby subjecting himself to time and plunging into revenge? 
Then, what is the nature of time? And, is it that will, perhaps, 
which is our original nature, or an aspect of it? If it is then 
it is clear how 'mineness' cannot be thought for our origtnal nature. 
In that case 'that which is higher than any reconciliation', namely, 
the overcoming of the duality of the I mineness' of will and time, 
the redemption from revenge, cannot be accomplished within the 
customarily ongoing world. It cannot be accomplished there for 
that world is based on the ascription of will to 'myself' and 
therewith on the melancholy which is inseparable from the will's 
being imprisoned in time. The imprisonment in time being due to 
the ascription of will to 'myself', the accumulation of data, the 
improvement of theories, the rectification of beliefs, or the 
correction of calculations within the ongoing customary world 
of 'myself' and time is impotent to deliver man over to his 
original nature, cannot 'translate (or ferry) man back into the 
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eternal basic text of homo natura'. But, since the phenomenon 
of 'mineness' cannot be thought for our original nature if 
that nature is the will itself, 'the eternal text of homo natura' 
does precisely not signify an eternal essence belonging to us, 
a Platonic pattern of man. In other words, man's nature 
is 'the same' -if 'sameness' may be said of what is prior to 
any entity- as that of any other animal or thing. Wherein, 
then, do animals, men and things differ? They differ in what 
is being willed in and through them. Nietzsche speaks of the 
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'what' of these differences as 'quanta' and 'ranks' of power. 
However, these differences do not 'belong' to men, animals, or 
things because the will is not 'theirs', is not ascribed to them. 
Thus acknowledging 'the same' nature in man as in all other beings, 
man is able to stand "with intrepid Oedipus-eyes and sealed 
Odysseus-ears, deaf to the siren songs of old metaphysical 
bird catchers who have been piping at him all too long, 'you are 
(Ja 
more, you are higher, you are of .a different origin! "'. 
But it is not only the will that is faultily ascribed to 'myself': 
consciousness, too, is not 'mine', i. e. there is no 'one' 
continuing through or underlying it; there is no 'one' underlying 
the series. As Omar Khayaam says in his . Rubaiyyat : this 
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costly spectacle is shown to no one; -and yet shown it is. 
Again, we are encouraged in this conclusion when in CandrakTrtils 
previously quoted . Prasannapada' we read that "the way of 
attainingreal.1t,. ...... is thediltter cessation or the 'I' 
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and the 'mine'''. 'Myselfl is an extremely com pIe x unity, 
in whose movements II gibt es keine Einheit 'welche strebt"! .68 
As a matter of fact, "All unity is unity only as organization and 
cooperation •••• , as a pattern of domination that s i g n i fie s 
69 
a unity but i s not a unity.1! And, "the interpretation itself 
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(which conceives of unities) is a form of the will to power". 
The experience of the illusion of 'willing' and 'myself' as unity 
is at the basis of our categories of our false understanding: 
entity, causality, substance. Just as in the case of positing 
an underlying 'myself', "If I say 'lightning flashes', I have posited 
the flash once as activity and a second time as a subject, and 
thus added to the event a being that is not one with the event 
but i.s rather fixed, is, 600 To regard an event as an 'effecting', 
and this as being, that is the double error, or interpretation, of 
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which we are guilty 0 1.1 
We have seen how time is a central element in man's 
false nature ( Unnatur. ) • Tied up with the suffering from time 
are the ascription of will to 'myself', that is, the belief in 
myself as the author or cause of my actions, and the notion that 
man has a different or higher origin or nature than animals or 
things. The prevalence and the seeming 'need' of ideals in order 
for man to be man express this latter notion. But perhaps there 
is a sense in which ideals contribute to the ruin of man rather than 
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to his virt~, elevation or redemption! "Mein Schlussatz ist: 
dass der w irk I i c h e Mensch einen viel hoheren Wert 
darstellt als der 'wUnschbare' Mensche irgend eines bisherigen 
Ideals; ••• dass das Ideal bis jetzt die eigentlich welt- und 
menschverleumdende Kraft, der Gifthauch uber der Realitat, 
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die grosse V e r f u h run g z u m N i c h t s war ••• II 
The most decisive oversight of the ideal is typically the neglect 
of the bodily reality of man. The bodily reality suggests a 
proximity between men, animals and things which those ideals 
that suppose a higher or different origin or nature in man 
must deny. But since it cannot be denied in the body those 
ideals are forced to speak of an immaterial soul whose nature 
is separate from and higher than that of the body. Consequently, 
the needs and natural movements of the body are not those 
of the immaterial soul, and, being different, are in conflict 
with it. In this conflict the soul's needs and demands are 
reckoned as having priority even t~ough this priority is rarely 
enacted with consistency. But even though the theoretical 
-or theological- priority of the soul over the body is usually not 
enacted with consistency the conflict is sufficient to disturb 
the integrity of the bodily reality of man. The higher rank of 
man's status being theoretically -theologlcally- derived from 
his immaterial soul the very conception of what constitutes 
bodily integrity therefore is usually separated from man's highest 
functioning, that is to say, is constructed in disregard of man's 
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uniqueness and special possibilities' of value, from a comparison 
wi.th animals and things alone. Thus, under the influence of the 
ideal man's bodily integrity comes to be conceived narrowly in analogy 
with beings other than himself, namely, in analogy, on the one 
hand, with beings whose nature he is believed to share with 
regard to his body, and, on the other hand, with beings- or 
a being- whose nature he is believed to share in his soul. Thus, 
instead of regarding all beings as having the same nature the 
ideal - the idealist - regards man as having two natures: that 
of the animal and things, and that of immaterial beings. As a 
result man's bodily integrity is first conceived in a false 
analogy with that of animals and things and then, under this 
conception, gains ascendancy in men's thinking as the belief in 
man's immaterial nature dwindles. The belief in a higher or 
different origin or nature of man thus has the curious~ consequence 
that man is regarded either in total neglect of his bodily being 
or in purely material terms, i. e. ~n strict analogy with animals 
and inanimate things. The latter view, however, of necessity 
derives its concept of "nature" exclusively from a contemplation 
of animals and inanimate things, which concept is then adduced 
to make scientific 'sense' of man. Through a peculiar dialectic 
the belief in a separate nature of man results in a denial of 
man, but a nature whose concept denies - because excludes -
everything specifically human. This .r e d u c>t ion of man 
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is then hailed as an overcoming of the old superstitious 
anthropocentrism. Thus the attempted elevation of man by 
the ideal through assigning to him a special nature results in the 
debasement of man through a dialectical assimilation of man's 
nature to that of all other beings whose nature, in turn, has 
been conceived by the methodical omission of what reveals itself 
specifically through man, such as: will to power, luminous 
eternity, joy, absence of being. In consequence, the concept of 
the nature of beings other than man -animals, plants, minerals, 
planets, etc. - also incorporates a debasement of these beings 
just because their nature has been construed as if separate 
from that which most clearly and specifically manifests itself 
in man but which in man has been assigned to his special nature. 
Once the belief in man's immaterial nature has lost its 
force in the life of man his nature appears debased in its 
unabashed analogy to animals and inanimate things, since their 
nature, in turn, is excluded from participation in that which 
formerly had been assigned to man's immaterial separate nature. 
'The 1 i e of the ideal has \ so far been the curse on reality; on 
account of it, mankind has become itself mendacious and false 
down to its most fundamental instincts - to the point of 
worshipping the 0 p p 0 sit e values of those which alone 
would guarantee its health, its future, the lofty rig h t to 
73 its future. JI 
In view of this link between man's debasement, man's unhealth 
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-due to his false concept of bodily integrity-, and man's idealism 
-his belief in his separate nature and his reliance on ideals to 
support the claims of his higher nature against those of the 
body, more accurately, against the claims resulting from the 
falsely construed bodily integrity-, the 'consecration of man', 
his recovery into the great health, and the achievement of a 
true concept of his nature -or at any rate the release from 
all false concepts of it, as opposed to all ideals supposing man 
to be 'more, higher, of a different origin'- are inseparable tasks. 
The deliverance from revenge is therefore the bridge to 
man's highest hope in that, teaching him 'reconciliation with time 
and something higher than any reconciliation' , it overcomes the 
mendaciousness both of the belief in a separate nature or origin 
, 
of man and of the correlate narrow, debased concept of nature; 
that is to say, it overcomes both idealism and materialism: 
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"matter is as much of an error as the God of the Eleatics. /I! 
After both man and nature hav.e been freed from their false 
concepts it is possible to "begin to 'n a t u r a liz e' humanity 
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in terms of a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature" 
which, however, is as far from the scientific concept of nature 
as it is from the Christian concept of creation. 
Morality, next to time and idealism, is the third element 
in the trinity of man's unnature. HMorality" in Nietzsche's 
parlance usually connotes that way of thinking which projects its 
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concept of value opposites into the being of things, events and 
acts. Its logical extreme is therefore Manicheism. "Diese 
Denkweise, mit der ein bestimmter Typus Mensch gezuchtet wird, 
geht von jener absurden Voraussetzung aus: sie nimmt das Gute 
und das Bose als Realitaten, die mit sich im 'Widerspruch sind 
(n i c h t als complemendtre Wertbegriffe, was die Wahrheit 
ware), sie rat die Partei des Guten zu nehmen, sie verlangt, 
dass der Gute dem Bosen bis in die letzte Wurzel entsagt und 
widerstrebt, - s i eve r n e i n t dam i t 
tat sac h 1 i c h d a s L e ben , welches in allen 
seinen Instinkten sowohl das Ja wie das Nein hat. Nicht dass 
sie dies begriffe: sie traumt umgekehrt da von, zur Ganzheit, 
.. t. 76 
zur Einheit, zur Starke des Lebens zuruckzukehren ••• JI 
Nietzsche calls this way of thinking and living "the hemiplegia 
77 
of virtue" because. it .denies the inextricable mixture of good and 
evil in all things, in life itself, and therefore demands of man 
"dass der Mensch sich an jenen In~tinkten verschneidet, mit 
denen er Feind sein kann, schaden kann, zurnen kann, Rache 
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heischen kann ... " It is a hemiplegia in that 'half' of all 
existence, and, as part of it, 'half' of man -namely, that half 
which can do evil - is paralyzed in order to prevent the enacting 
of evil. Its presupposition is that good and evil things and 
actions have different natures. Insofar as it regards as evil 
that which harms man its presupposition is that evil -that which 
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harms man- is less, lower, or of a different origin than man, 
With the way of ideals, then, it shares the belief that that 
which furthers man in his specific humanity and realizes his good 
is of a different nature than that which harms man or is indifferent 
to his values. But since life itself so obviously consists in the 
unabashed thriving of a luxurious diversity of beings and impulses 
most of which are either harmful or indifferent to man's good 
the moral way of thinking -and living-, "jene Erkrankung und 
. 79 ideologische Unnatur welche diese Doppelhelt ablehnt", must 
suppose that life and man's good not only have different natures 
but conflict. In this conflict morality teaches that man ought 
to obey the imperatives of the good rather than the instincts 
of life. These instincts, by virtue of the assumption of separate 
-and therefore conflicting- 'natures in good and evil, are assumed 
to be either incidental or plainly opposed to man's good and as 
such inessential to or detracting from man's realization of it. 
Being inessential, at best, for and detracting from, at worst, 
man's achievement of his true good the logically moral strategy 
is to cultivate a profound and 'instinctive' distrust of life's 
own movements as well as either a habitual repression of the 
instincts in favor of acting morally or a cold-bloodedly 
Machiavellian manipulation of life's instincts in order to achieve 
the moral good. Kant postulated not only the concept of a causal 
self and the belief in man's separate and higher nature but also 
the logically moral strategy as 'enlightened truths'. For reasons 
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such as these Nietzsche said of him: "The instinct which errs 
without fail, ant i - n_ a t u r e as instinct, German decadence 
80 
as philosophy - t hat i s K ant !" 
When a moral world order cannot be substantiated, however, 
man's nature comes to be assimilated again, by a dialectic similar 
to that in the case of idealism, to that of all other beings and 
events. The concept of nature, however, under which these 
ot~er beings and events are subsumed still incorporates the 
slander and denial of man's distinctive good woven into it by 
idealism and morality. F or instance, "We misunderstand the beast 
of prey and the man of prey (for example, Cesare Borgia) 
thoroughly, we misunderstand 'nature', as long as we still look 
for something 'pathological' at the bottom of those healthiest 
, 
of all tropical monsters and growths, or even some 'hell' that 
. 81 
is supposed to be innate in them" Since the tradition of 
, looking for something 'pathological' at the bottom of all tropical 
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monsters' goes back to the venera.ble Plato, if not further, the 
whole of our customary· judgment, sentiment, and outlook bearing a 
decisive idealist-moralistic slant, lJdie Entmenschung der Natur 
und dann die Vernaturlichung des Menschen, nachdem er den reinen 
83 
Begriff 'Natur' gewonnen hat" still remains a task which has 
not only sentiment, habit, 'culture' and philosophy but also 
language against itself. 
Here too the deliverance from revenge acts as the bridge 
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to a reconvalescence from time-honored errors - which have 
become the very basis of 'culture' - inasmuch as it,_ leads to the 
abandonment of the view of separate natures in men, animals 
and all other beings and events, and therewith to the dissolution 
of the conception of good and evil as realities, as beings or events 
of different natures. The "good and the evil action cannot be 
called good and evil in themselves, but only in the perspective 
84 
of what tends to preserve certain types of human communities ll • 
All beings and events, good and evil, human and non-human, have 
the same nature. In that alone already there lies a certain 
release from the paranoia of the 'good man' who IIsieht sich wie 
umringt vom Bosen und unter dem besdindigen Ansturm des 
.. 85 
Bosenll. The resulting calm after the storm of the moral 
world order has subsided brings on "a kind of sec 0 n d 
86 
inn 0 c e n cell. Moreover, the release from revenge and 
from the paranoia of the 'good man' for the first time also 
reveals the possibility of. t ran s m uta t ion of 'evil' 
into 'good', a possibility which Plato, for instance, saw only in 
the direction from 'good' to 'evil' - such as the philosopher's 
strong nature being corrupted by bad circumstances and becoming 
the source of greater evil than any weaker nature would be 
capable of-but not in the direction from 'evil' to 'good', as is 
evidenced by his insistence in The RepUblic on a one-sided diet 
of 'good' irrpressions for the city's youth. The sameness of the 
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nature of all things means that each thing does not have an own 
na t ur e, that is, doe s not h a v e its elf for 
its nature things and arrangements do not have eternal 
duplicates or warranties .i la Plato's Ideas. 
The nature of all beings and events being the same, it 
follows that what "mankind has so far considered seriously" 
-namely, good and evil, 'the nature of man', self- "have not 
87 
even been realities but mere imaginings." That is, "Not 
t h i n g s but opinions abo u t t h i n g s t hat are 
not eve nth ere have so disturbed and upset 
88 
verstort ) man! ", have turned him into 'the sick animal' -
but also into man -: "It is by invisible hands that we are bent 
89 
and tortured words. JI 
But as we have already said with regard to the motives 
of Nietzsche's scepsis it would not only miss his point but would 
misunderstand his thinking into the very opposite of its purpose 
to suppose that this second innoc~nce and the. thesis of the 
sameness of the nature of all things is to serve as a licence 
for all that is bad, for all the "wild dogs (that) want freedom 
••• (and) bark with joy in their cellar when your spirit plans to 
90 
open all prisons. II The dissolution of the moral world order 
does not neutralize all value distinctions: "Beyond Good and Evil 
91 
••• this does not mean 'Beyond Good and Bad'." On the 
contra.ry, "there is nobody from whom I want beauty as much as 
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from you who are powerful: let your kindness be your final 
self-conquest. Of all evil I deem you capable: therefore I 
92 
want the good from you. II 
The purpose of the realization of the sameness of the 
nature of all beings and events is not the untrammelled growth 
of monsters finally freed from the inconvenient constraints 
of morality but is to provide a basis for the dualistically 
impossible redemption of the fundamental unhealth and conflicts 
in man. Man "subdued monsters, he solved riddles: but he must 
still redeem his own monsters and riddles, changing them into 
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heavenly children./I Even "the liberated spirit must still purify 
himself. Much prison and mustiness still remain in him: his eyes 
94 
must still become pure." "Nur dem v ere del ten 
Menschen darf die Freiheit des 
G e i s t e s gegeben werden; er zuerst darf sagen, dass 
er urn der F r e u dig k e j t willen lebe und urn keines weiteren 
95 
Zieles willen". By the same token the abandonment of the view 
of different natures in beings and events serves not a -social 
or metaphysical- egalitarian desire but the pat h 0 s 0 f 
dis tan c e. "Chief viewpoint: establish dis tan c e s 
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but c rea ten 0 ant i the s e s. JI F or it is precisely 
the customary living under time, ideals and morality which not 
only does not permit the redemption of the monsters and dogs 
in man but also everywhere creates false equalities between men, 
actions, and events as well as between different expressions of 
13.5 
oneself such that they get referred to one and the same 'I', 
-and then exacts loyalties to these false equalities and entities. 
The most important distances to be opened, however, are 
'i n sid e' man: "an ever new widening of distances within 
the soul itself, the development of ever higher, rarer, more 
remote, further-stretching, more comprehensive states -
in brief, simply the enhancement of the type 'man' , the continual 
'self-overcoming of man', to use a moral formula in a supra-
moral sense. ,,97 "Precisely in this width of space and this 
accessibiltiy for what is contradictory, 2arathustra experiences 
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himself as the sup rem e t y p e 0 f a lIb e i n g s". 
The loyalty to false unities and equalities, especially to the 
putatively solid 'I', makes not only the reconvalescence from 
man's sickliness but also the attainment of greatness impossible: 
for the pathos of distance, in turn, serves to prevent the higher 
-most importantly, the higher 'i n' man- from degrading itself 
to becoming an instrument of the .lower. Within the pathos of 
distance the task is: "Das neue Grosse nicht uber sich, nicht 
ausser sich sehen, sondern aus ihm eine neue Funktion unser 
99 
selbst machen." This is possible only once the pathos of 
distance has dissolved the indiscriminate idolatry of 'I'. The 
pathos of distance pulls the rug out from underneath any sort 
of humanism, less in order to assert differences bet wee n 
men than to· explode the idolatrous unity of 'man' and 'I' so as 
to reopen the question of the relations of supremaqy 'w i t h i n' 
I 
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man. It is first as an expression of these 'inner' relations 
of supremacy that there are decisive differences bet wee n 
men. 
The destruction of the view of different natures in men 
and other beings opens the possibility of transmutation and leads 
to the pathos of distance. Thus it is able to undermine the 
indiscriminate and mendacious worship of 'man' that has dominated 
and blinded Western politics and philosophy since Machiavelli, to 
n arne a distinctive landmark, and to reopen, for the first time 
since the Greeks, the que s t ion of the highest good and 
of man's destiny. Under the rule of time, ideals and morality 
man is incapable either of true virtue -flvirtQ •• 0 that is moraline-
100 
free"-or of true greatness, greatness that is not merely the 
astounding spectacle of "an inverse cripple", such as that of 
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"an ear as big as a man II • 
Deliverance from revenge, through the release from the 
prison of time, truth, ideals and morality is, in Nietzsche's 
view, the event necessary for a cure from that sickliness and 
smarkness which is the customarily ongoing world, which i s the 
'Mensch' to be overcome. The deliverance from revenge, however, 
is not a simple 'event' but an extremely complex process precisely 
102 
since revenge "has so far been man's best re:l!lection" and has 
infiltrated all movements of human existence through the 
proliferation of its false consolations, poisonous palliatives, 
distorting concepts, desperate hopes, and ideals. The recovery 
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of intellectual probity ( Redlichkeit ) after a solid history of 
mendaciousness and misguided cruelty in the name of I truth' 
-both moral and metaphysical- is a more than Herculean tasko 
That which is 'higher than any reconciliation' is not to be achieved 
in a wink: every atom, so to speak, of human existence must 
be purified and realigned, however subtly, in the process of 
tr.anslating and ferrying man back into nature. This reconvalescence 
is necessarily the transition to a different type of man. At the 
same time, the difference cannot be defined morally, in terms of 
ideals ( Wunschbarkeiten ), biologically-materially (scientifically, 
n a mel y , in terms of the distorted concept of nature 
which remains over from the dualism after its ideal part has been 
abolished), historically (in terms of temporal events or 
'inevitabilities' ), or metaphysically (in terms of relations to a 
transcedent bcing or of knowing transcendental truths). In 
other words, the entire customary language, both philosophical, 
theological scientific and everyday is incapable of rendering a 
concept of the type of man who is free from ressentiment and 
from its moral and other expressions. This suggests that 
language, as well as the capacity for sentiment and vision, is 
inseparable from a specific way of life, that is, from a type of 
being. And we turn to ponder once again that guess which 
Nietzsche formulated in the preface to The Joyful Wtsdom 
that "what was at stake in all philosophizing hitherto was not at 
all 'truth' but something else - let us say, health, future, growth 
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power, life", -and that means: for a particular ongoing 
existence, that is, type of man, in each case. If a type of 
man, a particular ongoing existence, is defined, in each case, 
by its 'i nne r' relations of supremacy -or by its lack of 
discrimination in that respect- then it follows that all philosophizing 
hitherto was a self-articulation of a type of relations of supremacy 
with a view to expanding its dominion. Conversely, a radical 
change of doctrines would require a different fDt'm of existence 
if life is not to perish. A suitable form of doctrine, then, will 
not only articulate the man of the great health but wi.ll also 
put such strain and pressure on 'the sick animal' as to force 
him to certain fundamental political, physiological and practical 
decisions. "It is only beginning with me that the earth knows 
g rea t pol i tic s", writes Nietzsche, "But my truth 
1,104 
is t err i b I ej for so far one has called lie s truth. 
In what words, then, does the new form of existence, the 
great health, speak for itself? 
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IV. "I have presented such terrible images to knowledge 
that any 'Epicurean delight' is out of the question. 
Only Dionysian joy is suff ieient ••• ,,* 
" this victor over God and nothingness - h e 
m u s teo m eon e d a y."** 
* WM 1029 
** GM II 24 
Man's illness has shown itself to 
reside in the difference between the 
fact of man and the truth of man. 
The cure -both the overman and the 
Bodhisattva- consists in embodying 
the truth of existence while creating 
and playing its facts and values 
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Our present explorations embarked on the experiment of 
suspecting a basic unsoundness, rather than a lack of know-
ledge, goals, meaning, resources or values, at the center of 
I t:fl.e hu.man predicament'. Leaning on the discoveries of 
Nietzsche and the Buddhists we discerned a fundamental false-
ness in ordinary existence; we saw that the customarily on-
going world is a false relationship to the truth of exist-
once. We also acknowledged that we suffer from this false 
r!31atlonship in as much as while we are in thrall to it our 
mm nature -- or rather, that which under the spell of that 
relationship we talee to be our nature -- is essentially 
denied by the nature of the world as it is experienced and 
comprehended in that rela t:ionship (time), even though thi s 
suffering is normally unconscious and expressed only in 
miseries with a -- seemingly -- concrete occaSion, and 'is 
a truth only for the wise'. 
We can now venture a reasoned anSllJer to the question we 
asked at the beginning: Is it a lack of the right goals or 
values, or a scarcity of resources, or an insufficiency of 
organization or knowledge which generates 'the human predi-
cament', so that progress in these and related areas would 
imply a gradual reduction of 'the predicament', perhaps 
asymptotically tending to its complete r!~solution in the 
future, grant.ing good will, social stability and hEird 
work? On the other h&nd, if such lacks are not the kernel 
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of 'the predicament' and progress is not its solution, why 
are they not? 
The assence of our answer is immediately clear: the 
adherence to projects and values, to the manipulation of 
resources and the reliance on organization and knowledge 
not only fail to come to grips with the basic falseness of 
ongoing existence but entrench us more deeply in it by 
remaining captive of that type of existence -which is main-
tained through reliance on the concept of being and 'the 
view that the person is real'. 'Progress' and 'improve-
ments' provide 'the sick animal' with further toys, 
distractions, palliatives and intoxications but fail to 
ferry it over (_zu.r!ickY,Q~~~) into its original 
nature and great health. 'In Buddhist parlance, all 'im-
provements t are duhkha, and from Nietzsche's point of view 
, --:-
they are the pro~iferating and increasingly complicated 
expressions of ressentiment and decadence. 
Illness can not be defined, according to what we have 
said, simply by pains or other objective processes. By the 
same token, it is not the bare objective fact itself of 
those c.qncrete activities considered to be 'improvements' 
that condemns them to being mere ramifications of the ongoing 
'predicament' and translations of it into up-to-date dilemmas. 
Rather, it is the reI ian c e that is placed on these 
ramifications, namely, the reliance on them with regard to 
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and for the sake of adequately encountering, recognizing, 
extending our sensibilities into, understanding and dealing 
with the human 'predicament' that renders them mere exten-
sions of the illness.. That reliance condemns all reform and 
'progress' to be mere complications of the 'predicament' 
because, as we have seen, the elements and systems of every-
day existence when taken to constitute and articulate the 
truth of existence are the currents and nodes and body of 
man's unhealth, untruth and antinature (Yn~!BL ), a I' e 
the ill and deluded man himself.. The re.liance on progress is 
a systematic side-stepping of the task of attaining the great 
health and of the f!' Hinaufkommen' - in die star:-ce sonnen-
reine furchtbare Natul' und Naturlichkeit des IAenschen, 
~elche mit grossen Aufgaben spielen darf, weil sie an Klei-
nem mude 'll\urde und E.k.el empfande .. ,,1 In other words, the 
reliance on progress of .knmvledge, organization, tech-
nology, and the r9st of modern man's pride -- is a .;!fr u b -
st i t u t e for the m a n that is necessary, for the man 
who i s the incarnate resolution of the 'predicament' • The 
reliance on certainty, values and facts substitutes for the 
adequate man a herd animal, a laughable creature who is not 
one but many. This reliance continues that f1tselflessnesst 
the. t ...... was hitherto called' mol'. a. 1 i t Y t1, continues 
? 
tithe morality that would unself man".- The search for 
meaning and values deserts living in exchange for obedience 
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to a cause, and freedom in exchange for conformity to LEr'I: 
rather than live one v'lishes to serve a cause, i .. e .. be the 
effect of i:i C8.use. It is neither reason nor life thct 
seeks ul timC',l.te values and ends but it is JVanting-to-support-
one1s-life-by-certain-fixities JVhich seeks them .. "The 'be-
liever! does not belong to himself, he can only be a means, he 
must be use d u p, he requires somebody to use him up .. ,,3 
In effect, the quest for support in new values, socia-econ-
omic improvements, teclmical innovations and additional know-
ledge equates truth with what gets articulated through the on-
going everyday, and good vii th the desirable achievements of 
th<3.t existence -- a fallacy vlhich Plc.to never tired of attack-
ing. 
But if we do not follovv' the ideology of posi ti ve think-
ing -- 'positive' both in the sense of persuading ourselves 
tha t 'ilre are ultimately successful when \ve achieve the goods 
of the ongoing everyday, as well as in the sense of con-
ceiving and planning that success exclusively t:hrough posi-
tive concepts, that is, concepts which assume ultimate enti-
ties and processes involving beings -- and if negative thirut-
ing is only too obviously a cul-de-sac, then "/hat remains 
to be done? By means of scepsis ~e have recognized an ir-
remediable falseness in the concepts and assumptions sup-
porting the transactions of the customarily ongoing exist-
ence. Is it possible to extract ourselves from that false-
ness by means of the very same scepsis? But what would an 
"extraction" amount to if it is not the attainment of some 
certainty &bout something somewhere, the provision of some 
basis, however modest? Has our scepsis, irreproachable 
though it may be as an lIDcompromising morality of truthful-
ness, transported us into the desert of nihilism instead of 
ferrying us over into the great health and 'the basic text 
of homo natura'? 
In the transition from our initial naive realism and 
its associated fantastic metaphysical exaggerations and 
moralistic di stortions there is a stage at which the wary 
falseness itself of what had hitherto been reckoned to be 
real is reified, taken for an answer to the questions which 
one has not yet relinquished, and proclaimed as the ultimate 
principle.. As Candraklrti says, none who, not seeing the 
due distinction between the two truths (that is, between the 
conventional and the ultimate truth) in this way, grasps at 
the la.ck of self-existence in all composi te things and dwells 
on it, eager for liberation, either he imagines that all com-
posi te things ¢lo not truly exist or that the absence of self-
existence in them itself exists like a thing (~~m£!§ :2!lliva-
];:E!:1!) .. ,,4 Certainly, such tf an experimental philosophyH as 
Nietzsche lived it "anticipates experimentally even the 
possibilities of the most fundamental nihilismfl • 5 At that 
stage falseness is taken in isolation from that whose false-
ness it is, is seized upon as (if) itself? concrete given 
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and treated as one's support. But his one-sided position is 
even more insidious than that of the original nalve realism to-
gether with i tsmetaphysical and mars.l pendants. "Being feeble-
minded is destroyed by the mt,sunderstood doctrine o:f the 
absence of being in things, as by a snake ineptly seized or 
some secret knowledge wrongly applied", says Nagarjuna, 6 
while Nietzsche speaks of "the r a', va g e S . worked 
by tl'tl8.bitude.dfadmirer llinintelligible au lieu de 
rester tout~ simpLement dans .1'lnco~}l'"?' Nihilism 
consists in the grasping hand (or rather, mind) :finding 
nothing -- and taking Nothing to be what it foundL It is 
the stage where the new second-level insight into the false-
ness o:f the everyday eats away at and dissolves things, 
sentiments and knowledge presented by the remnant of one's 
naive realism as :fast as they arise and actually prevents 
the experience of their true-- rather than their metaphysic-
ally adulterated -- concreteness. Just like naive realism 
and its associated metaphysical elaborations, this stage 
too is a distortion of the actual truth, but a distortion 
in the reverse direction, so to speak. It is a sort of 
self-consciousness on the part of falseness, the stage where 
things-not-being-what-they-used-to-be spoils onets joy and 
innocence with them. In Zen Buddhism this is called the 
phase of when "mountains are no longer mountains". But 
though Nietzsche's experimental philosophy anticipates the 
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most fundamental nihilism, "this does not mean that it must 
hal t at a negation, a No, a will to negation. fl8 The 
insight ma~ures such that the negative is seen i. p the po~i­
tive while the positivity of the positive is by all means 
acknowledged without, however, as in the previous naive 
realism and its metaphysical appendices, being exaggerated 
into a positive behin<J the positive, into a reality behin~ 
the concrete one. The solidity of the world in naive real-
ism was actually based on a metaphysical overshooting of the 
actual concreteness. It overlooked the real nature of con-
creteness which is not once more (like) the solidity of 
t h i n g s. Oftly between the two extremes of metaphysically 
hardened solidity and Dihilistically dissolved actuality is 
a genuine supportedness and concreteness to be found which is 
not the fantastical, theoretically exaggerated 'reality' of 
the first "mountains are mountains" stage. By the same token 
the nihilistic denial of value measures the concrete nature 
of preciousness with its former metaphysically inflated stan-
dard -- and naturally finds it lacking. Nietzsche thought 
that "wenn man den Wert falsch angesetzt hat, so erscheint, 
bei der Einsicht in diese Falschheit, die Welt e n;t ;.. 
lY e ~ t et " .• ? "Conclusion: _.Th~ faitn in tJ.:te categor-
ies of reason is the cause of nihilism~· . We have meas-
. _. . . - ... ~ 
ured the value of ~he:world.acGor4il1g.to categ;orles t h'a t 
ref e r t ~ a pure ~y f i c tit i o'u's 
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Vi 0 1" 1 d."lO Nihilism breaks out because fidas aus-
geloschte J ensei ts schickt dem scblecht Entzauberten ein-
zig Kal te heriiber; es verstarkt seinen Abstand vom Fealen, 
" ... das Leben, das Handeln total entwertend."ll 
The only one, according to Nietzsche, who steers clear 
of this wicked dilemma, of both the ill everyday -- the 
world of 'positive' thir~ing and the fat,al nihilist re-
action, is the overman. The purpose of scepsis and of 
',,~nticipating experimentally the most fundamental nihilism' 
is not, as with Descartes and others, the location of rea-
sonable beliefs or rockbottom cert(;linties nNot doubt, 
eel" t a i n t y J2 is lWhat drives one insane If -- but is 
to make the overman n e c e s s a I' y: for man, the sick 
animal, the embodiment of revenge and BeBdacity 1ntheir '\ 
manifold subtle and respected expressions, is flnot free to 
have any conscience at all for questions of 'true' and 'un-
true': to have integrity at t his point \'Vould at once 
destroy him. n1) The fldecadents nee d the lie -- it is one 
of their conditions of preservation .. n.L4 It is not possible 
Uta 'n a t u I' ali z e' humanity in terms of a pure, newly 
discovered, nel';ly redeemed naturen1.5, to fftranslate man back 
into naturel1l6 simply by means of believing certain propo-
sitions about nature; "man reaches nature only Cifter a long 
strue;gle -- ." .. daring to be immoral like nature .. ,,1 7 Re-
venge was to be overcome through 'something higher than any 
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reconciliation', through an overcoming of the basic duality 
itself between 'myself' and world/tlme. But the duality 
consisted in maintaining two concepts of being ('myself' and 
'world'!' time') such that some properties and actions were 
attributed to one while denied to the other, and vice versa. 
This precluded even a "temporary identification with the 
principle of life. ,,18 The duality is properly abolished on-
ly when the "mytholo gy ... (which) separates that which 
effects from the effecting ••• (and which always adds) to 
the event a being that is not one with the event but is 
rather fixed, i s, ••• (when) that ••• double error ••• of 
which we are guilty,,19 has come to a stop. In Nietzsche's 
thought and life this error comes to a stop in the concept 
of Dionysus. 
There is a sense in which that which the concept of 
Dionysus grasps, or rather points to, as an ecstatic unity 
is named mundanely and from the point of view of a limited 
situation through the concept of "the will to power". That 
the will to power is not someone's,protects it from being 
(misunderstood as) merely the self-assertion and self-
expansion of a given unit. For instance, both sympathetic 
receptivity, friendship and self-sacrifice immediately make 
sense as manifestations of the will to power if we do not 
. wrongly construe the will to power as one's will to power 
over the other. They make sense as the achievements 
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of more inclusive relations. At the same time, it goes 
Ylfi thout saying that destruction as well as the absence of 
sr~pathetic receptivity, friendship and self-sacrifice also 
make sense as will to power. In other words, "the will to 
power" as little as fI causali tyfl serves to name or explain 
anything but provides rather a schema in terms of which a 
certain type of perception, description, and explanation is 
first possible.. In contradistinction to the schema of "caus-
ali tyfl, the ""Viill to powern does not involve the concept of 
time, at least not that of things-passing-away. Instead, 
ftthe "'rill to power ll provides a manner of framel'lOrk of per-
ception and description strictly within the eternal Now. 
For this reason, as well as because of its non-reference to 
permanent entities, its ultimate indifference with regard to 
good and evil, and its being the true nature of all beings 
and events it is possible to treat the concept of lithe will 
to po'rier" as an attempt to continue speaking at the point 
'i/'{here the I double error' has come to a rest in the ecstatic 
'vision' of Dionysus .. 
Has Nietzsche's scepsis, his morality of truthfulness, 
arrived at the truth of Dionysus, of 'the ~D.ll to power', 
then? Must he not suppose tlthat this also is only interpre-
tation -- and .... (that we) will be eager enough to make 
this objection?U20 If he must -- fl1l'iell, so much the bet-
t'srf121 for this is prHcisely the strange inSight of a 
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completed scepsis: that the most severe truthfulness does 
not lead to the discovery of truths, to any theory. "There 
is something about 'truth', about the sea r c h for tnlth; 
and when.a human being is too human about it -- ••• I bet he 
finds nothing. n22 Instead, scepsis shows us the strange 
'artistic' nature of 'truth' and the power of tlle first word. 
The re~ard of the most severe truthfulness is not any truth 
about anytlling but the spontaneity of apparition-invoking, 
suggestive and appropriate speech which, moreover, can no 
longer be attributed to 'myself' or any other real entity 
because "myself" as well as all other beings and relations 
are first posited in speech, in the 'double error'. nBe-
fore there is 'thought' there must have been 'poesis' ("Be-
vor 'gedacht' wird, muss schon 'gedichtet' worden sein"); the 
c·o ns t r u c t ion of identical cases, of the appear~ 
ance of sameness, is more primitive than the k now 1 e d g e 
of sameness."Z3 This is more radical than Kant for the very 
entities which Kant presupposes ._- 'reason', 'man', etc. --
have in Nietzsche's view themselves the status of fictions, 
so that Kant's entire 'arcrutectonic of reason' is a ques-
tion-begging enterprise: mind (-as such) cannot be modelled 
in terms of (productions-of-, i.e. concepts-of-) mind. 
Thus, at the pinnacle of scepsis speech (language) it-
self enters a phase of nihilism where every possible word 
and construction seem to be hopelessly committed to false 
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realities, corrupt, absurd, pointless at their very inception, 
so that the very impulse to speech is paralyzed* just as 
action is impossible during the nihilistic sttiges of noth-
ingness and valuelessness. More accurately, however, what 
is impossible at this intensity of scepsis is any action 
that first demands to r~ve before itself a pre-given model, 
that will not go forth unless there is precedent -- of value, 
fact or object -- to which it can accommodate i tseli', into 
which it can fit itself. But fa value', fa fact', Ian 
object' is simply a command given by someone else, a com-
mand to y,hich one's consciousness and entire sensi bili ty 
responds -- quite unconsciously -- by molding itself to it 
completely, thus perceiving in terms of the command. This 
eagerness for 6. command ino terms of lI'1'hich it may open to 
and go forth into the worle, this unwillingness to risk a 
projection 'of its oltiln' -- a perfectly unconscious attitude 
is the definition of the 'camel' in Zarathustra!s speech 
on the three metamorphoses. The summit of scepsis, hOVliever, 
re'lreals the hypnotic bondage of speech and destroys the 
camel's naive realism and willing accommodation to more or 
less anonymously floatIng commands: the camel is driven 
into its desert. If In the loneliest desert, however, the 
*' This nihilistic paralysis of speech is acutely described 
by Hugo von Hofmannsthal in his flDer Brief des Lord Chan-
do s" • 
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second metamorphosis occurs: here the spirit becomes a lion 
who would conquer his freedom and be master in his Ofin des-
ert. Here he seeks out his last master: he wants to fight 
him and his last god; for ultimate victory he wants to fight 
with the great dragon. n24 
Thus, action and speech are possible at the summit of 
scepsis only if there is a willingness to command, to go 
forth without a precedent, to mold the-world-before-it-r~s­
any-mold without a model, to invoke apparitions without re-
liance on real entities, that is, to do so without permission 
or desire for approval. But ~hat is in the way of such a 
step from obeying to commanding is 'the great dragon'. "Who 
is the great dragon whom the spirit will no longer call lord 
and god? 'Thou shalt' is the name of the great dragon. . . . 
'Thou shalt' lies in his way and ••• speaks . . . . . 'All 
value has long been created, and ••• there shall be no more 
'I will' .,,25 Therefore, "why is there a need in the spirit 
for the lion? Why is not the beast of burden, which re-
nounces and is reverent, enough? To create new values --
tlllit even the lion cannot do; but the creation of freedom 
for oneself for new creation -- that is within the power of 
the lion. • •• To seize the right for oneself to new values 
("Das Recht sich nehmen zu neuen Wertenfl) -- toot is the 
most terrifying acquisition (nNehmen") for a reverent spirit 
that would bear much.,,26 
155 
In other words, even the summit of scepsis is not 
sufficient to free us from the overpo'fiering attraction of 
the spells of the customarily ongoing world and of the free-
floating hypnotic commands, or from our reverences: a de-
cisive shift from obeying to commanding, from explaining to 
defining, from duty to experiment, from perceiving to seeing, 
from having thoughts to thinking, from burden to play, from 
reverence to love, -- and from time to fate is necessary. 
It is this shift from time to fate in the 'heart' of man 
which first institutes -- intellectually, emotionally, ex-
perimentally -- for him that \l\ihich under the name of fTfatum" 
determines one of Nietzsche's most important vivial concep-
tions and criteria for a life well-lived: Hamor fatinG 
However, at this stage the phenomenon, the task, and the 
sense of "amorY! has not yet become apparent: the amor of 
aIDor fc_ti is the fruit of the last metamorphosis. The 
present shift is the action of what is leonine is us: by 
means of it ilie seize the right for ourselves to new values .. 
Actually, to speak of "seizing the right" does not put the 
matter sharply enough yet: for precisely the concern about 
having or not hdving certain rights before it lvill act is 
the camel's nature. Rather, W!lhat is lion-like in us over-
comes the addiction to justifications altogether. Clearly, 
at this crucial stage it all depends on who or what one i s: 
flat the bottom of us, really f deep down', there is, of course, 
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something unteachable, some granite of spiritual fat u m, 
of predetermined decision and answer to predetermined sel-
ected questions. Whenever a cardinal problem is at stake, 
there speaks an unchangeable 'this is I' .,,27 
What is leonine in us will, as it were, rea d y us 
for creating, commanding and loving and protect us from fall-
ing back under the spell of the customarily ongoing world or 
into a reverence through given doctrines, but by itself it 
does not yet confer the power of speech or of action: in 
the ancient terminology of doer-doing it would be necessary 
to say that it is first the impulse and influence of a div-
inity -- either of a high or of a low rank -- which causes 
the happening of speech or of action. In any case, at this 
stage of scepsis and in this delicate 'moment of truth' 
where one's fate is revealed it makes no sense whatsoever 
to attribute the arising of speech or action to "oneself": 
"oneself" has become the most useless of Viords. 
In'Zarathustra's speech on the three metamorphoses 
Nietzsche avoids the diction of doer-doing and introduces, 
instead, the image of the child: "Why must the preying 
lion still become a child? The child is innocence and for-
getting, a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, 
a first movement, a sacred 'Yes'. For the game of creation 
a sacred 'Yes" is needed: the spirit (c).1st) .ow nIl.s he i II 
own will, and he who had been lost to the world now 
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conquers ("gewinnt") his o Vi n world. ,,28 Although 
the tJord ffspirit" occurs it is clear that no particular being, 
indeed, no entity at all separate from the willing, innocence 
and sacred rYes' itself is intended: that word has far too 
Ii ttle use and emphasis in Nietzsche's writings to justify 
our taking it seriously as a subject and author of the vari-
ous happenings of willing of which Nietzsche speaks. In 
addition to the lack of use and emphasis on "spirit" as a 
subject and/or doer any such construction is also excluded 
by Nietzsche's own critique of that primitive "faith in 
29 grarnmarll • Consequently, "innocence and forgetting, a new 
beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a first movement, 
a sacred 'Yes1ff are simultaneous characteristics or aspects 
of willing-his-own-will as of conquering-his-own-world, 
where "hist! again refers to the willing itself, not to some 
owner or author or underlying being. That is to say, the 
happening of speech or of action at the summit of scepsis, 
in the 'void' or the pristine re"cepti ve clearing or the 
luminous bridal chamber prepared by scepsis, is a happening 
at once of innocence and playfulness and sacred affirmation, 
of undivided power and of attaining what uniquely -- and by 
a sublime right, one is tempted to say, if the happening 
were not altogether beyond 'right' or no 'right' -- belongs 
to that power. That which is 'higher than any reconcilia-
tion' with time and which is, thus, the key to the deliver-
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ance from revenge is the lion's b e com i n g the child, 
and that means: the happening of speech, creation, action 
at the summi t of scep si s. The condition 11 at the su:nmi t of 
scepsisYl protects the happening from being subtly appropria-
ted by, in terms of, and for the sake of some lingering 
schema of entitativeness or purposive distortion (such as 
revenge, for instance). 
When, therefore, the 'double error' -- of separating 
a doer from the doing and pOSiting the doer to exist self-
identically', -- comes to a stop in Nietzsche's thought and 
life ecstatically in the concept of Dionysus (and mundanely 
in "the will to power tl ), this concept must not under any 
circumstances be taken to Signify an explanation of, or a 
naming of something underlying, or a hypothesis concerning 
the cause of, the ongoing world and the happening of will, 
for precisely all the grammatical, logical and other schemata 
presupposed in explanation, naming (of determinate particu-
lars) or hypothetical reasoning have come to a stop at the 
summit of scepsis. Consequently, the 'name' of Dionysus 
happens in an atmosphere free from grammatical implications, 
and therefore also free from grammatical, explanatory, or 
other claims and intentions which would presuppose the in-
tact operation of the normal schemata of thought and exper-
iential organization. Thus, Nietzsche's scepsis has not 
arrived at any truth concerning Dionysus. 
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On the other hand, the concept -- and not only the 
concept but, paradoxically, the intense 'experience' -- of 
Dionysus makes it possible to speak of the living essence 
of the overman without recourse to the notion of 'self' or 
to determinate -- and therefore essentially irrelevant --
particulars of the world. Since "Dionysus" signifies what-
happens -- or what is recognized as happening -- at the 
summit of scepsis, and since this happening does not waste 
itself into an abyss of Nothingness but goes forth to and 
is inseparable from a 'living' luminosity, it is possible 
to obtain a concept of that 'living' luminosity and to assign 
to it a name whose symbolic meaning is just as intimately re-
lated to that of "Dionysus" as what-happens-at-the-summit-of-
scepsis is to the luminous, embrace into which it expends it-
self. This name is "Ariadneff , which literally means "the 
luminous one" or "the shining one". tiThe union in love of 
Dionysus and Ariadne" is, then, a different name for the 
innocent, playful, sacred happening of speech and action at 
the summit of scepsis. Since it is, however, not a real 
name, namely, not an ontological designation, it is sense-
less to bel i eve in Dionysus and Ariadne or to use 
their concept to explain the world. On the other hand, the 
essence of the overman, of the one who has reconvalesced 
into the greet health from the customarily ongoing ill and 
false relationship to the truth of existence, can be 
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characterized as "the eternal love of Dionysus c:md AriadnetT • 
The overman, therefore, carmot be comprehended in terms 
of actions of a self (!lIgh"), for instance as the Kantian 
causali ty of one's free vYill, or as distinguishing himself 
from Dl6.n (fidem Men.§£h.,gn") by his choice of vf;.lues or projects. 
'1'he language of 'values' is decisively fettered to the camel 
stage since it can concei ve of cifferences betJ/reen men and 
actions only in terms of the prescriptions and prec ents 
\''I'hich they follow. Thus it is unable to render intelligible 
the overcoming of man's 'predicament' and. the attainment 
of the grec;L t health both of which make ob solete, or second-
ary, the question of value, namely, the que s t ion: 
'Vrr.l.i:1t shall I do? r. The que3.tion 'What shall I do? I is not 
yet the hi£hest approach to life but is merely the noblest 
action of the camel. Kant's Categorical Imperative is the 
B(lblest burden the camel Cdn take upon itself, the most 
sublime master it can find -- and serve as a shive. A high-
er approach than that c;uestion -:... and than that obeisance --
is the metamorphosis into the child, is "to be oneself the 
eternal joy of becoming fl • This second innocence is a more 
radical freedom than that of ac ting from (Kantian) duty for 
it is an emancipation also from oneself, from the 'I' 
(flI.£hff), and from the craving to acquire (moral) 'IImrth. 
Perhaps this is the reason why Nietzsche never wrote a 
'Transvaluation of all values': values belong to man and 
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do not define overman. And, what is the use of prescribing 
to man when one's task is to bring forth the overman? 
But Dionysus as the active 'principle', as tlmt 
which happens (everywhere) -- once this happening is con-
ceived as needing neither cause, substratum, subject, motive, 
project, nor doer -- is the happening not only of just, beau-
tiful, pleasing, welcome events .but of all things, and 
that includes the worst. Therefore Nietzsche must say: 
"my truth is t err i b 1 elf. 30 If Dionysus is a god he 
is not a god like the Christian one: it is impossible to 
pray to or worship him. It is only possible "to be 0 n e -
s elf the eternal joy of becoming, beyond all terror and 
pity (tTtiber Schrecken und Mitleid hinaus, die ewige Lust des 
lJiJerdens s e I b s t z u . s e in") -- that joy which in-
cluded joy even in destroying. lt )l That 'Which is higher than 
any reconciliation with time, the deliverance from revenge, 
can be attained only by an Ilaffirmation of' passing away and 
des t roy i n g, ... by saying Yes to opposition and war 
. . . along with a radical repudiation of' the concept of 
b e i n g. ,,32 Only he has attained something higher than 
any reconciliation with time, h£s overcome the basic duality 
of myself-and-time/world, who "does not merely comprehend 
'. the word' Dionysian' . -- but comprehends' h i III S elf in 
33 
·;the word 'Dionysian' n. Once the duality is overcome and 
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the identification achieved, flMan no longer needs a Ijust-
ification of ills'; 'justification' is precisely what he 
abhors: .... he now· talces delight in a world disorder without 
God, a world of chance, to whose essence belong the terrtble, 
the ambiguous, the seductive .. fl34 tiEs ist ein Zeichen von 
Wah 1 - und Mac h t g e f ~ h 1 01;) er uberhaupt 
YLosungen' am SchluB braucht lf • 35 The attempts at justifica-
tion are merely postponements of fElcing up to the terrible, 
to the contradiction of all our hopes and investments" 
without reservation or ressentiment: in these atterupts one 
identifies not with spontaneous happening as such but only 
'With reasonable happenings, namely, only with reason, and 
is forced to somehow subsUl:ne the terrible under the reason-
able in order to overcome the duality and one's ill 1'iill 
against the unreasonable. :x:.;ven a temporarily successful 
attempt of justification is therefore bound to live in dread 
of irreconcilable futu.re discoveries.. But such a condi tion-
<11 affirmation and smoldering fear of future refutations is 
revenge itself: an ill will against the raw happenings of 
this world so far as they talce no notice of our preferences. 
BeSides, any attempt at justifications whatsoever implicates 
one in a faith in the ability of thought to express eternal 
features of real being -- a fed th wr-rich, in Nietzsche's 
view, is merely the traditional lack of intellectual in-
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tegri ty in philosophers. He ¥!iho has overcome revenge, how-
ever, lIa spirit who has b e com e f r e e stands amid 
the cosmos YJi th a joyous and trusting fatalism, in the 
f a i t h that only the particular is loathsome, and that 
all is redeemed and affirmed in the whole -- h e doe s 
not neg ate any m 0 r eo Such a faith, however, 
is the highest of all possiblE faiths: I have baptized it 
with the name of D ion y s u s.,,36 
This faith is not a pious inactivity but i s the 
author-less and olimer-less happening of acti vi ty at the 
summit of scepsis after the fundamental shift from obeying 
to playing and commanding, from reverence to love, and from 
time to fate: it is the shift to unconditional affirmation. 
But this affirmation is not an assertion, namely, not of 
anything, not even of 'oneself', even though in the case of 
man this author-less and owner-less activity happens in the 
shape of body and in the form of mind. This organic, quasi-
substantial unity of individual being receives in Nietzsche's 
thinking the name of n 5elfT! (nSeJJ2.§~ff) as distinct from the 
phenomenon of flI f1 (fllchf!). Usually, Nietzsche identifies 
this self with the body ("LeibH), understood not as a phys-
ical occurrence kno1l!able by scientific means but as that 
concrete life which is individually available. The self, 
thi£, body, is the bearer of the great reason (nca"g .s£.2'§'§~ 
Y'§£D1ill:f!Ii) as distinct from the little reason of the I 
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'f.hich operates by principles, i.e .. by conceptual substi-
tutes for the spontaneous wisdom of the body. 'I'herefore 
Nietzsche writes, "this 'return to myself' (I!Biic~!f.§hr_,!;g 
!!LL.rtl)f1, that is, the return from following the id.eal and 
from the morality of selflessness, "meant -- a supreme kind 
of recovery.!! One becomes wise ;;;md attains genuine health 
only by listening to the self. And yet, the unconditional 
affirmation of the faith of Dionysus is not Iii will to self-
preservation. On the contrary, it is precisely onels indi-
vidual nUnter€:angl! v~hich is also affirmed in that faith: on-
ly revenge insists on the ultimate preservation of the in-
dividual. The faith called I Dionysusl is, of course, not a 
denial of the everya.ay protection of oneself, as the entire 
problem of revenge ana. its overcoming is not a matter of 
<ieciding everyday purposes and schedules but of first and 
last questions, of both the ground and the blood and the 
sn.y of one's everyday existence. It is the r e that 
one has abandoned all consolation o'nd mendacious wishfulness 
in favor of 'being oneself the eternal joy of becoming'. 
Because this truth, as distinct from the traditional 
fairy tales, is terrible in that its joy must incorporate 
l1.holeheartedly the very nego' tion of oneself, of all hopes 
and investments, "any 'Epicurean delight' is out of the 
c;uestion" for it has not yet seen to the bottom of the matter 
and is altogether too indulgent in both its assumption of 
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and its servitude to 'self': "Only Dionysian joy is suffi-
cient".37 By virtue of its unconditional affirmation Diony-
sian joy is an u n sup p 0 r ted joy: an ecstatic 
consciousness-- and more than consciousness: joy is a 
blessed luminosity dancingly embodied -- not dependent on 
any putative beings. The overman is thus "allem Abschied 
voran,,38 and has his home, or rather his dwelling, in the 
"reinen Bezugrt39 sooner than in personal identity, national 
loyalties, economic imperatives or culture: for they assert 
only themselves and repel their own negation, they and their 
successes express not the t rut h of life but only an 
organization, that is, a perspective, of life. The overman, 
like Plato's wise man, is not any "Vl'unschbarkeit" -- nor is 
his concept to be gained through any bouquet of facts and 
values -- but is a possibility which is laid out in the very 
truth of things itself, more accurately, which i s the 
embodiment of the truth of things: the utter repulsion of 
, .' in any fo rm and a joyous union wi th fate. 
The overman's dwelling, "allem Abschied voran ft , in the 
"reinen Bezug" not only does not exclude but necessarily 
involves his participation in the finitudes of life, for 
there must "be that 0 v e r which one dances and dances 
40 
away". Though he !tis nscessarily a sceptic ••• Great 
passion, the ground and power of his existence ••• employs 
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his whole intellect ..... (and) gives him courage even for 
convictions ••• as a mea n s; Great passion uses 
and uses up convictions, it does not succumb to them -- it 
knows itself sovereign. n41 The 'passion', however, is not 
I his' the (any) individual's -- for precisely any senti-
ment and movement that imagines tI' (f!I£h") as its source, 
owner and ultimate justification and reference point has 
been overcome through scepsis and through the deliverance 
from revenge. That f passion', then, is Dionysus himself --
which name explains nothing but permits a way of speaking 
in order to prevent misunderstandings. Still, it i s a 
passion: it is love both of and for fate, ~mQ£-f£!l. As 
the faith baptized with the name of Dionysus this love is 
not a mere contemplative dwelling -- for instance, an flamor 
intellectualis DeiY! a la Spinoza -- but is the love of a 
mistress called flfate n" Fate, as we have said, corresponds 
to the accomplished shift away thanks to l/1ihat is leonine 
in us -- from obeisance, imitation, time, reverence, values 
and facts. It corresponds to unconditional affirmation --
not assertion -- at the sUJnmit of scepsis -- and therefore 
it appears not as beings or values, in the i r time, 
Iq 
but as tfabyss of lightT14'-::' in its t timet, eternity, 
which is a 'time' not of things-passing-away but of inno-
cence and exuberance. 
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More accurately, it is only fate as it corresponds to 
the lion's seizing ths right to new values that can be 
1 0 v e d; there also is a fate, in Nietzsche's view, 
that corresponds to the camel (stage) and which can only be 
b 0 r n e. This fate is called "the eternal recurrence 
of the same": "existence as it is, without meaning or aim, 
yet recurring inevitably without any finale of nothingness. n43 . 
It is, as is necessary since it corresponds to the stage of 
the camel, lithe most extreme form of nihilism: the nothing 
(the 'meaningless'), eternallyl,,44 for when the camel finds 
no meaning prescribed and no task commanded it takes no-mean-
ing and no-task to be its load -- and its honor. Is it mere 
perversity, then, that lets Nietzsche call "the idea of the 
eternal recurrence ••• (t~e) highest formula of affirmation 
that is at all attainable,,?45 It would be if its meaning 
and experience were attainable only in the time of things-
passing-away, and there as a long, eternal lane leading 
backward on which everything that can happen has happen-
ed before,46 an idea which Nietzshe/'Zarathustra t calls his 
"most abysmal thought", one that "would change you as you are 
or perhaps crush you. n47 But the view of time as the passing-
away-of-things belongs to revenge in that it is the express-
ion of the attribution of the will (as well as of experi-
ence, thought, consciousness, etc.) to 'myself'. In other 
words, it corresponds to an identification not with "the 
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eternal joy of becoming" but 'With the pleasures and pains 
and activities of being individual. It is on this individ-
ual existence in time that the idea of eternal recurrence 
exercises "the greatest stress" (t'Schwergewicht'l) : it 
places the greatest load (nSchwergewichttt ) on it, namely, 
on the-camel. But once the camel 'speeds into its desert' 
and there undergoes its metamorphosis into the lion, and 
once the lion seizes 'the right to new values' and makes 
the happening of innocence, playfulness and creation poss-
ible, time as the passing-away-of-beings correlate to the 
camel stage also undergoes a metamorphosis and becomes the 
'time' of innocence and exuberance: eternity. This eterni-
ty, however, bears a different face than did 'the most abys-
mal thought' with its meaBingless, eternal lanes backward 
and forward: for Dionysus it bears the face of Ariadne, flthe 
shining one ff -, "ein so reines, durchleuchtetes, ver-
klart-heiteres Gesicht fl • 48 With her the 'eternal re-
currence' has become a marriage, in vie. of her 'Zara-
thustra' sings: nOh, how should I not lust after eternity 
and after the nuptial ring of rings, the ring of recurrence? 
Never yet have I found the woman from whom I wanted children, 
unless it be this woman whom I love: for I love you, 0 
eternity.n49 It is beholding her that 'Zarathustra' sits 
"jubilating where old gods lie buried, world-blessing, 
-world-loving"; that "the earth is a table for gods and 
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trembles with creative neVi words and gods' throws"; that 
"even the greatest evil is worthy of being used"; that the 
ttcoast hds vQ.nished, (that) now the. last chain has fallen 
from ••• (and) the boundless roars around" him; and that 
'Zarathustra' swims "playfully in the deep light-distances, 
••• the bird wisdom of ••• (his) freedom ••• (speaking) 
thus: 'Behold, there is no above, no belowL ••• SingL 
Speak no moreL Are not all words made for the grave and 
heavy? Are not all words lies to those who are light?,".50 
There are, then, two conceptions of eternal recurrence. 
One corresponds to the individual caught in time, knowing 
himself and his best to pass away, meaninglessly, and to re-
cur eternally, equally meQ.ninglessly. The other corresponds 
to having-overcome-revenge,and being-oneself-the-eternal-
joy-of-becoming: there the question of meaning does not 
arise because that question belongs to the camel stage at 
which one only acts aft era precedent and only in 
obedience to a purpose or a cause', that is, only as the 
effect of Q. cause, and where one ftmust be use d u p.n5l 
The eternal joy of becoming is, therefore, neither meaning-
ful nor meaningless: tr~t distinction applies only once 
a framework of beings, and therewith of time, is posited; 
and, this positing itself is one of the creative delights 
of the eternal joy of becoming. 
Thus, the concept of the eternal recurrence establishes 
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as it were, a watershed: it divides those to whom it presents 
only an eternal lane going backward and forward, a lane on 
which everything that can happen has already happened, from 
those to whom it promises "the nuptial ring of ringsf! with 
that eternity which is an abyss of light. 
In his notebooks Nietzsche wrote many attempts to give 
the idea of the eternal recurr:mce -- in the sense of an 
eternal lane going backward and forward -- a scientific 
foundation from the two premisses of infinite time and fin-
ite quantum of existence. But, following his Olm reasoning 
elsewhere, it should be quite clear that this is an absurd 
attempt: on the one hand, for everything that science ,c.a n 
know happens wit h ina 'cycle' of recurrence, while, 
on the other hand, that which becomes apparent in a rapture 
such as 'Zarathustrats vis-~-vis eternity can hardly find 
its adequate expression in scientific deductions. In any 
case, Nietzsche presented the idea in his published writings 
only as a d 0 c t r i n e , that is, as a teaching. Accor-
ding to Ecce Homo this doctrine is the "fundamental con-
ception" 52 of Thus SQoke Zarathystra • Zarathustra is 
a book of teachings, and rZarathustra r himself is the tea-
char of the eternal recurrence. But 'Zarathustrar also 
proclaims the overman: "I shall show them the rainbow and 
all the steps to the overman_,,53 The trainbow' is ITa rain-
bow after long storms t1 , It the bridge to the highest hope": 54 
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the deliverance from revenge. The doctrine of the eternal 
recurrence is "the great disciplining and breeding idea: 
the races that carnot bear it stand condemned; those who find 
it the greatest benefit are chosen to rule.,,55 It is "a new 
weapon •• o. to provoke a fearful decisionlt • 56 It is, as "an 
ecstatic nihilism, ••• a mighty pressure and hammer with 
which ••• (the philosopher) br9aks and removes degenerate 
and decaying races to make way for a new order of life, or 
to implant into that which is degenerate and desires to die 
a longing for the end.,,57 It is a cultivating idea for to 
"e n d u r e the idea of the recurrence,,58 one must be 
something more than man ("Mensch") since man -- the meta-
physical and moral animal -- i s that way of being which 
relies on beings and on ~he good-in-itself and which in 
this reliance is bound to revenge and prevented from 'be-
coming himself the eternal joy of becoming' .. 
Thus, the doctrine of the eternal recurrence is itself 
a splendid example of that new way of language which becomes 
possible -- and necessary -- once the faith in beings, and 
therewith the naive appearance of naming has been eradicated. 
Normal thought proceeds with a view to s u c c e s s (for 
its 'truth' is merely the success of certain correspondence 
operations, and of certain productions) whereas Nietzsche's 
thought proceeds with a view to the goo d, more precise-
ly, with a view to the "enhancement" of man.. It cannot 
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proceed with a view to 'truth' in the sense of a fcorrespon-
dence to beings' for the assumption of 'beings' has been sus-
pended by scepsis. Moreover, the assumption of 'beings' be-
longs to the camel stage at which one will not act without a 
precedent -- and what is the 'correspondence of thought to 
beings' but the insistence on a precedent? At the summit of 
scepsis, and once what is leonine in oneself has 'seized the 
right to nev, values', one n first c rea t e s truthY!. 59 
That creation is not arbitrary: it proceeds to layout 
visions and the world such that a higher type of man finds 
himself in them -- and such that they need the higher man. 
But the enhancement of man, in Nietzsche's sense, proceeds 
not according to moral principles or ongoing social projects 
or IlWunschbarkeitenfi but according to the one thing necessary: 
the deliverance from revenge through the destruction of the 
world of Ibeings', 'myself', 'good and evil' and 'time', and 
the identification with the eternal joy of becoming, and ac-
cording to the one direction provided by existence itself, 
a direction not dependent on any 'beings' or particular 
circumstances: towards greater quanta of power. 'Power' 
and 'will to power' can, however, never be referred to Ymy-
self' as a primary reference point or anchoring point for 
action once 'myself' is left behind -- as a support for and 
organizing concept of oneYs way of being -- in the deliver-
ance from revenge.. Since I C"l£hfl) am no eternal entity nor 
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an acting unity or center but only a phenomenon, and since my 
self (nSelbstt1) is not the cause or owner of my action -- which 
conception would commit the 'double error' -- but is the hap-
pening of spontaneity itself in this shape (body) and this 
form (mind), "myself" as a concept can in no way support an 
(mis-)understanding of "the will to power" as necessarily a 
"Will to power for oneself, e.g. over others. On the contrary, 
the consumm~tion of the spontaneity of the will to power hap-
pening in the shape of this body and in the form of this mind 
might take the expression of a ('self'-)sacrifice of this in-
dividual, or of its immediate inclinations. Thus, a genuine 
morality can very well be understood in terms of the will to 
power. 
Speech at this level" then, proceeds, first with a view 
to settling man in the truth of things, and second, with a 
view to bringing about greater quanta of power (\'IIithout an 
owner, subject, author or doer of power), such as, for in-
stance, more inclusive relationships. Clearly, speech here 
takes on a deliberately educational and pol i tic a 1 
character. Moreover, in the absence or 'beings' all concepts 
represent p han tom s rather than beings. Thus, "when 
truth enters into a fight with the lies or millenia, .... The 
concept of politics will have merged entirely with a war of 
spirits; all power structures of the old society will have been 
exploded -- all of them are based on lies ff ,60 that is, serve 
the degradation of man, for, "Ultimately, it is a matter of 
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the end to which one lies_,,6l "Genuine philosophers 
(;finally,) ••• are co~~anders and legislators: they say, 
'thus it shall bet' They first determine the Wither and 
For What of man ••• With a creative hand they reach for the 
future, and all that is and has been becomes a means for 
them, an instrument, a hammer. Their 'knowing' is c r e -
a tin g , their creating is a.; legislation, their will to 
truth is -- w ill top 0 W e r.,,62 
We have now outlined Nietzsche's concept of the overman 
the man who i s the cure from the sickliness and small-
ness of the customarily ongoing world. But the picture is a 
strange one and we certainly do not recognize either our-
selves or any of our traditional ideals in it. In view of 
its strangeness -- even though there is a striking, and 
* probably not at all coincidental, continuity from Plato's 
metaphysics and to rewrite his concepts of 'truth' and 'being' 
and 'good' in a more 'existential' fashion such that they do 
not depend on eternal beings/Being -- we are likely to regis-
ter the idea of the overman as anunsuccessful attempt on the 
part of Nietzsche to escape from and to go one up on the 
Greco-Christian ideals of man. Within a stream of con-
sciousness -- intellectual, emotional, volitional -- involun-
tarily patterned by the Greco-Christian paradigms the idea 
of the overman does not make sen s e: we irresistibly 
* picture of the wise man: it is only necessary to omit his 
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feel, and think, that something essential is left out in 
that picture: either God, or self, or morality, or truth, 
or reality, or any combination of these. 
In order, therefore, to add more weight to the claim 
that the idea of the ovennan does indeed deserve to be taken 
seriously, 1 nit s -- i.e. Nietzsche's -- 0 W n 
t e r m s I shall also layout the essentials of the Budd-
hist concept of the Bodhisattva, that being -- or rather, 
that way of being -- which most purely embodies the cure from 
that illness which the normal everyday is, and which, too, is 
incomprehensible against our own background but at the same 
time shows certain affinities with the overman. 
ttBodhisattva" literally means: "enlightenment-being", 
that is, a being that strives for enlightenment, or a being 
whose essence is enlightenment. The ~hi~~~~ is the 
unique outcome -- according to the Ms~z-~ school -- of 
the Buddhist critique and analysis of existence. Like the 
overman, he is not so much a k now led g e of the 
truth of existence as an e m bod i men t of that truth 
for, in a strict sense, that truth can not be known but 
only lived. But since it is lived consciously and 'deli-
berately', so to speak, that truth can, after all, be said 
to be known in some sense by the ~Q£h!§~~!~. Because it 
can in some sense be known the ~llsa~~X2 is said to be en-
lightened (or striving for enlightenment). However, the 
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sense in ·which he can be said to lcnow the truth of existence 
is not that of a cognitive relationship for the obvious rea-
son that existence cannot become an object for any existing 
being or for itself. The sense in which the ~QQh!~~~1Y§ 
does know the truth of existence is rather a negative one: 
he knows ('it') in the sense that he cannot be fooled by any 
false ideas concerning the nature of existence. But which 
ideas are false, indeed, are necessarily false concerning the 
nature of existence? All ideas which make assertions con-
cerning (putative) beings. But that eliminates all that can 
be said by means of languagel In any case, any cog n i -
t i v e employment of language will, then, necessarily fal-
sify the nature of existence. It is for this reason that the 
~Qgh!~~!!Y~ must be considered, rather, to be an embodiment 
of the truth than a cognitive grasp of it. He embodies the 
truth precisely in that he avoids, on the one ruind, being 
side-tracked into notions of being and taking them to render 
the truth of things, and in that he nevertheless continues, 
on the other hand, to live in the world and among men and to 
speak a s i f he believed in beings. 
With regard to his continued presence among men and in 
the world the £Qgh!.§£:~.!:,Y§;'S 'knowledge', his embodiment of 
the truth, is therefore not negative -- as it is in relation 
to all cognitive claims of thought -- but is positive. It 
is, moreover, eminently positive since his transactions are 
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no longer screened by false concepts of beings and are no 
longer attached to projections of 'good' and 'bad' or distor-
ted by serving as a means to his ambitions, but proceed, in-
stead, in response to things having stepped into the light 
of their true nature. 
At the beginning of chapter III we have defined IlprajnaTf 
as that way of being for which all things step into the light 
of their own nature rather than into the shadow of finite in-
tentions and a preoccupation wi th projects. E!ej!I~ is also 
called uThe Middle ~iayll since it avoids the assertions con-
cerning beings both that they are and that they are not, as 
well as avoiding the clinging to either ~a~§§£e or n!!y§~a& 
It is the (J2Qgh!~§..i!:va's) way of "considering one's stay in 
.§~§:§;£.§ as similar to a stroll in a parkn .. 63 Another way of 
defining it would be: an inwardly luminous, everyvtihere 
open-ended, non-grasping way of being such that the so-being 
of every object is taken into account at the sarne time as its 
non-existence as a being (entity) is clearly realized .. 
is aware of things both in the light that they throw on each 
other and in the light of no-thing-ness. Since ~unz§~~ is 
the Buddhist term for the absence of being in things Q£~jna 
is the ongoing relation to things! distinctiveness in view 
f th ' /- t-o elr sunva a. ---~-",... Thus, Qf§jn§ is the ~Q9hi.§e~!yeis em-
bodiment of the truth of existence .. 
• .rJ_ However, Slnce Q£~Jna, by its nature, does not cognize 
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any truths it is incomplete, in fact, literally impossible, 
without iii 'purpose f inhering in it or one to which it is put. 
Language being the formulation of what is seen it cannot in 
thf~ Bodhisattva's use of it represent the cognition of beings .. 
"'_ Thus, his speech as \vell as his .2.!:§j!1§; require, or must upon 
closer examination exhibit, a further determining element. 
This incompleteness of 2!§jfi~ -- and language -- by itself, 
due to the absence of being in things, exactly corresponds 
to the peculiarity of Nietzschets use of language which 
'first creates truthl and which found its guiding determina-
tion not in some correspondence to beings but in the estab-
lishment of man in truth and in the creation of greater 
quanta of power. However, like the overman the ~Qgh1~~!~Y§ 
cannot base his 'purpose' on any notion involving (the assump-
tion of) beings. His activity must ffive a direction indepen-
ent of beings, without any reliance whatsoever on facts, 
values, or entities. This direction is compassion (!1~~_ 
ka!gn~tI). Just as Nietzsche's orientation tOlWards greater 
• 
quanta of pov~er was not externally added on to the nature 
of things but represented, so he thought, the inherent 
tendency everywhere to be seen in the truth of things once 
ilIe were able to look 'past! our notions of entitativeness, 
causality, time, etc., so compassion, in the Buddhist view, 
is not a principle of action added on to living in the pre-
sence of truth (££gjna) but belongs essentially to it rather 
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than as an external purpose. Compassion is that 'purpose' 
which is inseparable from living in such a way that for it 
all things step into the light of their own nature. Com-
passion, however, has no beings in view: "Although they 
(the Bodh1s~~~v~~) fetch suffering beings out of the three 
places of woe, yet they never have anywhere the notion of a 
being.,,64 Whereas if "Beings are ••• imagined, a self is 
imagined, -- the practice of wisdom (Q£~j5~), the highest 
perfection, is laCking,,65 and, consequently, genuine com-
passion is impossible, giving rise, instead, to the clumsy 
and unsB.tisfactory happenings of pity and (more or less 
naive) egocentricity. 
At the same time, the Bodhi~e}tva's compassionate ac-
tions, proceeding in the l.ight of I!.!:.§:J.na, also parta.ke in 
that absence of reliance on a notion of beings. His action 
is called ffupan!:" -- skilful means. Thus, skilful means, 
like I!.!:§jn~, is impossible without that decisive step out of 
holding the world together by the assumptions of personal 
identity and the existence of beings. 'Personal identity' 
and 'existence of beings' never w ere truths but always 
were means in certain pursuits. Together with the relin-
quishing of these pursuits (as the central definition of 
one's way of being) their associated concepts and ways of 
sensibility (e.g. perception) also come to an end (as the 
basic organization of the dynamic sentience of one's way 
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of being). Since only certain rigid structural features but 
not liveliness as such -- both active and sensible is 
removed t~.ereby the step out of the personal worle. is not a 
step into notrungness but into the inseparable couple of 
l2.1:§:jn.§: and Q.Q~Z§: whose way is compassion.. In the case of 
the overman too the step out of the temporal-personal form 
of existence into 'being oneself the eternal joy of becoming' 
represented the entry into a non-personal realm both of act-
ivity and of sensibility whose movement nowhere could be 
attributed to 'oneself' (as its author or owner) and which 
l<vas, therefore, beginningless and endless. Like thE; overman 
the ~.Q£hi.§a.t.t.Ys retains the concept of f oneself' as an indi-
cative notion representative of no (causal) reality but use-
ful for certain clearly delimited purposes wi thi.n conven-
tional transactions. That is, for both the overman and the 
!iQghi.§!!~j:;Yfl 'oneself' remains Ii type of phenomenon and a 
purposive designation v.- i t h i n and on the 'basis' of, 
rather than determinative of, their 'first and last Y su.pra-
personal movement. The ~Qgh!§§;!l.Y.§;' S ll.Q€!x§;-action which 
does not conform to thE.~ patterns of puta ti ve beings makes it 
that he "appears as if he broke the prohibitions '\I'.-hile de-
lighting in pure living and being apprehensive at committing 
even amino r faul t. ft 66 
Again, like the overma.n the Bodhisattva i s a cure 
from the illness of the normal everyday since thfit illness 
un 
vms mediated through an adherence to the assumption of per-
sonal existence and of the reality of beings both of which 
have come to an end in the £2'sIh!§§:!:!'y§:who orients himself 
by means of 12!.§ina which lets things appear in their truth .. 
Their truth, however, is that no beings appear: §iIDleta .. 
Thus, the Bogh!.§.§:lli.E:, the embodiment of truth, actually 
Ii ves with tVJO r truths I : the' truth' C.§§ll.Y£!!), by means of 
. ~ 
language, in terms of putative beings allowing him to formu-
late his vision vdth respect to given limited purposes, and 
the truth 0 f that first lind ted employment of both lang-
uage and 'the person'. The formulation of the second truth 
(.Q§:!§ID.§£!:h§:) does not serve to convey finite intentions or 
cogni tions about obj ects (mundane or trcmsmundane), but to 
. induce -- like a medicine -- the release from finite inten-
tions and cognitive structures into that luminous, non-
rJ_ 
grasping, open-endedvifaY of being which is called t ll!.§:,~tQ.§:f , 
or rather: 
Thus, for both the overman and the £.Q.9J}!.§!!.tty.§: theory 
and practice have no independent bases but are inevitably 
mutually interdependent, and their common emplo;yment, in 
turn, serves ei ther to enhance or to degrade the "i~ay of being 
in the situation at hand. Their interdependence gets normal-
ly overlooked bee a use they are so intimately inter-
locked and because we normally do not have a different van-
tage point in p I' act ice from which our normal theory 
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our habitual constructions by means of thought and speech 
could be see n in its bias. Consequently, the seeming 
theoreticdl independence of a Descartes, for instance, is 
actually the involuntary ext ens ion of his uncon-
scious theoretical bias --a bias due to his 'morale par 
provision', namely, to a fundamentally unaltered practice 
into new applications. This is especially clear to us today 
with regard to his 'proOfs' of the existence of self and God: 
tus conclusions were simply presupposed in his unconscious 
theoretical bias which, in turn, stemmed from the fundamental 
continuance of 'business as usual' in the 'morale par pro-
vision' • 
Both in Nietzsche's and the Buddhist view the degrading 
tendency of the normally .ongoing theory-practice couple --
a couple untouched even in scientific research, as in the 
case of Descartes -- is due to its ('self-imposed') restric-
tion to and reliance on the conventional, finitely purposive 
'truth' and its lack of redemption into the freedom from both 
finitude and purpose, that freedom which, at the same time, 
positively is the beginninglessly, endlessly ongoing way 
things truly are. Because theory and practice are eternally 
inseparable (there being no independent bases -- beings or 
purposes/values -- for either), while representing distinct 
'principles', their enlightened form and union (and their 
enlightened form i s 'heir complete union in the embodi-
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ment of truth) is symbolized in Y§j!'§:~ll'§; Buddhism as the 
love embrace of YQ~~~ (male, active) and Q£~llg (female, 
receptive). This icon presents a remarkable parallel to 
the love union of Dionysus and Ariadne (nthe luminous one", 
eternity) in Nietzsche's ecstatic conception of the eternal 
recurrence as it is expressed most beautifully in the tt1iO 
chapters "Before Sunrise" and "Beven Seals" of'Zarathustra". 
This enlightened union of theory and practice in the 
lives of the overman and the ~QgJ!!'§.§;.tJ;;.!.swould seem to be 
able to overcome both the ethical and the metaphysical dil-
emma mentioned in chapter I. We had encountered these dil-
emmas ciS soon as we had decided to make the experiment of 
suspecting a fundamental unsoundness permeating both the 
totality of everyday transactions and the moralities and 
ideals grovdng out of this totality with a viev" to 'improv-
ingl it. We recall that the ethical dilemma consisted in 
the problem of finding an attitude for our investigation 
which avoided both taking sides in the ongoing conflicts 
and condemning existence as a whole. The metaphysical dil-
em..ma, on the other hand, was opened up for us by the problem 
of steering clear both of na:ive realism, together with its 
metaphysical off-Shoots, and of nihilism. These tv/a dil-
emmas represent the inevi table difficulties vihich theory and 
practice find themselves beset with when each seeks an inde-
pendent basis for itself in dependence on v/hich it could 
184 
build up, and by reference to ltvhich it coulc justify, all its 
further expressions. The grasping for an independent basis 
is alwaYf> betrayed by its search for the unconditioned, for 
that which has absolute primacy; more accurately, it is be-
trayed by its search for the unconditioned within either 
theory or practice. Even the positivist referral of all 
theory for its verification or falsification to experience 
still assumes that primacy is to be found, if not in any 
theory then at least in experience.. On the assUt'1lption that 
theory or practice must have an anchoring point in some 
element of absolute primacy the two dilemmas are insoluble 
and are bound to generate an oscillation between condemna-
tion, despair, nihilism, and other -isms (e .. g .. troditional 
metaphysical and religious doctrines) .. 
These attachments to some (putclti ve) element of primacy 
are themselves expressions of the ongoing illness since the 
lutter is (the inevitable suffering from) a false relation-
ship to the truth of existence consisting in seizing upon 
some elements of the ongoing existence -- theoretical, 
grammatical, experiential, metaphorical -- and treating them 
as representing eternal features of real being" There in-
evitably is suffering from this relationship, as we have 
said in chapters II and III, since under its spell that 
which appears to us to be our nature is essentially negated 
by the nature of the world as it appears correlatively. 
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Thus, the attempt to resolve the dilemmas by taking a 
stand in some element treated as absolute remains a mere ex-
tension of the ongoing unsoundness. When any elements --
theoretical, grammatical, experiential, metaphorical -- are 
treated as absolute (e.g. as ultimate horizons) and are taken 
to be the basis and the justification of all further moments 
of theory and practice the resulting hierarchy permits both 
perception and expla.nation. Permitting perception and ex-
planation, the character of existence a s a magical per-
formance fades, to be replaced by its emerging character as 
a lawful, rational, and more or less scientifically explain-
able complex event in time (somewhat in the sense of Kant's 
"transcendental illusionlt ). In chapter III we have likened 
this latter way of experiencing the magic act of existence 
to being deceived by an itinerant magician whose performance 
persuades one to take it seriously in terms of its own claims 
about itself. 
The great, all-pervasive unsoundness of the ongoing 
everyday is, then, exactly correlative to the apparitional 
character of existence as (more or less) rational, namely, 
correlative to its character appearing to be such that at 
least in some of one's knowings one believes to have grasped 
hola of an ultimate truth of existence. Unsoundness as de-
fined in this way char~cterizes both the normal everyday and 
the madman, and the latter to a greater degree than the 
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former, -- which is precisely the reason why the madman is 
more deranged than the ci ti zen of the normal everyday. 
Both the Buddhists and Nietzsche agree in their view 
that the ·rational character of the world does not belong to 
its essence. They seem to be able to extricate themselves 
from the ethical and. the metaphysical dilemma by virtue of 
avoiding all final taking of position, either theoretically 
or practically, thanks to their completed scepsis, and by 
not letting either theory or practice settle into an indepen-
dent basis of its own: the Buddhist by walking the Middle 
Way, and Nietzsche by dancing in Dionysian joy. In their 
embodiment of the truth theory and practice interdepend 
mutually and serve, in turn, both to establish men in the 
truth and to enhance the situation at hand. In other -words, 
the (comprehendingly lived) difference between truth and 
fact (i.e. cognitively grasped 'trutht) solves the meta-
physical dilemma, while the (comprehendingly lived) diff-
erence between the ~pftpi~2!1Y~s' compassion (me~a£Ulla) and 
the overman's creative delight, on the one hand, and the 
pleasures and emotions of the everyday, on the other hand, 
solves the etlrlcal dilemma. These crucial differences which 
provide the clue for the resolution of our two dilemmas are 
clearly not 0 n t 0 log i c a I differences, just as the 
Buddhist does not admit an ontological difference between 
samsara and nirvana and Nietzsche refuses any two-world theory. 
. . 
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The differences correspond ro.ther to those between a magic 
show falsely and truly taken. By the same token, the mater-
ialiastic world cannot be redeemed by the add i t ion to 
it of spirit, eternity, truth, values, Being or God: nothing 
is m iss i n g, for to speak of a 1 a c k is to maintain 
the everyday in its own claims while locating its inadequacy 
outside of it and in terms of its own (mis-)understandings. 
It is more accurate, instead, to view the ongoing everyday 
itself as false or -- going beyond a merely theoretical cri-
ticism -- as ill. The profane world does not a 1 S 0 need 
a sacred world or element, but 'the profane' as a whole needs 
to be redeemed or rather, cured -- less into sacredness 
than into that health which has abandoned the distinction 
between sacred and profane. 
We have seen in chapters II and III that the great health 
coincides with the abandonment of the standpoint that the per-
son is real: for the Buddhist, _because the afflictions are 
rooted in the belief in the permanent self; and for Nietzsche, 
because time as things-passing-away, and consequently revenge, 
stem from ascribing the will to myself. The character of the 
world as a rational whole collapses once the view that the 
person is real no longer holds the world together. Through 
the dissipating fog of r&.tional (as well as mythical) con-
structions the magical character of-the world re~ppears for 
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an exuberant innocence. The 'predicament' never was one in 
tITIth but only in fact -- correlative to the world appear-
ing as beings, facts and values.. Then we are able, like 
thg master in Goethe's poem tIThe Sorcerer t s Apprentice!!, 
to bring to a rest the spirits which, once summoned, had 
been unceasingly performing their increasingly injurious 
labor, for instance as technolo~y. The spirits are brought 
to a rest in that they are knovm a s spiri ts and as having 
no basis of their own but as belonging exclusively to a 
certain practice, to certain purposes. 
The life of ill can be likened to a dream, and that 
life1s rewards and medicines as continuc.tions of the dream, 
while health is the 'Wciking up from the dream -- t 0 the 
dre&m.. Then I find thfJ.t Uamong all these dreamers, I, too, 
1.'.ho 'kno"¥r', am dancing my dance; (but) that the knower 
belongs to the masters of ceremony of existencefl~67 
.. . .. 
Thus it can be Said that the great health coincides 
with living in such a way that the world appears a s a 
magic performance. In that presuppositionless delight 
free from finitude the metaphysical and the moral quest of 
man can be redeemed. 
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